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Abstract
The past decade changed how we perceive the risks connected with the composition of bank’s
assets and their quality. This thesis provides insights into two topics that gained prominence
during this period, namely the sovereign debt and non-performing loans.
The second chapter investigates the role of country characteristics as the determinants of
banks’ sovereign debt exposures. It finds that banks’ sovereign debt exposures are related to
the quality of political institutions, monetary policy framework, ownership structure of banking
sector, regulatory and supervisory environment; even after controlling for differences in wealth
across countries. The banks overexposed to the sovereign risk are found to increase the cost
of banking crisis, create a potential bank-sovereign nexus and contract credit supply during
recessions.
The third chapter presents stylised facts about the episodes of high non-performing loans
(NPLs) and policies deployed to reduce NPLs. It provides insights on the effectiveness of differ-
ent policy packages dealing with NPLs at a country-level and uses an event study methodology
to evaluate the impact of reducing the bad debt burden on subsequent economic performance.
We provide evidence that a combination of the establishment of asset management companies
(AMCs) and government bailout of ailing banks is the most effective approach to resolving an
average NPL crisis. Once a sharp reduction in NPL ratios occurs, economic growth improves by
more than 1.5 percentage points a year over several years. This is reflected in higher investment
and consumption growth and lower unemployment rate.
The fourth chapter investigates the question of cross-border spillovers from reducing non-
performing loans. The global banking system is a complex network of foreign subsidiaries
that facilitates spillover of risks. We exploit this multinational dimension to investigate the
importance of credit risk transmission. Firstly, we show that changes in the NPL stock of
a parent bank affect the non-performing exposures of its foreign subsidiary banks. Secondly,
as a result of this transmission, policies aimed at reducing NPLs can have detectable cross-
border effects. We find that in particular the establishment of asset management companies
(AMCs) in the jurisdiction of parent bank has a positive effect on the NPLs reduction of the
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The global financial crisis of 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis had not
only major consequences for the global economic performance but also revealed a large gap
in our understanding of financial intermediation. Such extreme events may happen relatively
rarely but allow the academic community to re-evaluate the underlying fundamental theories
and raise a number of important research questions. This thesis addresses two topics that
gained more prominence in the aftermath of the aforementioned crises.
Firstly, this thesis explores the topic of interconnectedness between banking and sovereign
risk. Some observers have suggested that the Eurozone debt crisis has been particularly severe
and difficult to resolve because of the institutional characteristics of the monetary union. In-
deed, this thesis provides evidence that the strength of political and economic institutions may
nudge banks to increase their exposure to sovereign debt and in turn affect aggregate credit
conditions.
Secondly, over a decade since the two major global crises, balance sheets of banks in many
advanced economies and emerging markets remain clogged by non-performing loans, often also
referred to as toxic, bad or impaired. The persistence of bad loans has brought it to the forefront
of the political debate, with countries around the world implementing various policy packages.
Despite the importance of non-performing loans and the potential costs to the taxpayers of
addressing this problem, there remains a large literature gap that this thesis aims to address.
This thesis is a collection of three essays on the two aforementioned topics, which gained
importance in the past decade. Importantly, this work takes a global perspective on the issue
of bank’s sovereign bondholdings and non-performing loans in contrast to a vast majority
of related literature. Due to the importance of Eurozone in the global economy and data
availability, most studies exploring the topic of bank’s exposures to sovereign risk focus on the
1
Chapter 1: Introduction
countries that were the most affected, during the 2010-2012 episode, such as Greece, Spain or
Italy. Similarly, prior research on non-performing loan exposures typically explores particular
events of sudden increases in toxic assets in case study settings. As the three chapters of this
thesis demonstrate, the experience of European countries in the past ten years is by no means
unique from a global perspective and there are important lessons to be learned from taking a
more holistic view of these two issues in banking regulation.
The first essay investigates the role of country characteristics as the determinants of banks’
sovereign debt exposures. It finds that banks’ sovereign debt exposures are related to the
quality of political institutions, the monetary policy framework, the ownership of banking
sector, the regulatory and supervisory environment; even after controlling for differences in
wealth across countries. Excessive bank exposures to the sovereign risk are found to increase
the cost of banking crisis and create a potential bank-sovereign nexus. Furthermore, the chapter
explores more granular data and finds that banks with large sovereign bondholdings contract
credit supply more during recessions, thus also further exacerbating the economic growth.
However, bank supervisory power can to some extend reduce this procyclicality. The chapter
provides insight into the potential effectiveness of various policies to prevent or break the vicious
sovereign-bank feedback loop.
The second essay presents stylised facts about the episodes of high non-performing loans
(which in the remainder of this work will be referred to as NPLs for short) since 1990, in a
large global sample, as well as about policies deployed to reduce NPLs. This chapter takes
a two stage approach: (i) it provides insights on the effectiveness of various policies dealing
with NPLs and (ii) it uses an event study methodology to evaluate the impact of reducing the
bad debt burden on economic performance. It relies on novel dataset combining prior work on
financial sector bailouts, deployment of asset management companies, use of macroprudential
policies with hand-collected data on policy actions. The paper finds that a combination of
the establishment of asset management companies (AMCs) and government bailout of ailing
banks is the most effective approach to resolving an average NPL crisis. The analysis reveals
a complex nature of interactions between sovereign bond holdings and effectiveness of policies
2
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aimed at reducing NPLs, especially in the case of government bailouts of ailing banks. A
typical policy-assisted NPL reduction episode starts with a sudden decline in stock of NPLs
and is followed in the subsequent years with a revival of the credit growth. Once a steep drop in
NPLs occurs, economic growth improves by more than 1.5 percentage points a year over several
years. This is reflected in higher investment and consumption growth and lower unemployment
rate.
The third essay seeks to answer the question of cross-border spillovers from reducing non-
performing loans. The global banking system is a complex network of foreign subsidiaries
that facilitates spillover of risks. We exploit this multinational dimension to investigate the
importance of credit risk transmission. Firstly, this chapter documents how changes in the
NPL stock of a parent bank affects the behaviour of its foreign subsidiary banks and presents
evidence that this transmission is driven by the workings of internal capital markets, application
of consolidated supervision principle and knowledge transfers. Secondly, as a result of this
transmission, policies aimed at reducing NPLs can have detectable cross-border effects. We find
that in particular the establishment of asset management companies (AMCs) in the jurisdiction
of parent bank has a positive effect on the NPLs reduction of the foreign subsidiaries; where the
estimated effect is a 12 percent decline in the stock of non-performing exposures as compared
to control banks. The results are highly relevant for the ongoing debate in the EU on the
establishment of a potential pan-European AMC, suggesting that the returns to such policy
action may be bigger than previously thought - on account of the positive cross-border spillovers.
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 covers the topic of bank’s exposure to
sovereign bondholdings and institutional characteristics, Chapter 3 introduces the topic of
non-performing loans at a macro-level and analyses the economic costs of legacy problem loans
and effectiveness of policies used to address the NPLs. Chapter 4 covers in more detail the
non-performing loan problem from the perspective of individual banks and with a focus on the
interconectedness of global banking networks. Chapter 5 summarises the main results, sets out





of Banks’ Sovereign Debt
Exposure:
The Role of Country Characteristics
Abstract
This paper studies the determinants and consequences of banks’ sovereign debt holdings
in a cross-country setting, including both developed and developing countries. Banks tend
to have large exposures to domestic government debt, which can reinforce the sovereign-bank
nexus. We find that the quality of political institutions, monetary policy framework, ownership
structure of the banking sector, regulatory and supervisory environment are all related to
banks’ sovereign debt exposure, even after controlling for, among other factors, differences in
income across countries. We also find that during recessions banks with larger exposures lend
less. Importantly, bank regulation and supervision are correlated with both sovereign debt
exposure, and the extent to which bank loan growth is slower for banks with large exposures.
Our results inform about the potential effectiveness of various policies to prevent and/or break
the sovereign-bank nexus.
Keywords: government bonds, sovereign-bank nexus, bank lending, bank regulation
JEL codes: F3, G15, G21, G28, H63
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Chapter 2: Sovereign bondholdings and country characteristics
2.1. Introduction
Banks’ domestic sovereign debt exposures have been identified as a significant source of in-
stability during the European sovereign debt crisis1. Such exposures tighten the link between
bank and sovereign solvency by creating large (realized or unrealized) losses for banks when
government default risk increases. Additionally, some observers have suggested that the crisis
has been particularly severe and difficult to resolve in the Euro-zone because of institutional
characteristics of the monetary union. Specifically, political factors, the conduct of monetary
policy, a fragmented banking sector and a lack of adequate bank regulation and supervision
might have made breaking out of the bank-sovereign feedback loop especially difficult.
A less transparent and accountable government might use their power to influence banks
to hold more sovereign debt2. During crises, ineffective governance and political instability
may further defer the resolution of a sovereign-banking crisis, as the experience in Greece
suggests (both domestic political factors and the difficulties to negotiate with other Euro-zone
members). Similarly, the lack of independent monetary policy might have contributed to the
sovereign debt crisis in certain Euro-zone countries, because these countries could not rely on
inflationary/expansionary policies to manage their sovereign debt.
Third, the European banking sector is highly fragmented, consisting of mainly national
banking systems, making it relatively costly for any government to default on their debt, given
the domestic banking sector’s large exposure to government debt. Finally, the lack of effective
and coordinated European bank supervision3, and in particular bank resolution framework,
made it difficult to deal with insolvent banks, which were then unable to sufficiently support
the economy.
In this paper we study the relationship between the banks’ sovereign debt exposures and
country-level institutional characteristics4; and their effect on the cost of banking crises and
1Becker and Ivashina (2018); Popov and Van Horen (2015); Acharya et al. (2016)
2Becker and Ivashina (2018); De Marco (2018); Langfield and Pagano (2015); Horváth et al. (2015);
Ongena et al. (2016)
3Prior to the establishment of the Single Superisory Mechanism in 2014.
4Those institutional characteristics are grouped in four categories: political institutions, monetary
policy and regime, structure of banking sector and supervisory power
6
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bank lending. While there are several papers analysing the causes and consequences of banks’
sovereign debt exposures, most of these papers study European banks during the sovereign debt
crisis. Since there is little variation in many of these key country characteristics within Europe,
one has to rely on a larger sample of countries to study their roles in the sovereign-bank nexus.
Surprisingly, there is little evidence about banks’ sovereign debt exposures in a cross-country
setting including both advanced and emerging markets. In this paper we aim to fill this gap
by studying a large, global sample of banks.
Our main findings are as follows. Using country-level regressions we find that all four groups
of country characteristics are correlated with banking sector’s exposures to sovereign debt. In
particular, using regressions including both emerging and advanced countries, we find that the
quality of political governance, as proxied by the World Governance Index (WGI), is negatively
correlated with banking sector’s government bond holdings after controlling for, among factors,
economic development (measured by GDP per capita). This is consistent with governments
using their power to nudge banks to buying domestic sovereign debt especially when government
accountability and transparency is relatively low. Interestingly, the correlation between WGI
and banking sectors’ bond holdings is positive among emerging countries after controlling for
all the other country characteristics we study, suggesting that a marginal improvement in the
quality of governance might improve governments ability to influence banks’ portfolio decisions.
Among the other country characteristics, capital controls and supervisory power are the
only variables, that robustly predict banks’ bond holdings, after controlling for WGI, across
developing and advanced countries. Banks in countries with capital controls might be more
exposed to sovereign debt (as the regressions suggest), because they are less able to diversify
their investments and choose to hold relatively more safe assets, or because of a potentially
lower availability of alternative high quality securities. In addition, having strong supervisors
in a country might be positively correlated with bond holdings (again, consistent with the
evidence), if governments rely on supervisors to exert their power to cajole banks’ into buying
government debt.
The next set of our results is related to the cost of banking crises. Large sovereign debt
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portfolios, especially if they consist mostly of domestic government debt, create a potential
negative feedback loop between bank and government solvency: The failure of domestic banks
endangers government solvency, because of explicit and implicit bailout guarantees, which in
turn lowers the value of banks’ government bonds, exacerbating the initial problems in the
banking sector. We find only weak support for this channel from regressions of GDP losses
and fiscal costs of banking crises on measures of banks’ (domestic) sovereign debt exposure. In
addition, we do not find robust results for the role of country characteristics in the relationship
between the cost of banking crises and sovereign debt exposure.
The last set of regressions relate bank-level loan growth to bank’s bond holdings, its in-
teractions with country characteristics and variables capturing macroeconomic recessions and
sovereign defaults. Confirming our expectations, we find that bond holdings are negatively
correlated with loan growth in years of a downturn or a sovereign default, consistent with
banks experiencing higher funding costs due to their holdings of government bonds. In addi-
tion, supervisory power dampens this relationship, possibly because strong supervisors curb
bank risk-taking and mitigate the effect of bond holdings on funding costs; while activity re-
strictions and capital constraints reinforce the negative relationship between bond holdings and
loan growth during downturns, possibly by tightening capital constraints and restricting banks’
possibilities to diversify their risks.
Our results have to be interpreted with caution. In particular, we do not exploit exogenous
shocks in bank sovereign debt holdings, and as a result, we cannot confidently claim that all
of our results reflect causal effects, despite our efforts to tackle various endogeneity concerns.
Nonetheless, our results are useful in identifying possible policies that can be used to break
the bank-sovereign nexus. In particular, supervisory power is a robust predictor of exposure,
as well as a factor that influences the relationship between loan growth and bond holdings,
and as such it highlights bank supervisors’ role in mitigating the risks associated with banks’
sovereign debt exposures.
We contribute to a recent literature on the causes and consequences of the home bias in
banks’ government debt portfolios. Several papers test the main theories behind the home bias
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using European data. Some papers5 find evidence for governments actively persuading banks
to buying domestic sovereign debt (moral suasion). Others6 find support for banks voluntarily
exposing themselves to sovereign default risk anticipating that the cost of default would be
borne by bank debt holders and/or (possibly foreign) taxpayers (risk shifting). Becker and
Ivashina (2018); Acharya et al. (2016); Popov and Van Horen (2015) show that banks exposed
to the debt of ailing Euro-zone countries reduced their lending during the European sovereign
debt crisis more. All of these papers, however, use European data. We thus contribute to this
strand of the literature by studying sovereign debt exposure on a sample that includes a much
wider set of countries.
The most closely related papers to ours are Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Gennaioli et al.
(2018). Gennaioli et al. (2014) use country-level data and find evidence for a decline in private
credit to GDP following a government default in countries where banks hold more sovereign
debt on a sample that includes both developed and developing countries. Gennaioli et al. (2018)
find additional evidence of a relatively large decline in lending for banks exposed to government
debt using bank level data, also in a global sample. We add to these papers by systematically
studying the roles of country characteristics as both determinants, and as factors that influence
the effect of bond holdings on bank lending.
We proceed in the next section by summarising the literature on banks’ sovereign debt
holdings. In Section 2.3 we describe how various country characteristics might influence banks’
incentives to hold (domestic) sovereign debt, and how these factors might strengthen or weaken
the relationship between government bond holdings and loan growth during recessions and
sovereign default. In the same section we also describe the data we use. In Section 2.4 we
presents the main results and in Section 2.6 we provide a discussion of the main results and
conclude.
5Becker and Ivashina (2018); De Marco (2018); Langfield and Pagano (2015); Horváth et al. (2015);
Ongena et al. (2016)
6Acharya and Steffen (2015); Acharya et al. (2016); Drechsler et al. (2016); Horváth et al. (2015)
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2.2. Literature Review
Standard portfolio management theory suggests that an investor is best protected against an
idiosyncratic risk by holding a diversified portfolio of assets. Bank managers and risk officers
are responsible for diversifying away the idiosyncratic risk in their equity, loan or derivative
portfolios. Despite of this, it is still very common to hold sovereign debt of only one country,
the one where the bank is located in. The standard finance literature often assumes that
sovereign debt is virtually risk-free and can act as a storage technology while delivering the
”risk free” return. Perhaps the chronic underdiversification of the sovereign debt portfolio can
be attributed to this common simplifying assumption, therefore not requiring diversification
or active risk management on the side of bank managers. This assumption does not allow to
study the effects of the sovereign-bank interconectedness and therefore it is abandoned for the
purpose of this thesis.
There are two sources of incentive distortion - banks and government. This section begins
with detailed theoretical and empirical discussion of the prior research on risk shifting and
moral suasion channels. It then proceeds to explain the theoretical mechanism behind the
negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns and presents the empirical consequences
of large domestic sovereign debt exposures for the macroeconomy and in particular lending
activity.
2.2.1. Risk Shifting
The classical asset substitution problem occurs when managers invest in a high-risk project
that will yield returns for shareholders and transfer the risk to debt holders. Highly-levered
firms are particularly prone to this type of agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is
especially true in financial industry, where banks tend to have high leverage while debt holders
and depositors bear the majority of downside risk. From the perspective of bank equity holders,
risky domestic sovereign debt delivers relatively high return without increasing substantially
the probability of default. Since the original exposures to domestic government are relatively
high, sovereign default would inevitably lead to banks insolvency in any case. Therefore, large
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domestic debt exposure increases loss given sovereign default but not the probability of bank’s
insolvency. It is a voluntary profit-maximising strategy pursued by banks.
Diamond and Rajan (2011) claim that banks may intentionally synchronise their default
with the domestic sovereign to ensure bailout especially if corporate governance is shareholder
friendly (Horváth et al., 2015). There are number of papers that give further empirical support
to the risk shifting theory. Acharya and Steffen (2015) show that European banks in 2007-2012
undertook on a large scale carry trades, by taking long position in risky peripheral sovereign
bonds and shorting safer German bunds, effectively betting on the EU’s economic convergence.
When the spread between the peripheral and the EU core sovereign bonds persisted for longer
than expected, banks realised losses on both legs of the trade. They show that this behaviour
was particularly strong for banks with large risk shifting incentives, ie. banks with high leverage.
Acharya et al. (2016) show that mainly weakly-capitalised banks with low credit ratings
engaged in such behaviour which contributed to the severity of the crisis. Battistini et al. (2013)
show that peripheral banks in response to the rise in the country-idiosyncratic risk increased
their exposures to domestic sovereign debt which is consistent with both risk shifting and moral
suasion theories, thanks to the zero-risk weights.
2.2.2. Moral suasion
In contrast to voluntary asset substitutions, an under-diversified portfolio can be a result of
government political pressure on banks to load on domestic sovereign debt. In return the
government can offer implicit bail-out guarantees, lenient regulation or preferential access to
short-term liquidity funding.
Banks with majority government ownership, ex-politicians appointed as board members or
banks with prior experience of bailout intervention are more likely to increase their sovereign
exposures than other banks (De Marco, 2018; Ongena et al., 2016; Langfield and Pagano, 2015;
Becker and Ivashina, 2018). De Marco and Macchiavelli (2015) find that especially true for the
GIIPS countries because they are more responsive to political nudging. Our contribution is to
find the reason why some countries are more likely to experience moral suasion or risk shifting,
while others are more immune to it at an aggregated level.
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Moral suasion is reported to be particularly strong when government has the need to rollover
large amounts of maturing debt (Ongena et al., 2016). Asonuma et al. (2015) give evidence
that governments may in fact benefit from pursuing such strategy, because it reduces the costs
of borrowing and allows the government to issue more central debt, both in advanced and
emerging countries without significantly increasing service costs. Such myopic behaviour can
cause negative long-term consequences due to unsustainable debt levels and is rarely internalised
due to political cycles. Ongena et al. (2016) also document strategic government targeting of
weaker and government-owned banks in their moral suasion policy.
Both risk shifting and moral suasion are possible because of the zero risk weight attached
to any sovereign bonds, even those with sub-investment rating, regardless of country’s credit
rating. Therefore, banks are allowed to invest in sovereign bonds without the need to put aside
additional capital reserves. If we consider the case when sovereign risk is elevated, the return
on such bonds can prove to be an attractive investment, in comparison with the standard bank
activities such as loan-granting; thus creating regulatory arbitrage opportunity (see for example
discussion of carry-trades during the Eurozone debt crisis by Acharya and Steffen 2015).
Under Basel III regulation banks not only can invest in sovereign bonds without putting
aside capital reserves (thanks to zero-risk weights) but also are actively encouraged to hold
such assets for the purpose of liquidity management. Banks are required to hold sufficient
stock of high quality liquid assets (HQLA) to cover 100% of 30 day total net cash outflows7 to
promote the short-term resilience to funding shocks. Even though Basel III specifies that the
stock of HQLA should be well diversified within different asset classes, the regulation gives a
specific exception for ”sovereign debt of the bank’s home jurisdiction or from the jurisdiction
in which the bank operates, central bank reserves, central bank debt securities, and cash”. This
adds a secondary regulatory arbitrage motive to banks, as sovereign bonds can help to ease
both liquidity and capital requirement constraints8.
An alternative to moral suasion would be if a government pressured banks to increase
lending to domestic small and medium enterprises (SME) and households, however this would
7HQLA requirement was gradually phased in to reach 100% in 2019.
8Details on the HQLA regulation can be found at BIS website http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf
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involve additional RWA capital on part of banks. Gropp et al. (2014) shows that bailout
guarantees in Germany were associated with inefficient allocation of credit and larger risk-
taking incentives of banks, thus it can be particularly hard to disentangle the two channels.
2.2.3. Consequences
The most important real consequence of the sovereign bank nexus is a credit crunch. The higher
the share of domestic bondholdings, the less credit is supplied to the economy. If private credit
markets were frictionless, the sovereign bonds acquired by domestic banks could be financed
by borrowing from foreign creditors. As a result, purchases of government debt by domestic
creditors replace the investment in productive sector and is referred to as the crowding-out
effect (Broner et al., 2013). Becker and Ivashina (2018); De Marco (2018); De Marco and
Macchiavelli (2015); Asonuma et al. (2015); Ongena et al. (2016); Gennaioli et al. (2014) and
Bocola (2016) all report that increased government bond holdings contributed to a crowding-out
effect of corporate lending. Productive firms can try to substitute bank lending with corporate
bonds, however, the condition of credit markets is also likely to be negatively influenced by
the sovereign risk. The literature consensus is that in times of heightened sovereign risk, bank
lending contracts more when bank’s are heavily exposed to sovereign bonds.
Acharya et al. (2016) show that the unbalanced sovereign debt portfolio has broader macroe-
conomic consequences as it negatively affects also investment spending, job creation and sales
growth of firms affiliated with home-biased banks mainly through the risk shifting channel.
Since the banking sector is highly connected, and when banks engage in similar behaviour it
can also increase the systemic risk (Langfield and Pagano, 2015). All of those knock-on effects
lead to potentially a long-term deterioration of economic growth prospects and distortions in
capital allocations, especially in countries with limited access to credit markets, for example in
developing countries, or with traditionally high bank dependence, as for example in Europe.
The previously mentioned empirical literature is also supported by Chari et al. (2018), who
propose a theoretical model showing that moral suasion is never optimal from the perspective
of a forward-looking government pursuing commitment strategy, because binding collateral
constraints on banks mean that there will necessarily be crowding-out of lending. Uhlig (2013)
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argues that regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold domestic
risky bonds, while regulators in other ”safe” countries will impose tighter regulation.
This paper is also related to the literature on institutional quality and development. In-
stitutions are important because they shape the incentives of key economic agents and they
help to allocate resources to their most efficient uses. They traditionally determine economic
outcomes such as distribution of income, physical and human capital, etc. (Acemoglu et al.,
2005). Here in particular we are interested in how institutional quality affects the incentives
of bankers to shift risk and incentives of government to financially repress banks. The two de-
termine the transmission of risk in the economy, the probability and severity of financial crisis
as well as lending activity. We can differentiate between political and economic institutions.
Both banks and governments have incentives to engage in home bias, this chapter investigates
whether high institutional quality allows them to act upon those distorted incentives.
Some researcher papers have looked at how selected institutional characteristics affect home
bias but none of them focused on this point from a more systematic perspective. Gennaioli
et al. (2014) examined empirically the importance of creditor rights, Horváth et al. (2015)
investigated the role of shareholders rights, Uhlig (2013) focused on the regulatory power in
a theoretical setting and a few other papers studied the role of the ownership structure of
banking sector and the political connections of bank’s board members. Our contribution to the
literature is to combine this varied literature in a systematic study of economic and political
institutions role for the bank’s sovereign bondholdings choice and credit growth in a global
setting to allow policy evaluation.
2.2.4. Sovereign-bank feedback loop
Home bias distorts the incentives of banks in structuring the socially optimal sovereign bond
portfolio. This overexposure in turn transmits sovereign risk shocks to banks and vice versa. A
negative sovereign risk shock, for example due to unanticipated credit rating cut, is instantly
acknowledged by the active secondary market. The new information is reflected in a lower
price of domestic bonds that are held by home-biased banks. This happens because in an event
of default only part of the bad debt will be recoverable due to the costly state verification
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that is associated with legal and financial fees (Townsend, 1979). The marked-to-market value
of banks’ assets decline leading to the reduction in required capital ratio as depicted by the
schematic representation of nexus in Figure 2.1.
[Insert Figure 2.1]
In order to meet the Basel III capital regulation banks may need to deleverage by cashing
some of the assets in a fire-sale. The additional consequence of deleveraging could be a con-
traction of credit supply. Banks following deleveraging losses will curtail their lending activity
due to precautionary motives, therefore leading to spillover effects to the non-financial sectors.
Since the fire-sales are associated with haircuts it will feed back into lower price of bonds and
higher bond yields. This in turn means that government will find it more expensive to service
the rolled-over debt or in extreme circumstances may not be able to issue new debt at all.
This cycle is repeated and can amplify significantly the initial shocks to either sovereigns or
the banks.
As the vicious cycle continues, the weakening financial position of banks can trigger any
implicit or explicit bail-out costs, hence further undermining the fiscal position of government,
pushing cost of public debt up and potentially forcing cuts in public spending. Gennaioli et al.
(2014) propose a model of costly non-discriminatory government default that causes spillover
effects to the domestic banking sector and show that large exposure to domestic sovereign debt
indeed leads to a credit crunch. This amplification cycle is similar to the financial accelerator
mechanism in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium type of models even though they do
not model the over-exposure phenomenon explicitly (Christiano et al., 2010; Del Negro et al.,
2014; Gilchrist et al., 2014).
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2.3. Hypotheses and data
In this section we discuss our main hypotheses and describe the data we use. We start by
describing the potential roles that political institutions, the monetary policy framework, the
ownership structure of the banking sector and bank regulation and supervision play in banks’
demand for sovereign debt and in influencing the effect of bond holdings on credit growth and
cost of banking crises. We then proceed to describe our measures of banks’ sovereign debt
exposures, and finally, the economic outcome variables, such as credit growth and the output
and fiscal costs of banking crises.
2.3.1. The role of country characteristics
Our starting point is two findings by prior studies: (i) banks tend to hold more (domestic)
sovereign debt in developing and riskier countries (Gennaioli et al., 2014) and in countries
where government ownership of banks is higher (Gennaioli et al. 2018 and De Marco and
Macchiavelli 2015) and (ii) banks’ sovereign debt exposures have a negative impact on bank
lending following a sovereign default (De Marco, 2018; Gennaioli et al., 2014, 2018).
We build our hypotheses around these findings. The first set of our hypotheses thus relates
to whether country characteristics in addition to controls for country risk can explain banks’
sovereign debt holdings at a country-level. The second set of hypotheses is about the rela-
tionship between these country characteristics and the relationship between banks’ sovereign
debt exposure and their lending behaviour during economic slowdowns and the effectiveness of
(banking) crisis resolution. We group the country characteristics in four categories: (i) political
institutions, (ii) monetary policy, (iii) ownership structure of banking sector and (iv) regulation
and supervision.
First, we study the role of political institutions as a determinant of banks’ exposure to
domestic sovereign debt. In countries where the rule of law is stronger, corruption is more
controlled and politicians are more accountable, we would expect that banks are less subject to
political pressure to increase their government debt holding, suggesting a negative relationship
between the quality of political institutions and sovereign debt exposure. It can also be expected
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that countries, whose political institutions are better, resolve crises faster, to the extent that
these countries’ governments operate a more efficient bureaucracy. Alternatively, a strong
system of checks and balances may impede a government’s ability to intervene in a timely
manner, potentially exacerbating the negative effect of banks’ domestic sovereign debt holdings
on the sovereign-bank entanglement. Thus, the effect of political institutions on the impact of
sovereign debt exposure on crisis resolution and bank lending is ex ante ambiguous.
We proxy the quality of political institutions by the World Governance Index, which is
an equally-weighted average of six governance indicators: voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption;
with higher values of the index reflecting more effective, transparent, democratic government.
The World Governance Index is available for the 1996-2014 period, and has a mean of 0.502
and ranges between 0.002 and 0.897 as shown in Table 2.3. World Governance Index data
is obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database.
In the second group of country characteristics we study the role of monetary system. This
is an interesting characteristic for understanding the role of sovereign debt exposures, since
governments can attempt to reduce the nominal value of their liabilities by allowing higher
inflation. In such a situation banks suffer a loss in the value of their sovereign debt holdings,
but simultaneously, the government might be able to recapitalise banks easier by allocating re-
sources from households to the banking sector. We use four variables to capture the features of
the monetary policy framework in a country. The first of these is Central Bank Independence.
An independent central bank may be more reluctant to allow a high level of inflation in order
to finance government expenditure. In this case, and if the government is reluctant to increase
taxes or reduce expenditure, a sovereign debt crisis might be prolonged, and overall costlier to
resolve. Alternatively, a more independent central bank may have more credibility, and might
enable the government to borrow at a lower cost by lowering future expected inflation. In this
case, a higher level of government debt might be sustainable, allowing a larger government debt
exposure by banks without triggering a sovereign-bank crisis. Our proxy, Central Bank Inde-
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pendence (CBI), is from Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) and is constructed using government
reforms to central bank independence for the 1998-2010 period. As Table 2.3 shows CBI has a
mean of 0.522 in our sample and ranges between 0.1 and 0.83.
Next, a country loses its ability to carry out independent monetary policy if it wishes to
maintain a fixed exchange rate regime while allowing international capital flows. Thus its
ability to rely on higher inflation to reduce the real value of government debt is diminished. As
above, this suggests that crisis resolution will be more difficult when banks hold large amounts
of domestic sovereign debt, and the government maintains a fixed exchange rate. In addition,
governments often choose to be indebted in foreign currency, especially when domestic bond
markets are underdeveloped. When a significant amount of this foreign-denominated debt is
owned by domestic banks, giving up the fixed exchange rate regime might not help resolve a
sovereign-bank crisis because the likely depreciation lowers the value of banks’ sovereign debt,
leading to tighter capital constraints and lending conditions. A benevolent and forward-looking
government may thus limit banks’ sovereign debt exposure when the country maintains a fixed
exchange rate regime.
Alternatively, a flexible exchange rate regime might help transmit foreign credit supply
shocks, possibly further tightening already binding financing constraints (Bruno and Shin,
2015; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017). We capture a country’s exchange rate regime with a dummy
variable, Exchange rate flexibility, which is one if a country maintains a flexible exchange regime
based on the classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2017) (see the precise definition of this variable
in Table 2.2). Table 2.3 shows that about 65.5% of our observations are from countries that
maintain flexible exchange rates.
Finally, capital controls also affect domestic banking sectors’ willingness to hold sovereign
debt. If a country has tight capital controls, banks have limited opportunity to internationally
diversify their portfolios and may choose to hold relatively more safe assets, such as government
bonds. This suggests a positive relationship between capital controls and banks’ sovereign debt
exposures, and especially domestic sovereign debt exposure, on account of their reduced ability
to buy foreign assets.
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Additionally, in a crisis capital restrictions may stop capital flight, and may thus mitigate
the negative effects of large domestic sovereign debt exposure. Our measure of capital controls
is an index, Capital Controls, that is an overall measure of restrictions on capital inflows and
outflows. This measure is from Fernández et al. (2016), and is constructed using the IMF’s
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, awarding an additional
point for a restriction on any one asset category, which is then normalised to be between zero
and one. Higher values of Capital Controls thus reflect tighter restrictions on the inflows and
outflows of a broader set of asset categories. Table 2.3 shows that the average value of Capital
Controls is 0.369 in our sample.
The third set of variables captures certain characteristics of the banking sector. The recent
experience during the European sovereign debt crisis suggests that the geographic segmentation
of the European banking sector might have played an important role, since most Euro-zone
countries have predominantly domestic banks. A geographically more diversified banking sector
would possibly have allowed ailing governments to write down some of their debt9 without
imposing large losses on the domestic banking sector, potentially restricting credit growth and
suppressing aggregate demand. Furthermore, foreign banks are likely to be more resistant to
the influence of the government and have weaker incentives to shift the risk of a government
default onto creditors, because they are less likely to fail when the host government fails. Under
these circumstances governments may force domestic banks to hold more domestic government
debt. To capture geographic diversification we use Foreign owned banks, which is the ratio of
the assets of foreign owned banks to the assets of all banks in a country. Table 2.3 shows that
on average 39% of banks’ total assets are foreign owned in our sample.
Government ownership might also be important to explain both banks’ sovereign debt
holdings and lending behaviour during banking/sovereign debt crises, because ownership gives
the government more direct control over the portfolio decisions of the bank. Hence we expect
that higher government ownership is associated with higher sovereign debt exposure due to
moral suasion. During crises government-owned banks may reduce their lending less if they
have a large sovereign debt exposure, because these banks may maintain lending due to political
9assuming a possibility of discriminatory default
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pressure (e.g. Bertay et al. 2015 show that lending by state banks is less cyclical). Our measure
of government ownership comes from the World Bank database, and is defined as the ratio of
the assets of government owned banks relative to the assets of all banks in a country, with a
sample mean of 16.2% (as seen in Table 2.3).
Next, we study whether the extent to which bank deposits are insured matters for the
determinants of sovereign debt exposure and the transmission of sovereign debt shocks through
these exposures. Deposit insurance induces bank’s risk taking (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010),
thus banks may choose to hold more domestic sovereign debt especially when the banking
sector is weakly capitalised and sovereign default risk is high (risk shifting).
We measure the extent of deposit insurance in a country by the maximum deposit insurance
coverage as a fraction of GDP per capita. Data about deposit insurance coverage comes from
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2014). We also winsorised this variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles
to limit the effect of outliers, and standardised by the standard deviation of the thus obtained
data. After these adjustments Deposit Insurance has a sample average of .025 (Table 2.3).
Finally, the last set of country characteristics we study are bank regulation and super-
vision. These factors might directly influence banks’ willingness to hold sovereign debt and
ability to provide loans at times when financing constraints are tight. Powerful supervisors are
expected to be able to persuade banks more easily to buy sovereign debt even if it is a subop-
timal portfolio choice (moral suasion). Similarly, stronger supervisors might curb banks’ risk
taking in traditionally risky assets and encourage investment in relatively less risky and more
liquid assets, such as government bonds. During banking and/or sovereign distress, powerful
supervisors might force banks to provision for losses, and lend more prudently than they would
otherwise do, potentially throttling credit growth. Alternatively, supervisory power might be
used to induce banks to lend more during an economic slowdown especially in countries where
the government has more political influence on the decisions of supervisors.
Next, stringent capital requirements reduce risk-shifting incentives on one hand but also in-
duce banks to hold more sovereign debt, because these assets fetch zero risk weights (Korte and
Steen, forthcoming). Stringent capital requirements may also lead to faster and less costly crisis
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resolution if they force banks to hold more capital, because then banks need less fiscal support
from the government and can return to providing credit faster following a banking/sovereign
crisis. However, stringent capital requirements might also increase procyclicality of lending, by
requiring banks to maintain high capitalisation when capital is scarce.
Finally, activity restrictions may matter because they affect banks’ possibilities to diversify
their income stream and asset portfolio, and because they affect bank competition. On the
one hand regulators might restrict relatively risky activities (such as real estate activities),
potentially inducing banks to substitute less risky government bonds for more risky assets
to achieve their desired risk exposure. On the other hand, activity restrictions may be used
by the government to induce banks to hold more government debt (moral suasion). Activity
restrictions may also alleviate a possible crowding out effect of government bonds during a
banking/sovereign debt crisis if these restrictions lead to relatively little crowding out of loans
to the productive sector of the economy (e.g. SMEs). Data for our regulatory and supervisory
variables are from the 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2011 version of the Bank Regulation and Supervision
Survey carried out by the World Bank (Barth et al., 2001). Each wave takes a snapshot of
the quality of bank regulation and supervision around the world. Supervisory power, Capital
stringency and Activity restrictions are indices constructed from answers given by central banks
and regulators to questions in the surveys. All three variables are standardised to fall between
zero and one, and have sample means of 0.670, 0.567 and 0.633, respectively. The values
between survey collection years are carried forward with the latest available values.
The full set of hypothesis is summarised in table 2.1 while the detailed description together
with the sources is reported in table 2.2.
[Insert Tables 2.1 and 2.2]
2.3.2. Measures of sovereign debt exposure
Most of our hypotheses are related to banks’ domestic sovereign debt exposure and as such, we
would ideally test them on bank level domestic sovereign debt exposure data. Unfortunately,
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such granular data is not available for an international sample of banks that contains developing
countries as well. Even in Europe, the publicly available data on sovereign bondholdings
with the detailed breakdown of issuing country is limited to a sample of significant credit
institutions collected by European Banking Authority in a series of recent stress tests10. Within
the European setting the study of country characteristics is however more complicated, as
European countries tend to have a comparable development level of political institutions, they
share monetary policy, have relatively integrated and homogeneous banking system with a
common Single Supervisory Mechanism. Due to limited variation in our independent country
characteristicsof choice, European sample would not allow us for the identification of coefficients
of interest. Instead, we use two proxies for domestic sovereign debt exposure.
The first, Bond holdings, is bank’s total holdings of any government debt securities relative
to its total assets following Gennaioli et al. (2018) using data from Bankscope, this data cannot
differentiate between domestic and foreign sovereign issuance. Gennaioli et al. (2018) use the
EBA stress test data in Europe to test and show that these cumulative bond holdings are highly
correlated with banks’ domestic sovereign debt holdings, as banks tend to hold predominantly
domestic debt. Given that we do not have access to a more detailed data, we refer the reader
to the robustness tests presented in Gennaioli et al. (2018) paper.
The data is cleaned by removing all observations with total assets below $100.000 and
prior to 1990, because Bankscope’s coverage is poor for earlier years. Observations that are
subsidiaries of consolidated parent banks or those that have multiple reports within a calendar
year are deleted to avoid double counting (Thibaut and Mathias, 2015). The sample includes
bank holdings and holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, savings banks,
real estate and mortgage banks, investment banks and other non-banking credit institutions.
The final sample consists of 168 373 bank-year observations coming from 22 712 individual
financial institutions located in 186 countries and spans the years 1990-2015.
In country-year level regressions we aggregate the bank level Bond holdings variable to a
country-level by taking an average, weighted by banks’ total assets. This yields 3217 country-
year bond holding observations from 186 countries spanning 1990 to 2015. Figure 2.2 shows
10This data is limited to a more recent sample and has a short time dimension
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the evolution of the weighted average of Bond holdings over time separately for advanced and
emerging economies.
[Insert Figure 2.2]
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, banks in advanced countries increased their
bond holdings, as also documented by Asonuma et al. (2015); Battistini et al. (2013); Ongena
et al. (2016), among several other papers. The figure also shows that, except for a short period
at the end of the 1990s, banks in emerging economies continuously held significantly more
government debt. This is consistent with these countries’ governments forcing banks to hold
more government debt to reduce the financing cost of their debt, as well as banks voluntarily
loading on domestic sovereign debt to benefit from risk shifting.
Given the lack of decomposition of our main variable of interest into domestic and foreign
sovereign bondholdings, in the robustness checks we also employ an alternative measure of
domestic sovereign debt exposure. Following Acharya and Steffen (2015) we estimate the
sensitivity of bank stock returns to the returns on domestic government bonds. The more
domestic sovereign bonds a bank holds the higher the sensitivity is expected to be. To calculate
this variable we estimate the following regression:







δkityMACROkjty + εity, (2.1)
where RBijty is the return on the stock of bank i located in country j on day t in year y, R
S
jty
is the return on 10 year benchmark government bond in country j, RMjty is the orthogonalised
equity market return in country j11, and MACROkjty is a collection of macro variables. The
included macro controls are the daily change in implied volatility (∆V STOXX), the yield
curve is defined as the difference between the yield on 10-year benchmark government bonds
and 3-month interbank rate, the level of the 3-month interbank offer rate, the quarterly change
11We orthogonalised market returns to bond returns to account for the tight co-movement of these
variables.
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in real GDP, the quarterly change in inflation (∆CPI), yearly change in the nominal effective
exchange rate, and the Fama-French SMB and HML12.
The estimated βiy coefficients proxy for banks’ domestic sovereign debt exposures
13. As
with the bond holdings variable, in the country-level regressions we aggregate the bank-year
exposure proxies weighted by banks’ total assets and multiply by 100. The average factor
loadings, beta, has a sample mean of -0.689 and ranges between -217 and 194. Furthermore,
the correlation between the factor loadings and sovereign bond holdings is positive at 0.132, and
statistically significant. The coverage of the beta estimates is however limited due to extensive
data requirements.
2.3.3. Crisis variables
We use data collected by Laeven and Valencia (2012) who identify 147 systemic banking crises
globally in the period 1970-2011 for which they estimate associated output loss and fiscal
costs. Output loss is calculated as the cumulative difference between actual GDP path and
the forecasted trend over the 3 year period from the start of banking crisis. Fiscal costs are
calculated by adding up all gross fiscal outlays related to the restructuring of the financial
sector, including bank recapitalisation in a period of banking crisis but excluding government
asset purchases or direct liquidity assistance, therefore they represent a lower boundary of
the actual fiscal outlays. Both are expressed as a fraction of GDP. On average governments
spent 12.4% of GDP on direct intervention in the financial sector during banking crisis and the
cumulative GDP loss over three years is around 30%.
2.3.4. Macro controls
In the portfolio regressions we include additional macro control variables, all of them taken from
the IFS database. Output gap volatility proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty. A higher level
of economic uncertainty may induce banks to hold more sovereign debt to reduce their overall
12For further details of the methodology see Acharya and Steffen (2015).
13In addition to proxying domestic sovereign debt exposure, the factor loadings also include the value
of implicit and explicit bailout guarantees by the government. The interpretation of this proxy is thus
broader than domestic sovereign debt exposures.
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risk exposure. At the same time, countries with more economic uncertainty tend to have weaker
political institutions. Next, we include GDP per capita as a control for economic and financial
development. In more developed countries banks may have better investment opportunities
and hold less government bonds. Next, GDP growth is an additional control for the possibility
that banks in fast growing countries invest less in government bonds to benefit from economic
booms. Finally, we also include consumer price inflation growth (∆CPI) as a crude proxy for
price level uncertainty. In countries where there is a higher level of uncertainty about the price
level banks might be more reluctant to hold long term, fixed rate government securities. In
bank-level loan growth regressions country-year fixed effects control for time-varying country
characteristics.
2.3.5. Loan growth and other bank level variables
In the final part of this paper we turn to a more granular bank-level analysis and study loan
growth during periods of economic downturns. The dependent variable in these regressions is
annual loan growth. Additionally, we control for time-varying bank characteristics, including
the ratio of interests on loans to average gross loans, the fraction of non-performing loans to
total loans (NPL), return on average assets (ROAA), change in total assets, change in deposits
and short-term funding and Tier 1 capital ratio. All bank-level control variables are lagged
by one year to reduce endogeneity concerns. All bank balance sheet data is obtained from
Bankscope.
In these regressions we relate loan growth to bank-level sovereign bond holdings and its
triple interactions with country characteristics (Xt) described above, as well as a recession or
banking crisis dummy (Crisist), as shown in equation 2.2. Recession is a dummy variable that
equals one if in a given country and year GDP declined for two or more consecutive quarters
and zero otherwise. Default is also a dummy variable, taking the value of one if there was a
sovereign default event in a country in a given year according to Standard & Poor’s definition.
The regression controls also for lagged bank level controls (Zi,t−1) and country-level fixed effects
(δjt). Table 2.3 shows that about 28% percent of our observations occurred in recession years.
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∆Loanit = αi + β1BHi,t−1 + β2BHi,t−1 × Crisist + β3BHi,t−1 × Crisist ×Xt+
+β4BHi,t−1 ×Xt + γZi,t−1 + δj, t+ εit
(2.2)
2.4. Results
In this section we present results of three sets of regressions. We first relate country level mea-
sures of banks’ sovereign debt exposure to various country characteristics to find determinants
of bank’s sovereign portfolio choice. Next, we present the results of regressions of measures of
crisis severity on interactions between country characteristics and sovereign debt exposure to
check how the chosen sovereign portfolio affects the cost of banking crisis resolution. Finally,
we present bank-level results of regressions of loan growth on interactions between sovereign
debt exposure, economic slowdown or sovereign default and country characteristics.
2.4.1. Determinants of sovereign bond portfolio choice
Table 2.4 presents the results of regressing sovereign bond holdings (country-level) on various
country characteristics one by one, including a set of control variables for macroeconomic fluc-
tuations and economic uncertainty, as well as year fixed effects. Given that majority of our
institutional characteristics display high persistency across the time dimension, we cannot add
country-level fixed effects as those would not allow for identification of the coefficients of inter-
est14. Instead we try to control for most important country-level characteristics that could be
correlated with both bank’s sovereign bondholding choice and the country institutional char-
acteristic, therefore contributing to omitted variable bias. Those variables include: GDP per
capita to control for relative wealth/development level, GDP growth and output gap measure
to control the local business cycle, measure of inflation to capture potential effect of devaluing
nominal debt amount. In addition the time fixed effects capture global factors that could affect
average bondholdings, such as global uncertainty or oil prices that may drive bank’s demand
14Please note that country-year fixed effects are included in the credit supply regressions as the higher
data granularity allows for such specification.
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for relatively safer assets.
In the baseline model we include our measure of the quality of political institutions, World
Governance Index (WGI). This variable obtains a negative coefficient, which is significant at 1
percent. This is consistent with our hypothesis that banks hold more sovereign debt in countries
where the quality of political institutions is lower, even after controlling for differences in the
relative wealth level.
Next, we add country characteristics proxying the monetary policy, banking structure, and
regulatory environments one by one. We continue to control for various structural charac-
teristics of countries that are not policy variables, such as GDP per capita, GDP growth,
output gap, CPI, including the quality of governance (WGI). In regression (2) Central Bank
Independence obtains a significantly negative coefficient, while the World Governance Index is
estimated to have a negative, insignificant coefficient. These results suggest that governments
might apply their power to force banks into buying domestic sovereign debt through central
banks, or through other institutions, whose political independence might be correlated with
central bank independence, such as government debt management agencies, consistent with
hypothesis.
Next, Capital controls obtains a positive coefficient, significant at 1 percent. This is consis-
tent with out hypotheses that banks in countries with capital controls are less able to diversify
their investments and hold more sovereign debt, either because of a lack of available alterna-
tive high quality securities or to lower the average risk weight of their portfolios. Finally, the
last variable capturing the monetary policy framework of a country, Exchange Rate Flexibility,
obtains a negative, insignificant coefficient.
Next, Foreign-owned banks and Government-owned banks obtain positive and significant
coefficients, while Deposit Insurance Coverage has a negative, insignificant coefficient. This
evidence is consistent with governments influencing banks in which they have ownership to buy
domestic sovereign debt, while foreign ownership might have a positive coefficient if domestic
banks hold a larger share of their assets in government bonds when there is a stronger foreign
bank presence, as these banks are less easily swayed by the government and may enjoy fewer
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benefits from risk shifting relative to domestic banks.
Finally, Supervisory Power and Activity Restrictions obtain positive, statistically significant
coefficients, while Capital Stringency has an insignificant coefficient. This evidence is consistent
with moral suasion, as governments may use supervisors, as well as activity restrictions to force
banks to hold more domestic sovereign debt. The insignificant coefficient on capital stringency
may be caused by the balancing of the trade-off between two effects: (i) reduction in the
risk-shifting incentives and (ii) rebalancing portfolio toward the zero risk weights.
[Insert Table 2.4]
These results suggest that after controlling for economic and political uncertainty, the coun-
try’s monetary policy framework, the ownership structure of its banking sector and the quality
of bank regulation and supervision are relevant for the country’s banking sector’s sovereign
debt exposure.
Next, we investigate whether the results hold for developing and advanced countries alike.
Since emerging countries are less financially developed and experience more economic and po-
litical instability it is conceivable that certain policies may have heterogeneous effects on banks’
incentives to hold sovereign debt. In Table 2.5 we re-estimate the regressions of Table 2.4 on
the sample of advanced countries. WGI continues to yield negative and significant coefficients,
this time even when we control for Central Bank Independence in regression 2. In the same
regression Central Bank Independence continues to have a negative coefficient, albeit an in-
significant one. Capital controls, Foreign owned banks, and Supervisory power have positive
and significant coefficients for the sample of advanced countries, as for the full sample. While
Deposit insurance coverage is estimated to be insignificant on the full sample, when estimated
on the sample of advanced countries it receives a positive and significant coefficient, consistent
with our hypothesis that more generous guarantees are positively correlated with bond holdings
because of risk shifting incentives, but only in advanced countries for which deposit guarantee
scheme is a credible insurance against bank insolvency.
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[Insert Tables 2.5 and 2.6]
Finally, the only variable with significant coefficients obtained using both the full sample
and the sample of advanced countries, but with different signs, is Government-owned banks.
For the full sample we find a positive coefficient (regression 6 in Table 2.4), while in regression
6 in Table 2.5 we find a negative coefficient. This might be because in advanced countries,
governments might be using their influence on banks they own to pursue other goals, such as
providing financing to the private sector as opposed to the public sector.
Next, regressions analogous to regressions in Table 2.4 but for the sample of emerging
countries are presented in Table 2.6. Interestingly, in regression (1) WGI obtains a positive
coefficient, which is significant at 5 percent. Since emerging countries overall have a lower
level of the World Governance Index, a possible explanation is that at already low levels of
the World Governance Index a marginal decrease in the quality of governance diminishes the
government’s ability to force banks to buy more domestic sovereign debt. This result is robust to
adding other country characteristics as control variables, as in all other regressions in Table 2.6
WGI obtains positive coefficients, which are significant in four out of nine regressions. Among
the other country characteristics, Capital controls, Government owned banks and Supervisory
power have significant coefficients, and these are positive, confirming the results obtained for
the full sample (regressions (4), (6) and (8) in Table 2.4).
Overall, Tables 2.4 to 2.6 suggest that capital controls and Supervisory power are robust
determinants of banks’ sovereign debt holdings across the range of advanced and emerging
countries, while political institutions (WGI) have a more heterogeneous effect.
To close this section, we assess the robustness of the results to using an alternative measure
of banks’ domestic sovereign debt exposure - beta factor loading (see section 2.3.2). We estimate
regressions analogous to those in Table 2.4 but replace sovereign bond holdings by Beta and
present the results in Table 2.7. World Governance Index obtains a negative and insignificant
coefficient in regression (1), which does not include other country characteristics other than
the control variables. In all regressions except for regression (2), WGI has robustly negative
coefficients, which are significant in regressions (5), (6) and (7), consistent with regression
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results in Table 2.4.
[Insert Table 2.7]
In regression (2) we add Central Bank Independence, which obtains a negative and signif-
icant coefficient. This confirms the result in Table 2.4, that more central bank independence
is negatively correlated with a banking sector’s sovereign debt holdings and suggests that this
result is driven by domestic debt holdings. In regression (2) WGI obtains a positive coeffi-
cient, suggesting that conditional on central bank independence, the quality of governance is
positively correlated with the interrelatedness of banks and government. In regression 3 the
included country characteristic is Exchange Rate Flexibility, which obtains a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient. This might be explained by banks or the government anticipating that in
a bank/sovereign debt crisis such exposures in a fixed exchange rate regime might inhibit reso-
lution of the crisis, and find it optimal not to hold a large domestic government debt portfolio
under a fixed exchange rate regime.
In regressions (4) to (10) the other included country characteristics obtain coefficients that
are not estimated with sufficient statistical precision. Nonetheless, Capital controls and Super-
visory power obtain positive coefficients, which further corroborates the results in Tables 2.4
to 2.6, suggesting a positive relationship between Capital controls and Supervisory power, and
banks’ (domestic) sovereign debt exposure.
2.4.2. Crisis resolution
In this section we present regressions of output and fiscal costs of banking crises on the sovereign
debt holdings of a country’s banking sector and its interactions with country characteristics.
If the feedback between the solvency of the banking sector and the government is strong, then
we would expect banking crises to be costlier when banks are more exposed to the domestic
government. In addition, we expect that these costs vary with institutional characteristics of
the country, as discussed in section 2.3.1.
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In regressions presented in Table 2.8 the dependent variable is Output loss. In regression
(1) of Panel A we include country level bond holdings, BH (country), lagged by one year to
reduce endogeneity concerns. This variable obtains a negative, insignificant coefficient, contrary
to our expectations. In regressions (2) to (11) we include country characteristics one by one,
also lagged by one year, and their interactions with Bond holdings. None of the estimated
coefficients are significant.
In Panel B of Table 2.8 we replace BH (country) by Beta and estimate analogous regressions
to those in Panel A. In the baseline regression (column 1) Beta obtains a positive coefficient
that is significant at the 10 percent level. Thus a one standard deviation increase in our
measure of bank-sovereign interrelatedness, Beta, is associated with a 12.9 percent GDP loss
(= 33.112 ∗ 0.392), which is about 43% of the mean GDP loss associated with banking crises
(using that the mean GDP loss is 30.143 as shown in Table 2.3).
In regressions (2) to (11) we repeat the exercise of adding country characteristics and in-
teractions of thereof with Beta to the baseline regression one by one, but we do not obtain
significant coefficient estimates. Overall, Table 2.8 provides some evidence of the interrelat-
edness between banks and governments being positively associated with higher output losses
following banking crises, but this relationship does not vary with country characteristics. It is
also possible that our sample size, limited by data availability, is not sufficient to estimate the
coefficients with sufficient precision.
Next, in Table 2.9 we present regressions of the fiscal cost associated with banking crises.
In Panel A we include BH (country) which obtains a positive and insignificant coefficient.
Similarly to the previous tables we proceed by adding lagged country characteristics and their
interactions with BH (country-level). In regression (5) Capital controls are included and this
variable and Bond holdings (country) obtain both positive coefficients, significant at 5 percent,
while their interaction has a negative coefficient that is also significant. This provides some
evidence that capital controls mitigate the fiscal cost of resolving banking crises, potentially
because they help avoid capital flight.
[Insert Tables 2.8 and 2.9]
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Next, Government ownership variable in regression (7) obtains a negative, significant co-
efficient, while its interaction with country level bond holdings is positive and marginally sig-
nificant. This suggests that a more significant government ownership coupled with a large
sovereign bond exposure is associated with a large fiscal cost of resolving banking crisis. This
is perhaps because the government might involve private investors in sharing losses when a
smaller share of the banking sector is owned by the government.
In Panel B of Table 2.9 we re-estimate the regressions of Panel A of Table 2.9, but we use
Beta as a measure of domestic sovereign debt exposure. These regressions yield insignificant
coefficient estimates.
Overall, Table 2.9 provides limited evidence of domestic sovereign debt exposure being
related to more costly banking crises, and some mitigating (exacerbating) role of capital controls
(government ownership).
2.5. Loan growth results
In this section we take a further step to assess the potential effect of banks’ sovereign debt
exposure on the real economy. To that end, we run regressions of bank-level loan growth on
the interaction between a bank’s sovereign debt holdings lagged by one year and a dummy
variable indicating either a macroeconomic slowdown or sovereign default. Consecutively, we
include triple interactions with country characteristics to test whether the identified relationship
varies with country characteristics.
We control for time-varying bank-level characteristics, and add country-year fixed effects.
The latter control for all time-varying characteristics, such as the abundance of growth oppor-
tunities. In addition, country-year fixed effects also control for credit demand at the country




2.5.1. Loan growth during recessions
Our baseline specification is regression (1) in Table 2.10. BH (bank) receives an insignificant
coefficient. Still in regression (1), the interaction of BH (bank) and Recession is negative at
-2.622 and significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, a reduction in lending is relatively large
in recession years especially for those banks that held a large amount sovereign debt on their
balance sheet the year before, consistent with the results presented in Gennaioli et al. (2018).
Next, we add triple interactions of BH (banking), Recession and country characteristics one
by one, and saturate the model by including interactions of BH (bank) and the included country
characteristic. We concentrate on regressions that yield significant coefficients for interactions
involving the Recession dummy, as our focus is on the effect of bond holdings on lending during
times of economic turmoil. In regression (7), including interactions with Government owned
banks, the interaction between Recession and BH (bank) is negative and significant, confirming
the baseline estimate, while the triple interaction is insignificant. In regression (9) Recession ×
BH (bank) has a negative coefficient, while the triple interaction including Supervisory power
has a positive coefficient, both significant at 1 percent. Thus, relatively powerful supervisors
dampen the negative relationship between bond holdings on loan growth: when Supervisory
power equals 0.8357 ( = 65.569/78.459) the estimated loan growth during a recession year does
not vary with bond holdings, while below this value a strong supervisor cannot fully offset the
negative effect excessive sovereign bondholdings have on the credit supply.
This result is consistent with the following narrative. During recessions sovereign default
risk increases, which in turn, is transmitted to the banking sector15. The resulting increase
in bank default risk is especially high for those banks that are highly exposed to government
debt. Relatively high default risk is then reflected in higher funding costs for these banks, which
discourages lending disproportionately (see e.g. Peek and Rosengren, 1997). If the increase in
the likelihood of a bank’s failure is coupled with agency problems, such as classic risk shifting
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), then bank funding costs might increase even further. In this case,
strong supervisors might mitigate the negative effect of domestic bond holdings by curbing
15Several papers show that bank and sovereign CDS spreads move strongly together (Ejsing and
Lemke, 2011; Gerlach et al., 2010; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009).
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banks’ risk taking. In this scenario bank funding costs would increase by less than under
weak supervision, and thus a smaller decline in lending is expected, consistent with estimated
coefficient.
In regressions (10) and (11) the double interaction of Recession × BH (bank) obtains
positive and significant coefficients, while the triple interactions involving Capital stringency
and Activity restrictions have negative and significant coefficients.
These results might reflect that when banks are subject to stringent capital requirements
they have to maintain high capital ratios, even when capital is costly, such as during recessions.
Losses on their sovereign debt portfolios might then force banks to reduce lending, and especially
those banks that are most exposed to sovereign debt. In addition, activity restrictions might
reinforce the negative relationship between bond holdings and loan growth during recessions,
because when banks’ activities are more restricted, their loan portfolio might make up a bigger
share of their assets.
Overall, Table 2.10 suggests that the regulatory and supervisory environments, in which
banks exposed to sovereign debt operate, influence their lending behaviour during recessions,
while we find no evidence of other country characteristics to have such an effect.
[Insert Table 2.10]
2.5.2. Loan growth during during sovereign default
Banks that hold large domestic sovereign debt portfolios might be affected especially after a
domestic sovereign debt default. In Table 2.11 we present regressions analogous to regressions
in Table 2.10, but we replace Recession dummy with Default, a dummy variable indicating that
a sovereign has defaulted in the same year. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate the regression
involving interactions with Central Bank Independence, because of a lack of sufficient variation




In the baseline specification (regression 1) BH (bank) and its interaction with Default
obtain positive and negative coefficients, respectively, suggesting that in years when sovereign
default occurred banks lend less if they had a large government debt exposure. Although these
estimates are insignificant, they are consistent with our priors and the result that in recession
years banks with larger sovereign debt portfolios experience slower loan growth or even credit
crunch (see regression 1 of Table 2.10). These results are further corroborated in regressions 3,
6 and 7, when we include interactions with Exchange rate flexibility, Government owned bank,
and Deposit insurance coverage, respectively. In these regressions Default * BH (bank) obtains
negative, significant coefficients. The triple interactions obtain insignificant estimates in all
regressions. Interestingly, all interactions involving Supervisory power, Capital stringency and
Activity restrictions (in regressions 8 to 10) have the same signs as the corresponding regressions
(9 to 11) in Table 2.10.
[Insert Table 2.11]
2.6. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied banks’ sovereign debt exposures using a large sample of banks
across the globe. Our results highlight the role of country characteristic heterogeneity in banks’
choice of sovereign debt portfolio and how it affects the real economy. In particular, we have
studied four groups of country characteristics: the quality of political institutions, monetary
policy framework, ownership structure of the banking sector, and the quality of bank regulation
and supervision.
We find that each of these characteristics is correlated with banks’ bond holdings choice in
the sample, including both advanced and emerging countries. Splitting the sample by the level
of income reveals differences between these wealth groups. The quality of political institutions
is negatively correlated with bond holdings in advanced countries (as well as in the full sample),
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while in emerging countries this correlation is positive. This is consistent with the narrative that
good institutions and checks on the government might limit governments’ ability to influence
bank portfolio decisions in developed countries, while among countries where the quality of
governance is poor a marginal improvement in governance increases the government’s ability
to persuade banks to buying domestic government debt. These findings are robust to controlling
for several other potential determinants of a banking sector’s demand for government debt.
Next, supervisory power is positively correlated with a banking sector’s holdings of govern-
ment debt, possibly because the government’s influence is channelled through the actions of
supervisors. Interestingly, capital stringency is not correlated with sectoral bond holdings, sug-
gesting that supervisory power matters for banks’ demand for government bonds not because
of their roles in enforcing capital requirements.
The other robust determinant of a banking sector’s bond holdings across developing and
advanced countries is capital controls. More restrictions on the inflow and outflow of capital
into a country are positively correlated with its banking sector’s government debt exposure,
possibly because these constraints limit banks’ ability to diversify internationally and choose to
hold relatively safe assets. While capital controls may increase banks’ sovereign debt exposure,
they seem to limit the damage these exposures create, as the GDP loss and fiscal cost of banking
crises are negatively correlated with an interaction between bond holdings and capital controls,
however our empirical evidence is not statistically significant due to limited sample size.
Finally, our last set of regressions relate a bank’s loan growth to its holdings of government
bonds and its interactions with recession or sovereign default and country characteristics. After
controlling for demand for loans at the country level, we find that a bank that is more exposed
to sovereign debt extends fewer loans in years when the economy enters a recession or the
government defaults. Furthermore, this relationship depends on the regulatory environment.
More powerful supervisors dampen the crowding-out effect, while capital stringency and activity
restrictions reinforce it.
These results inform about the potency of the analysed policies to expose banks to sovereign
debt, and to mitigate the effects of these exposures. For policymakers this offers guidance
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about the policies that might effectively be used to reduce the likelihood of dangerous feedback
loops between banks and governments; as well as about policies that might be used to limit
the negative effects of the feedback loop once it is in force. For researchers, these results are
useful, because they inform about which potential channels are worth pursuing to identify more
rigorously. In particular, the role of supervisors seems to be an area where further research
might fruitfully pin down the mechanisms through which banks’ portfolio decisions and/or
lending behaviour is affected during crises.
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2.7. Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary of hypothesis.
Determinants of BH Cost of crisis Credit supply
WGI - +/-
CBI +/-
Fixed Exchange rate +/- + -
Capital Controls + -
Foreign ownership - - +
Government ownership + + +
Deposit Insurance + +
Supervisory power +/- - -
Capital regulation - - -
Activity restriction + - +
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Table 2.2: Data description and sources
Variable Description Data Source
Country-level variables
BH (country)
Average total government debt securities to total assets in
a country and year weighted by banks’ total assets.
Bankscope
Beta
Average factor loading from regressions of daily domestic
bank stock returns on daily 10-year benchmark government









World Governance Index is an average of 6 world
governance indicators: Voice and Accountability; Political
Stability and Absence of Violence; Government
Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; Control of







Central Bank Transparency and Independence Index,






Overall inflows and outflows capital restrictions index.






Maximum deposit insurance coverage as % of GDP per



















Dummy variable indicating that the borrower’s country has
a flexible exchange rate regime. It takes the value of one if
a country’s exchange rate regime falls in one of the
following categories: pre-announced crawling band that is
wider than or equal to +/-2%; de facto crawling band that
is narrower than or equal to +/-5%; moving band that is
narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both
appreciation and depreciation over time); managed





Index indicating whether the supervisory authorities have
the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct
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Data description and sources (continued)
Variable Description Data Source
Capital
Stringency
Index indicating whether the capital requirement reflects
certain risk elements and deducts certain market value
losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is
determined, higher values indicate more capital






A measure of a bank’s ability to engage in the businesses of
underwriting, insurance, and real estate, and of the
regulatory effectiveness of banks to own shares in
non-financial firms standardised by the standard deviation





Absolute value of the percentage deviation of real GDP







Gross Domestic Product per capita in constant prices













Cumulative sum of the differences between actual and






Component of gross fiscal outlays related to the
restructuring of the financial sector including bank
recapitalisation but excluding asset purchases and direct














Dummy variable equal to one if real GDP has fallen for
two or more consecutive quarters in a given year and





Dummy variable equal to one if there was a sovereign
default event in a country in a given year according to





Data description and sources (continued)
Variable Description Data Source
Interests on
Loans
Interest Income on Loans/Average Gross Loans, lagged by
one year.
Bankscope
NPL Non-Performing Loans/Gross Loans, lagged by one year. Bankscope
ROAA Return on Average Assets, lagged by one year. Bankscope
Asset growth Yearly change in total assets, lagged by one year. Bankscope
Deposit
growth
Yearly change in deposits and short-term funding, lagged
by one year.
Bankscope
Tier 1 Tier 1 Ratio, lagged by one year. Bankscope
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
See Table 2.2 for variable definitions.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Country-level variables
BH (country) 3217 11.141 9.680 0 75.683
Beta 650 -.689 33.112 -217.792 194.321
WGI 2833 .502 .184 .002 .897
Central Bank Independence 821 .522 .238 .1 .83
Exchange Rate Flexibility 12498 .655 .475 0 1
Capital Controls 1900 .369 .340 0 1
Foreign bank ownership 2450 .390 .329 0 1
Government ownership 1997 .162 .222 0 .96
Deposit Insurance 1247 .025 .071 .001 1.013
Supervisory Power 2762 .670 .157 .242 1
Capital Stringency 2633 .567 .237 0 1
Activity Restriction 2660 .633 .177 .25 1
Output Loss 129 30.143 33.607 0 143.4
Fiscal Costs 87 12.351 13.258 0 56.8
Output gap volatility 2110 1.812468 2.656812 .021861 57.68859
GDP per capita 4524 15.03739 18.37006 .2466705 136.1355
GDP growth 2021 3.272199 3.467089 -30.52507 26.3679
CPI 5207 64.98557 38.46331 0 730.04
Bank-level variables
BH (bank) 168373 .104 .686 -.000 195.3
Loan growth 318031 .620 27.724 -798.014 915.863
Recession 350361 .283 .450 0 1
Interests on Loans 182390 8.983 20.192 -21.52 972.5
NPL 252179 3.293 7.502 -4.36 953.85
ROAA 359441 .853 4.990 -540.48 676.15
Asset growth 326086 8.151 26.775 -881.625 954.316
Deposits growth 321034 8.315 36.199 -1132.806 1285.021










Table 2.4: Determinants of banks’ sovereign debt holdings
The dependent variable in all regressions is BH (country), the average government debt security holdings of banks in a country in a given year relative to total
assets, weighted by total assets. The independent variables in Regression 1 are World Governance Index, Output gap volatility, GDP per capita, GDP growth
and CPI. In addition to these variables, regressions 2 to 10 include one country characteristic at a time, denoted by X. X is thus one of the following variables in
each regression: Central Bank Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls, Foreign owned banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance
Coverage, Supervisory Power, Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions. All regressions include year fixed effects.
White’s standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
































X -3.808*** -0.073 4.263*** 1.620* 2.571* -2.011 5.551*** 0.348 5.483***
(1.431) (0.672) (1.163) (0.898) (1.537) (2.224) (1.716) (1.184) (1.823)
World Governance Index -10.987*** -2.341 -10.996*** -8.215** -18.551*** -15.300*** -12.145*** -15.233*** -16.831*** -15.455***
(2.763) (5.211) (2.758) (3.682) (2.789) (2.697) (3.182) (2.744) (2.786) (2.830)
Output gap volatility -0.263 -0.258 -0.265 -0.204 -0.539** 0.163 -0.456 -0.496** -0.453* -0.433*
(0.262) (0.279) (0.262) (0.331) (0.251) (0.278) (0.345) (0.230) (0.237) (0.239)
GDP per capita -0.068*** -0.156*** -0.068*** -0.105*** -0.018 -0.034* -0.093*** -0.028 -0.025 -0.017
(0.022) (0.047) (0.022) (0.038) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
GDP growth -0.122 -0.058 -0.122 -0.264** -0.264** -0.202* -0.140 -0.217** -0.210* -0.206*
(0.103) (0.132) (0.103) (0.130) (0.114) (0.117) (0.130) (0.107) (0.107) (0.105)
CPI -0.058* -0.231*** -0.058* -0.018 -0.145*** -0.070 -0.068 -0.130*** -0.134*** -0.132***
(0.033) (0.049) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.048) (0.057) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
N 995 496 995 794 837 766 623 881 879 879
R2 0.143 0.287 0.143 0.199 0.197 0.169 0.204 0.197 0.188 0.198























Table 2.5: Determinants of banks’ sovereign debt holdings in advanced countries
The dependent variable in all regressions is BH (country), the average government debt security holdings of banks in a country in a given year relative to
total assets, weighted by total assets. The sample includes advanced countries only (high income countries based on World Bank country classification). The
independent variables in Regression 1 are World Governance Index, Output gap volatility, GDP per capita, GDP growth and CPI. In addition to these variables,
regressions 2 to 10 include one country characteristic at a time, denoted by X. X is thus one of the following variables in each regression: Central Bank
Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls, Foreign owned banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory Power,
Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions. All regressions include year fixed effects. White’s standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
































Determinant -1.500 0.315 3.141* 1.884** -6.530*** 17.394*** 5.025*** -1.457 2.267
(1.405) (0.625) (1.786) (0.885) (1.645) (3.288) (1.645) (1.239) (1.641)
World Governance Index -21.949*** -18.619*** -21.924*** -18.444*** -26.916*** -31.228*** -21.905*** -24.982*** -26.655*** -25.245***
(2.900) (4.419) (2.889) (3.354) (2.719) (3.120) (4.096) (2.721) (2.828) (3.055)
Output gap volatility -0.473 -0.523 -0.463 -0.625** -0.328 -0.072 -0.680** -0.246 -0.175 -0.130
(0.293) (0.369) (0.294) (0.311) (0.335) (0.320) (0.301) (0.289) (0.294) (0.294)
GDP per capita -0.009 -0.062 -0.009 -0.031 0.022* 0.026** -0.014 0.014 0.020 0.015
(0.016) (0.038) (0.016) (0.024) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
GDP growth 0.087 0.227 0.084 0.008 -0.023 0.086 0.137 0.024 0.055 0.058
(0.100) (0.139) (0.101) (0.122) (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) (0.105) (0.103) (0.102)
CPI -0.069 0.022 -0.071 -0.042 -0.003 0.071 0.093 0.005 0.004 0.007
(0.049) (0.069) (0.050) (0.055) (0.059) (0.062) (0.067) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055)
N 575 306 575 464 472 449 402 513 512 512
R2 0.172 0.175 0.172 0.169 0.206 0.205 0.169 0.199 0.187 0.187










Table 2.6: Determinants of banks’ sovereign debt holdings in emerging countries
The dependent variable in all regressions is BH (country), the average government debt security holdings of banks in a country in a given year relative to total
assets, weighted by total assets. The sample includes emerging countries only (low and middle income countries based on World Bank country classification).
The independent variables in Regression 1 are World Governance Index, Output gap volatility, GDP per capita, GDP growth and CPI. In addition to these
variables, regressions 2 to 10 include one country characteristic at a time, denoted by X. X is thus one of the following variables in each regression: Central Bank
Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls, Foreign owned banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory Power,
Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions. All regressions include year fixed effects. White’s standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
































Determinant -1.083 -1.210 5.491*** -2.700 8.031*** -3.580 5.792* 1.809 4.252
(3.300) (1.483) (1.535) (2.168) (2.087) (3.054) (3.131) (2.233) (3.203)
World Governance Index 13.820** 13.601 13.793** 15.288** 10.104 15.984** 40.306*** 8.826 6.576 5.187
(6.339) (9.903) (6.310) (7.523) (7.820) (7.141) (8.877) (6.664) (6.924) (6.676)
Output gap volatility -0.478 0.051 -0.521 0.034 -0.812** 0.082 -0.364 -0.860*** -0.797** -0.801**
(0.367) (0.438) (0.370) (0.471) (0.328) (0.372) (0.651) (0.317) (0.327) (0.319)
GDP per capita -0.546*** -0.915*** -0.552*** -0.704*** -0.490*** -0.580*** -0.750*** -0.483*** -0.461*** -0.433***
(0.096) (0.131) (0.098) (0.103) (0.100) (0.104) (0.102) (0.098) (0.101) (0.100)
GDP growth -0.650*** -0.461* -0.667*** -0.770*** -0.847*** -0.796*** -0.636** -0.728*** -0.707*** -0.732***
(0.214) (0.255) (0.213) (0.258) (0.258) (0.279) (0.299) (0.242) (0.244) (0.241)
CPI -0.059 -0.403*** -0.056 -0.006 -0.128** 0.041 -0.028 -0.132** -0.130** -0.134**
(0.051) (0.063) (0.052) (0.056) (0.060) (0.073) (0.084) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
N 420 190 420 330 365 317 221 368 367 367
R2 0.107 0.335 0.109 0.179 0.133 0.155 0.200 0.129 0.124 0.127























Table 2.7: Determinants of banks’ sovereign debt holdings - alternative exposure measure
The dependent variable in all regressions is Beta, the average factor loadings from regressions of daily domestic bank stock returns on daily 10-year benchmark
government bond returns in a given country and year weighted by banks’ total assets. The independent variables in Regression 1 are World Governance Index,
Output gap volatility, GDP per capita, GDP growth and CPI. In addition to these variables, regressions 2 to 10 include one country characteristic at a time,
denoted by X. X is thus one of the following variables in each regression: Central Bank Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls, Foreign
owned banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory Power, Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. See Table 2.2 for variable
definitions. All regressions include year fixed effects. White’s standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent
significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
































Determinant -16.851** 6.292* 5.864 3.755 11.403 -10.379 7.957 -3.647 -0.877
(7.671) (3.250) (8.381) (6.520) (11.034) (12.015) (9.800) (6.232) (9.360)
World Governance Index -28.516 40.932* -24.694 -19.093 -32.759* -35.205* -41.185** -25.925 -29.075 -28.061
(17.951) (21.748) (17.627) (18.406) (18.163) (18.628) (19.925) (19.373) (18.358) (18.072)
Output gap volatility 1.168 2.948 1.571 1.580 0.051 -0.144 2.747 1.062 0.852 1.084
(1.770) (2.225) (1.784) (1.773) (1.691) (1.749) (2.550) (1.751) (1.750) (1.768)
GDP per capita) -0.139 -0.318 -0.181 -0.088 -0.146 -0.170 -0.146 -0.154 -0.133 -0.156
(0.178) (0.242) (0.176) (0.183) (0.175) (0.198) (0.201) (0.184) (0.185) (0.177)
GDP growth 0.164 0.850 0.197 0.345 0.100 -0.468 -0.446 0.098 0.088 0.158
(0.610) (0.880) (0.609) (0.731) (0.622) (0.653) (0.729) (0.614) (0.614) (0.612)
CPI -0.015 -0.541* -0.011 -0.031 -0.125 -0.222 0.035 0.024 -0.034 0.012
(0.188) (0.288) (0.187) (0.210) (0.197) (0.198) (0.255) (0.202) (0.195) (0.195)
N 496 299 496 441 450 427 372 492 490 491
R2 0.063 0.086 0.068 0.072 0.079 0.090 0.071 0.064 0.062 0.062










Table 2.8: Output cost of banking crises
Panel A: The dependent variable in all regressions is Output loss, calculated as the cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real GDP over
the 3-year period from the start of banking crisis. BH (country) is the average government debt security holdings of banks in a country in a given year relative
to total assets, weighted by total assets. Regressions 2 to 11 include one country characteristic at a time, denoted by X, and its interaction with BH (country).
X is thus one of the following variables in each regression: World Governance Index, Central Bank Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls,
Foreign owned banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory Power, Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. See Table 2.2
for variable definitions. BH (country) and all country characteristics are lagged by one year. All regressions include year fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard
errors reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.




































BH (country, -0.492 -0.001 2.148 -2.302 0.535 1.525 -2.465 -0.662 2.212 -3.620 6.179
lagged) (0.589) (3.197) (83.648) (2.206) (2.483) (2.113) (1.975) (3.459) (10.590) (6.395) (14.810)
X (lagged) 0.364 43.611 -4.936 -8.811 153.820 -117.996 0.036 2.117 -7.756 1.982
(12.608) (832.003) (5.963) (25.986) (149.570) (180.036) (0.133) (5.134) (11.879) (10.109)
BH (country) × 0.297 -3.160 0.527 -0.834 -17.004 17.506 -0.005 -0.215 1.020 -0.712
X (lagged) (2.512) (102.041) (0.604) (7.240) (20.776) (37.189) (0.030) (0.962) (1.936) (1.742)
Constant 33.035*** 35.055* 6.743 48.070** 37.584*** 9.885 42.871*** 33.254** 11.105 62.760 13.242
(6.359) (17.910) (681.945) (21.123) (12.544) (16.327) (13.905) (14.369) (55.050) (43.646) (85.681)
N 56 31 18 55 36 24 22 23 26 25 26























Panel B: The dependent variable in all regressions is Output loss, calculated as the cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real GDP over
the 3-year period from the start of banking crisis. Beta is the average factor loadings from regressions of daily domestic bank stock returns on daily 10-year
benchmark government bond returns in a given country and year weighted by banks’ total assets. Regressions 2 to 11 include one country characteristic at
a time, denoted by X, and its interaction with Beta. X is thus one of the following variables in each regression: World Governance Index, Central Bank
Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls, Foreign owned banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory Power,
Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions. Beta and all country characteristics are lagged by one year. All regressions
include year fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.




































Beta (lagged) 0.392* 0.206 1.265 -0.121 0.441 0.275 -0.070 0.639 -1.363 0.538 1.698
(0.220) (0.888) (116.258) (0.431) (0.443) (0.538) (0.209) (0.560) (1.534) (0.890) (1.863)
X (lagged) -11.112 19.036 -0.964 -92.867 43.876 9.597 0.031 -0.906 -1.136 3.856
(12.778) (1612.474) (3.518) (104.237) (54.789) (1378.804) (0.096) (2.259) (2.507) (3.249)
Beta × 0.123 -1.014 0.276 -0.715 -1.788 0.979 -0.003 0.158 -0.056 -0.237
X (lagged) (0.628) (143.504) (0.236) (5.904) (3.367) (31.798) (0.005) (0.143) (0.182) (0.276)
Constant 30.852*** 45.399*** 15.098 30.159*** 40.401*** 20.313** 26.779*** 25.163** 35.107 34.734*** 5.351
(4.167) (14.324) (1305.565) (9.215) (8.006) (8.683) (3.688) (10.895) (24.223) (13.000) (21.936)
N 17 17 14 16 16 14 14 15 15 15 15










Table 2.9: Fiscal cost of banking crises
Panel A: The dependent variable in all regressions is Fiscal cost, calculated as the component of gross fiscal outlays related to the restructuring of the financial
sector including bank recapitalizations but excluding asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the treasury. BH (country) is the average government
debt security holdings of banks in a country in a given year relative to total assets, weighted by total assets. Regressions 2 to 11 include one country characteristic
at a time, denoted by X, and its interaction with BH (country). X is thus one of the following variables in each regression: World Governance Index, Central
Bank Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls, Foreign owned banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory
Power, Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions. BH (country) and all country characteristics are lagged by one year.
All regressions include year fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%,
5% and 1% level respectively.




































BH (country, 0.130 -0.328 -0.0913 0.0156 1.713** 0.686 -1.494 -0.246 -2.195 4.826* 2.646
lagged) (0.241) (1.753) (20.82) (1.145) (0.725) (1.468) (1.520) (3.934) (9.880) (2.781) (7.170)
X (lagged) -1.303 -11.60 0.405 23.67** -21.80 -139.2** -0.0544 -2.007 5.352 0.168
(8.275) (124.5) (2.727) (10.12) (54.46) (68.28) (0.197) (4.438) (4.991) (5.106)
BH (country) × -0.270 3.780 0.0369 -3.462*** 2.084 29.41* 0.00366 0.284 -1.172 -0.199
X (lagged) (1.490) (26.33) (0.335) (1.175) (7.228) (15.63) (0.0332) (0.888) (0.873) (1.031)
Constant 11.56*** 15.74 3.342 10.88 2.871 6.250 14.15 14.16 25.84 -13.51 1.778
(2.819) (10.40) (98.88) (7.684) (4.741) (9.834) (9.216) (23.32) (48.85) (16.13) (33.48)
N 51 31 18 49 38 24 22 23 26 25 26























Panel B: The dependent variable in all regressions is Fiscal cost, calculated as the component of gross fiscal outlays related to the restructuring of the financial
sector including bank recapitalizations but excluding asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the treasury. Beta is the average factor loadings from
regressions of daily domestic bank stock returns on daily 10-year benchmark government bond returns in a given country and year weighted by banks’ total
assets. Regressions 2 to 11 include one country characteristic at a time, denoted by X, and its interaction with Beta. X is thus one of the following variables in
each regression: World Governance Index, Central Bank Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls, Foreign owned banks, Government owned
banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory Power, Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions. Beta and all country
characteristics are lagged by one year. All regressions include year fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, ** and ***
represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.




































Beta (lagged) 0.149 -0.709 -1.394 0.056 0.201 -0.177 -0.040 0.282 -0.512 0.303 0.639
(0.150) (0.603) (154.042) (0.271) (0.339) (0.352) (0.121) (0.324) (0.833) (0.394) (1.438)
X (lagged) 0.987 -12.310 -2.769 -50.024 -10.749 -0.228 -0.018 -0.721 -1.394 -1.530
(6.810) (2129.981) (2.179) (77.109) (26.881) (66.997) (0.047) (1.159) (1.220) (1.273)
Beta × 0.559 1.916 0.058 -0.762 0.682 -0.275 -0.002 0.060 -0.060 -0.090
X (lagged) (0.400) (190.151) (0.139) (5.253) (2.166) (1.958) (0.003) (0.085) (0.087) (0.199)
Constant 7.300*** 6.293 17.244 13.045** 12.156** 5.839 4.391*** 8.942* 12.641 12.116** 17.056**
(2.171) (9.144) (1724.136) (6.456) (5.294) (4.240) (1.589) (4.930) (12.142) (5.786) (7.408)
N 17 17 14 16 16 14 14 15 15 15 15










Table 2.10: Sovereign debt exposure and loan growth during recessions
The dependent variable in all regressions is Loan growth, the annual change in a bank’s loans-to-assets ratio. BH (country) is the average government debt
security holdings of banks in a country in a given year relative to total assets, weighted by total assets. Recession is a dummy variable indicating two or more
quarters of negative GDP growth in a country in a year. Regressions 2 to 11 include one country characteristic at a time, denoted by X, and its interaction
with BH (country). X is thus one of the following variables in each regression: World Governance Index, Central Bank Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility,
Capital Controls, Foreign owned banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory Power, Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction.
All regressions include Interest on Loans, Non-performing loans (NPL), Return on average assets (ROAA), Asset growth, Deposit growth and Tier 1. See
Table 2.2 for variable definitions. All independent variables, except Recession, are lagged by one year. All regressions include bank country-time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the bank level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.







































BHi,t-1 3.375 109.646*** 50.154*** 34.963*** -4.733 -3.502 2.788 7.770* 107.516*** -27.539*** -56.433***
(2.872) (16.460) (15.213) (7.683) (3.830) (3.395) (2.396) (4.211) (18.956) (5.166) (12.477)
X × BHi,t-1 -142.724*** -18.715 -31.897*** 49.710*** 75.724*** 82.646*** -11.242 -120.107*** 42.436*** 89.120***
(22.566) (26.832) (7.851) (17.790) (19.888) (21.434) (8.355) (22.038) (5.145) (16.889)
Recession × BHi,t-1 -2.622* 0.552 -2.698 -7.199 -0.513 -3.387 -2.971** -3.837 -65.569*** 28.782*** 49.482**
(1.408) (25.596) (14.295) (10.598) (3.872) (2.913) (1.343) (4.474) (18.413) (8.255) (23.577)
X × BHi,t-1 -7.908 -1.584 3.909 1.639 1.482 -22.224 1.653 78.459*** -35.149*** -72.323**
× Recession (34.753) (21.930) (10.689) (25.161) (28.855) (27.755) (12.502) (22.197) (11.282) (34.641)























(0.100) (0.097) (0.077) (0.100) (0.097) (0.093) (0.094) (0.080) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096)
NPLt-1 -0.065 -0.074 0.267** -0.071 -0.043 -0.056 -0.071 -0.068 -0.068 -0.056 -0.056
(0.045) (0.047) (0.121) (0.045) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
ROAAt-1 -0.295*** -0.270** -0.112 -0.292*** -0.341*** -0.252** -0.275** -0.332*** -0.245** -0.244** -0.260**
(0.111) (0.111) (0.253) (0.111) (0.122) (0.110) (0.113) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
Asset growtht-1 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.141*** 0.090*** 0.097*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.078*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.088***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.028) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Deposit growtht-1 0.003 0.004 -0.016 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Tier 1t-1 0.297*** 0.288*** 0.565*** 0.294*** 0.288*** 0.301*** 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.294*** 0.299*** 0.301***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.131) (0.065) (0.075) (0.067) (0.072) (0.074) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
N 64590 63068 24399 64590 55977 63279 61707 59280 63722 63602 63652
N.Banks 12608 12438 9710 12608 12331 12452 12214 11682 12508 12497 12502
N.Countries 108 105 55 108 83 99 98 81 102 100 101
R2 0.328 0.327 0.494 0.329 0.342 0.323 0.324 0.310 0.327 0.324 0.323
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes










Table 2.11: Sovereign debt exposure and loan growth following sovereign default
The dependent variable in all regressions is Loan growth, the annual change in a bank’s loans-to-assets ratio. BH (country) is the average government debt
security holdings of banks in a country in a given year relative to total assets, weighted by total assets. Default is a dummy variable indicating a sovereign default
in a country in a given year. Regressions 2 to 11 include one country characteristic at a time, denoted by X, and its interaction with BH (country). X is thus one
of the following variables in each regression: World Governance Index, Central Bank Independence, Exchange Rate Flexibility, Capital Controls, Foreign owned
banks, Government owned banks, Deposit Insurance Coverage, Supervisory Power, Capital Stringency and Activity Restriction. All regressions include Interest
on Loans, Non-performing loans (NPL), Return on average assets (ROAA), Asset growth, Deposit growth and Tier 1. See Table 2.2 for variable definitions. All
independent variables, except Recession, are lagged by one year. All regressions include bank country-time fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the bank
level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
































BH (bank, lagged) 3.287 105.115*** 32.610*** -4.792 -3.465 2.681 6.266* 72.421*** -19.823*** -40.950***
(2.777) (16.979) (7.503) (3.701) (3.206) (2.293) (3.667) (12.727) (4.148) (10.564)
X × BH (bank, -136.867*** -29.648*** 50.020*** 74.021*** 76.547*** -7.921 -79.885*** 32.103*** 66.109***
lagged) (23.236) (7.638) (17.339) (17.864) (21.911) (7.110) (14.932) (3.884) (14.624)
Default × BH (bank, -24.731 -122.783 -48.889*** 46.455 11.691 -41.540*** -48.550** -63.345 116.465 68.319
lagged) (17.742) (287.375) (14.483) (54.962) (50.658) (14.478) (22.842) (174.787) (98.078) (97.047)
X × BH (bank 183.699 61.225 -124.336 -53.599 281.325 97.600 55.745 -177.142 -119.903
lagged) × Default (577.921) (46.009) (83.312) (58.445) (231.955) (126.630) (261.887) (114.826) (110.327)
Interest on Loans -0.018 -0.023 -0.018 -0.025 -0.029 -0.028 -0.049 -0.024 -0.027 -0.026























NPL (lagged) -0.067 -0.075 -0.073 -0.043 -0.056 -0.071 -0.068 -0.069 -0.051 -0.056
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
ROAA (lagged) -0.312*** -0.298*** -0.310*** -0.341*** -0.266** -0.287** -0.345*** -0.249** -0.246** -0.263**
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.122) (0.110) (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110)
Asset growth (lagged) 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.087***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Deposit growth (lagged) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Tier 1 (lagged) 0.294*** 0.285*** 0.291*** 0.288*** 0.301*** 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.295*** 0.302*** 0.302***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.075) (0.067) (0.072) (0.074) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
N 65306 63672 65306 55985 63286 61714 59291 63729 63609 63659
N Banks 12760 12576 12760 12333 12454 12216 11684 12510 12499 12504
N Countries 117 110 117 84 100 99 82 103 101 102
R2 0.327 0.326 0.328 0.342 0.323 0.323 0.311 0.326 0.324 0.323
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Figure 2.1: Sovereign-bank risk loop
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Stylised facts and economic impact
Abstract
Using newly collected data on non-performing loans (NPL) in more than 190 countries
over 27 years as well as policies aimed at dealing with NPLs, this paper presents stylised facts
about episodes of high NPLs and NPL reduction episodes. We find that a combination of
asset management companies and public funds made available for recapitalisation is shown
to be the most effective policy package in terms of resolving NPLs. A typical policy-assisted
NPL reduction episode starts with a sharp drop in the stock of NPLs while in later years
a greater contribution to the decline in NPL ratio comes from revived credit growth. This
profile enables us to focus on specific events - sharp drops in NPL ratios - and their aftermaths,
using cases of persistently high NPLs as a control group. Using matching analysis, we estimate
that reductions in NPLs are associated with extra economic growth in excess of 1.5 percentage
points per annum over several years.
Keywords: non-performing loans, economic growth, banking regulation
JEL Codes: F34, G21, G33, O40
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3.1. Introduction
The global financial crisis brought the problem of non-performing loans (NPLs) into the fore-
front of the policy debate from India to Italy. In contrast with earlier experiences, NPLs
continue clogging balance sheets of banks in many countries almost a decade after the 2008-09
global financial crisis. Both emerging markets and advanced economies have been affected: in
Greece, close to half of loans were non-performing as of 2016, in Italy more than 15 percent.
Yet surprisingly little is known about the ”anatomy”of a typical case of high non-performing
loans and the trajectory of NPL reduction. This contrasts with rich literature on the typical
aftermaths of a financial crisis (see, for instance, Reinhart and Rogoff 2014), a currency crisis
(for instance, Hong and Tornell 2005) or fiscal consolidation episodes (see, for instance, Alesina
et al. 2015).
The evidence on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of various policies in dealing with NPLs
is equally scarce. The policy debate has been largely informed by case studies, including
the United States in the 1980s (the savings and loans crisis) as well as the Nordic countries,
Japan, Mexico, Korea and South-East Asia in the 1990s (see, for instance, Klingebiel 2000;
Calomiris et al. 2004; Macey 1999; Krueger and Tornell 1999; Woo 2000; Fung et al. 2004;
Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). Baudino and Yun (2017) provide a useful recent summary of lessons
learned from various case studies. The debate in Europe has also been strongly influenced by
competition policy considerations and the perceived need to minimise state aid provided to the
banks. While insightful, case studies do not reveal how and whether various policies worked in
an average case where they were attempted.
The evidence on the macroeconomic effects of NPLs has been previously reported but
is primarily qualitative. A loan several months, or years, overdue is a burden for both the
lender and the borrower. For a debtor, a non-performing loan traps valuable collateral and the
unresolved debt makes it more difficult to obtain new funding and make investment (see, for
instance, Bernanke et al. 1999). On the bank side, NPLs tie up capital, contract credit supply,
distort allocation of credit and worsen market confidence (for instance, Kwan and Eisenbeis
1996; Cucinelli 2015; Jorda et al. 2013; Peek and Rosengren 2000, 2005; Caballero et al. 2008).
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Estimates of the overall macro-level impact of high NPLs, on the other hand, are few and
predominantly derived from vector auto-regression (VAR) complicating causal interpretation
of the findings (Nkusu 2011; Espinoza and Prasad 2014; Klein 2013).
This paper contributes to the literature by closing these three gaps. It distils key stylised
facts about instances of high NPL levels since 1990, in a large global sample, as well as about
policies deployed to reduce NPLs. It looks at how such policies related to the trajectories
of NPLs, providing insights into relative effectiveness of various policies. Finally, we use an
event study approach to estimate the impact of reducing NPLs on economic growth. The
impact analysis is complicated by the fact that NPLs themselves are often a reflection of an
economic downturn, while fast economic growth can lead to a swifter drop in the NPL ratio.
Our paper tackles the issue of causality by focusing on the cases of sharp reductions in NPLs.
It uses matching technique to compare the aftermaths of such sharp reductions with plausible
counterfactuals based on episodes where high NPLs persisted. This approach also enables us
to focus specifically on NPL reductions as opposed to combining positive and negative changes
in NPL ratios as is customary in the VAR analysis.
The paper also contributes to the literature on the economic impact of debt relief. An
event study by Reinhart and Trebesch (2016) finds that episodes of sovereign debt relief are
associated with extra annual growth dividend of up to 5 percentage points. NPL reductions are
conceptually similar as they stem from restructuring or writing off a large number of smaller
(and typically private-sector) liabilities. We show that NPL reductions can also have significant
real effects of economically meaningful magnitude.
All three parts of the analysis draw on a novel database of NPL ratios, episodes of high
NPLs and policies used in the context of high NPLs. The dataset on NPLs splices aggregated
bank-level data from Bankscope with the country-level NPL data from World Development
Indicators (WDI). The policy database draws on various existing databases, as well as narrative
evidence collected from various policy reports.
The construction of NPL episodes draws on the methodology used in the literature on the
impact of fiscal consolidation (for instance, Beetsma et al. 2015; Guajardo et al. 2014; Alesina
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et al. 2015). These studies employ narrative evidence to identify cases of fiscal consolida-
tion, distinguish between expenditure-based and tax-based episodes and analyse the differen-
tial impact of fiscal consolidations on consumer confidence, output and other macroeconomic
indicators.
The data reveal that NPLs are not just a by-product of (well-studied) crisis episodes; the
cases of high NPLs can be linked to a systemic banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis only
in around 40 percent of NPL cases. NPL levels seen in the mid-2010s are not exceptional by
historical standards, but in the past cases of high NPLs tended to be of more ”acute” nature
while they have recently become more ”chronic”. An average NPL reduction episode starts
only once NPL ratio exceeds 21 percent (median value). A successful NPL reduction episode
typically builds on a policy action that leads to a significant drop in the stock of NPLs, while
in later years a greater contribution to the decline in NPL ratio comes from revived credit
growth. Reductions kick-started predominantly by a credit boom are rare (less than 10 percent
of the total) and occur mainly in countries with low debt-to-GDP ratios (the median value of
15 percentage points).
In an event study analysis, comparing the countries with sudden NPL reductions and those
with persistenly high NPLs, we find that a combination of asset management companies and
public funds made available for recapitalisation is shown to be the most effective in terms of
resolving NPLs. However, the effectiveness depends also on the financing choice of the public
intervention. Using matching analysis, we estimate that reductions in NPLs are associated
with extra economic growth in excess of 1.5 percentage points per annum over several years.
This growth differential is reflected in faster investment growth and to some extend growth of
consumer spending and a decline in unemployment rate.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the
complex relationship between non-performing loans and the real economy, and briefly outlines
various types of policies used to reduce NPLs. Section 3.2 presents the data on NPL ratios
and NPL policies and discusses stylised facts about a typical case of high NPLs and a typical
episode of NPL reduction around the world. Section 3.4 discusses the link between financial
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sector policies and NPL reductions while Section 3.5 explores how this link is affected by banks’
sovereign bond holdings. Section 3.6 focuses on instances of sharp reductions in NPL ratios
and uses matching analysis to estimate the economic impact of these reductions, employing in-
stances of high and persistent NPLs to construct plausible counterfactuals. It also discusses the
overall results and illustrates various findings with a case study. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes
and discusses policy implications.
3.2. Literature review
Drawing on the existing literature, this section outlines the interlinkages between non-performing
loans and economic performance. On the one hand, macroeconomic environment and bank-
specific factors affect loan performance. On the other hand, high concentration of non-performing
loans has a negative impact on the economy, slowing down the creation of new credit and wors-
ening market expectations. This section examines both of these channels in turn and reviews
measures that can be deployed to facilitate a reduction in the stock of non-performing loans.
3.2.1. Determinants of non-performing loans
Factors driving NPLs fall into two broad groups: macroeconomic conditions (such as inflation,
interest rate and real GDP growth) and bank-specific factors (capital ratios, quality of risk
management). A wealth of papers document both.
GDP growth stands out as a key driver of NPLs. In a dynamic panel setting, Beck et al.
(2013) show that while the interest rate and share prices influence the NPL ratio, the growth
rate of GDP has the greatest explanatory power. In a similar vein, Espinoza and Prasad
(2014) document how lower economic growth and higher interest rates trigger an increase in
non-performing loans for banks in the Gulf States. Using panel autoregressive distributed lag
model, Mohaddes et al. (2017) argue that a sustained growth above 1.2 percent per annum in
an advanced economy like Italy could half NPL ratio over a period of around 5 years.
Other studies have found significant relationships between asset quality and macroeconomic
61
Chapter 3: Macro-level NPL reduction
environment in countries such as Greece (Louzis et al., 2012), Spain (Salas and Saurina, 2002),
Italy (Quagliariello, 2009) and Mexico (Blavy and Souto, 2009). Nkusu (2011) arrives at similar
conclusions in a panel of 26 advanced economies. (Ghosh, 2015) examines more detailed state-
level NPL determinants such as house price inflation, banking sector competition or public
indebtedness in the sample of the US banks. Klein (2013) extends these results for Central,
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, pointing out that bank-specific factors, such as leverage or
ROA, play a crucial role alongside the wider macroeconomic conditions.
3.2.2. Consequences of non-performing loans
A high ratio of non-performing loans to total loans impacts banks’ lending in several ways.
A bank plagued with a high stock of NPLs is likely to prioritise internal consolidation and
improving assets quality (deleveraging) over the provision of new credit. A high NPL ratio
requires greater loan loss provisions, depleting capital resources available for new lending and
denting bank’s profitability. It is also found to be a significant predictor of bank failures
(González-Hermosillo et al. 1997; Lu and Whidbee 2013; Barr et al. 1994). Where banks avoid
failure, NPLs impact negatively on a bank’s cost structure and efficiency (Maggi and Guida,
2011) and their willingness to lend (Cucinelli, 2015). As the NPL ratio increases, banks become
more risk-averse in their lending (Leon and Tracey, 2011; Hou and Dickinson, 2007)16.
Bank lending, in turn, is crucial for the health of the economy. It tends to underpin both
working capital and business expansion thus leading to real GDP growth at major turning
points of the business cycle (for example, Jorda et al. 2013). Lending standards are often relaxed
during economic booms and tightened in recessions, amplifying the impact of an economic
downturn on credit volumes and quality (Rajan, 1994; Ruckes, 2004). A credit crunch serves
as a transmission mechanism from greater creditor risk-aversion to weaker demand, which in
turn can lead to business failures and a further increase in non-performing loans, making banks
even more reluctant to lend. Such vicious credit risk spirals were observed, for instance, after
the 1995 crisis in Mexico (Krueger and Tornell, 1999) and after the 1997 crisis in Indonesia
16Some studies question the causal nature of the link between NPLs and lending. Accornero et al.




(Agung et al., 2001). Delays in the recognition of loan losses can further exacerbate the pro-
cyclicality of lending (Beatty and Liao, 2011).
An overhang of non-performing loans can also result in a misallocation of resources in an
economy with strong bank-business interlinkages. When banks channel most of new credit
to the troubled sectors and companies (”zombie lending”), they help to prevent second-round
business failures, at the expense of diverting funds away from the more productive parts of
the economy. This way, the lending disruption on the back of high NPLs compromises the
country’s long-run growth prospects through the reduction of total factor productivity (see
Peek and Rosengren 2005; Caballero et al. 2008). Large capital injections in banks are required
to break this vicious circle (Giannetti and Simonov, 2013). Furthermore, large NPL ratios can
negatively impact sovereign bond’s ratings (Boumparis et al., 2017) thus further exacerbating
the cost of falling into the negative feedback loop (see Chapter 2 for further discussion).
In sum, to estimate the causal relationship from NPLs to economic performance cross-
country studies must circumvent the problem of simultaneous causation. The most common
approach builds on vector autoregressive (VAR) models where identification of the impact
of NPLs relies on assumptions about the ordering of the variables within the VAR system.
Although studies use different samples and dependent variables, they typically find a negative
and significant impact of rising NPL ratios on GDP growth and employment. Such effects tend
to persist for several years after the initial NPL shock (Nkusu, 2011; Espinoza and Prasad,
2014) and can also be observed when it comes to employment, at least in the Emerging Europe
in the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis (Klein, 2013). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
further find that a large increase in the NPL ratio serves as a reliable predictor of financial
crises.
3.2.3. Dealing with non-performing loans
When it comes to resolving NPLs, identifying the problem is the first step. Banks need to
transparently and credibly assess and report the quality of their assets in order to build up
provisions against expected losses. A credible guidance to markets can help to restore market
confidence damaged by rising NPLs. For instance, the primary reason behind introduction
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of IFRS accounting standards in Greece in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis was to
improve the market trust in accounting practices.
Relying on banks’ voluntary efforts to resolve NPLs may not be sufficient, even when NPLs
are recognised on balance sheet. The regulator may guide banks as to the optimal use of their
capital buffers and determine target loan loss provisions. Banks may need to develop special
capacity to deal with NPLs - another area where the regulator may step in.
Creating a good legal framework for corporate restructuring and timely disposal of NPLs
is crucial, in particular when judicial capacity to deal with NPLs case-by-case is lacking (see
Laeven and Laryea 2009). Centralised out-of-court debt workout programme were actively used
by governments in Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1990s (Woo, 2000); Serbia
adopted a consensual restructuring framework for debt of small enterprises in 2012.
We further consider five types of financial sector policies targeting reduction in NPL ratio:
the establishment of an asset management companies, provision of bailouts to the financial
sector (public funds for bank recapitalisation), changes to macroprudential regulation, changes
to loan classification rules and changes to provisioning stringency.
The first type of policies encourages development of a secondary market for NPLs. One
option is to create a ”bad bank” or asset management companies (AMCs) that enable commer-
cial banks to transfer NPLs from their balance sheets to a specialised entity at a fair (market)
value. The AMCs can in turn securitise the impaired loans and resell them in a secondary
market, use their expertise to partially recover bad loans or initiate foreclosure with the view
to monetise collateral attached to bad loans.
This route was followed for example in Sweden and Mexico in the 1990s (Macey, 1999;
Krueger and Tornell, 1999). Similarly, public or private asset management companies, created
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, assembled assets valued at up to 20 percent of
GDP and achieved a significant degree of value recovery (Woo, 2000; Fung et al., 2004). More
recently, in 2016, the Italian government reached a deal with the EU allowing it to attach a
government guarantee to a subset of the e350m of NPLs to stimulate the establishment of
private AMCs and sales of NPLs on the secondary market. The Italian approach was also
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implemented in 2019 in Greece where tranches of securitised NPLs will be guaranteed by the
government. Such guarantees help to bridge the difference between the reservation value of
NPLs to the originating banks and the price potential buyers would be willing to pay, a gap
that often remains large in cases where weak contract enforcement creates strong asymmetry
of information (Garrido et al., 2016).
Majority of AMCs globally are publicly funded. Alternatively, banks may establish internal
AMCs by ring-fencing on- or off-balance sheet funds for a special internal workout department.
Internal AMCs have the same objective as public AMC: to recover maximum value from a
portfolio of impaired assets. In a few cases, governments directly used deposit insurance funds
to acquire non-performing assets. This option is, however, less popular as it may compromise
the ability of deposit insurers to perform their core function.
Alternatively, public funds can be used to recapitalise ailing banks directly. The bailouts
give banks an opportunity to fully provision their non-performing exposures, write them off,
or sale at discounted prices to a third party. Policy packages often combine establishment of
AMCs with the use of public bailout.
The third block of policies are macroprudential measures that target behaviour of financial
institution through limits on leverage, maximum interbank exposures, concentration ratios,
capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions, reserve requirements or
similar parameters. Macroprudential measures can also target borrowers by imposing limits on
loan-to-value or debt-to-income ratios.
Changes in the stringency of loan classification and provisioning rules may also have an
impact on NPL resolution. Forcing banks to recognise and fully provision NPLs generally
strengthens incentives to resolve or write-off non-performing assets. At the same time, a change
towards stricter loan classification may actually result in an increase in reported NPL ratios,
at least in the short-term.
This list of policies is not exhaustive but it accounts for a major bulk of actions historically
taken to reduce NPL ratios. Examples of other measures include changes in tax treatments of
NPLs that remove disincentives to write non-performing loans off for banks and borrowers or
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judicial reforms.
3.3. An anatomy of NPL reductions
3.3.1. Constructing data on NPL ratios
In this section we present key stylised facts about episodes of high non-performing loans and
NPL reductions. A non-performing loan is a loan where the full repayment of the principal
and interest is no longer expected. Typically, the principal or interest would be at least 90
days in arrears, although the precise definition of an NPL loan varies across jurisdictions. This
complicates international comparisons. In the absence of a universally applied definition of
NPL, however, there is little a researcher can do to remedy the situation.
As this paper primarily focuses on changes in non-performing loans within each country,
different definitions should not bias the results as long as country-specific approaches to clas-
sifying NPLs do not undergo major changes. The dataset inevitably lacks episodes where
regulatory forbearance results in NPLs being severely under-reported. In countries practising
”directed lending”, this would often be the case. In that sense, the stylised facts about NPL
reduction episodes and any estimates of economic impact of lower NPLs should be viewed as
conditional on the authorities willing to recognise the NPL problem in the first place.
Our source of data on country level non-performing loans is the World Development In-
dicators (WDI) database of the World Bank and complemented with bank-level information
available in Bankscope, aggregated to the country level, through the splicing procedure. The
initial WDI country-level dataset is an unbalanced panel covering 134 countries over the pe-
riod 1997-2016. The data are then cross-checked against a bank-level database, Bankscope,
and extended with additional observations. Bankscope reports the NPL ratio for banks in 190
countries since 1980, with a more reliable coverage for the period 1990-2015.
The combined dataset is constructed using a splicing procedure based on de la Fuente
Moreno (2014). The new spliced (N̂PLS) time series for each country is estimated by extending
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the WDI series backward when Bankscope measure is available. We preserve the last WDI
observation and use growth rate of Bankscope NPL17 to retropolate the spliced NPL. We then
use the ρ coefficient to adjust for differences in levels inferred from the cross-country WDI





t for 1990 ≤ t ≤ T (3.1)
Where T is the linking year, when first country-level WDI data are available while Bankscope
data are also available for preceding years. The mixed splicing distance measure is given by




The average distance between the two time series at the linking point is defined by equation






In addition to extending time coverage for 134 countries that report at least one year of
WDI data, we use the average difference between WDI and Bankscope to update the NPL data
for 60 countries with observations available in Bankscope only. First, we calculate the average
distance between WDI and Bankscope data at all linking points d̄T . Second, we update the
Bankscope measure as follows:
N̂PLSt = NPL
BS
t + d̄T (3.4)
The resulting dataset comprises 3,537 country-year observations in 194 countries between
1990 and 2016. Figure 3.1 illustrates the results of splicing procedure for Argentina, with
WDI and Bankscope series exhibiting similar trends. Figure 3.2 summarises the procedure for
the average NPL ratio across the entire sample. To the best of our knowledge, the splicing
17Bankscope data is reported on bank-year basis and aggregated to country-year level.
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procedure is not used widely in the field of finance or economics and this paper is one of the
first one to apply it to macroeconomic data. The additional step using the average distance at
linking point d̄T described in equation 3.4 is also a novel contribution to the literature. This
approach may seem adhoc, however, all of empirical results reported in this paper are robust
to the use of WDI data only. The obvious advantage of this novel splicing procedure is the
extension of the dataset and verification from two independent data sources, that exhibit high
correlation (68%***).
[Insert Figures 3.1 and 3.2]
3.3.2. Historical perspective
The (unweighted) average NPL ratio across all countries jumped in the 1990s and peaked at
almost 12 percent in 1999, in the immediate aftermath of the Asian and Russian crises (Figure
3.2). It then started declining swiftly and was further pushed down by the credit boom in the
run-up to the global financial crisis. It bottomed out at around 5 percent in 2007. The pattern
is similar for the median.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis the average quality of bank assets deteriorated
less quickly than in the 1990s, with a jump of 2 percentage points between 2007 and 2009.
However, rather than declining afterwards, the average NPL ratio has resumed an upward
drift, exceeding 8 percent by 2014. As a percentage of GDP, average NPLs plateaued at
around the peak levels reached briefly in 1998-99.
In other words, the magnitude of today’s NPL problem is not unprecedented. Yet if in
the past NPL episodes appeared to be of ”acute” nature, the more recent episodes tend to
be ”chronic”, slowly but steadily building up as economic growth and credit expansion slow
down. Furthermore, only 40 to 48 percent of instances of high NPL episodes (exceeding NPL
ratio of 7 percentage points) can be linked to a banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis that
occurred between 1990 and 2012 based on the data reported by Laeven and Valencia (2012).
The opposite is also true: 38 percent of banking crises were followed by high NPLs while the
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majority were not. This highlights the value of analysing the episodes of high NPLs in historical
perspective as these are more than just by-products of the (relatively well-studied) crises.
All in all, cases of elevated NPLs have been common: 165 out of 190 countries in the
dataset experienced NPL ratios in excess of 7 percent at some point (the baseline analysis uses
a 7 percent threshold for high NPL ratios, a ratio that is around 2.5 percentage points above
today’s median; alternative thresholds are used as robustness checks).
3.3.3. Data on policies addressing high NPLs
The database also puts together information on various policies aimed at resolving NPLs and
adopted across countries. Data on asset management companies is taken from the Building
Better Bad Banks project by Hallerberg and Gandrud (2015). A dummy variable is equal to one
if an AMC was operating in the past 3 years. Where the data on AMC closure is not available,
an AMC is assumed to have an average life span in the sample - 8 years. The database contains
information on 139 cases of AMCs (109 public, 20 internal, 8 backed by deposit insurance and
2 unclassified) across 62 countries during the period 1990-2016.
The data on financial sector bailouts is taken from Bova et al. (2016) and covers public
bailouts during systemic banking crises as well as stand-alone interventions. The database
includes 95 recorded cases of financial sector recapitalisations across 66 countries. For 83 of
those episodes, the data includes estimated fiscal costs of recapitalisation, averaging 9.7 percent
of GDP.
Cerutti et al. (2015) are our source of data for changes in macroprudential policies. We use
the positive changes in the values of the macroprudential policy index (MPI) as an indication
of regulation being tightened (in other words, the dummy variable is coded one when MPI
increased and zero otherwise). The database covers 119 countries from 2000 to 2013, with 135
cases of macroprudential tightening in 76 countries. In contrast, the instances of macropruden-
tial loosening are limited to Bulgaria in 2008 and Serbia in 2013, and therefore are not studied
in more detail.
The stringency of loan classification is proxied by the total number of days of delinquency
after which a loan is classified as sub-standard, doubtful or lost (combining the three categories),
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building on Barth et al. (2001, 2013). The data comes from surveys of 127 central banks
conducted in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 (with the values in between survey years carried
forward). The average loan classification measure is 18 months, ranging from 4 months to over
3 years across countries.
The provisioning stringency (taken from the same source) is proxied by the sum of the
minimum required provisions as loans become substandard, doubtful and loss (this sum averages
120 percent).
The data points constructed from the above sources were cross-checked against, and com-
plemented with, narrative evidence regarding policy response, if any, in instances when NPL
ratios were high. The narrative evidence was collected by looking at published case studies,
newspaper articles, reports of governments and international organisations.
3.3.4. Episodes of high NPLs and NPL reductions
In our analysis of NPL reductions we look at sustained drops in NPLs that over a number
of years amounted to a reduction of 7 percentage points or more. For each such occurrence
we record the length of the period of reduction, from the first year in which the NPL ratio
is smaller than in the preceding year to the last year in which the ratio does not exceed the
value in the preceding year. Occasionally, the NPL ratio increases briefly before falling again.
Such occurrences are not considered to break an NPL reduction period as long as they are
limited to a single year and involve a relatively small increase in NPL ratio (of less than 1.6
percentage points). Countries that suffer from recurrent NPL problems may have multiple NPL
reduction periods (assumed to be independent draws from the same data-generating process).
We identify 104 episodes when NPL ratios above 7 percent persisted for four years or more
and 178 episodes of NPL reduction. A typical episode of high and persistent NPLs lasts for 6
years, with NPL ratio rising by 1.5 percentage points a year, although some episodes stretched
to up to 17 years and remained ongoing as of 2016 (see Table 3.2 for definition and Tables 3.11
and 3.12 for the list of NPL episodes).
[Insert Figure 3.3]
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Some sort of policy action was taken in almost all instances of identified high NPLs and
policy packages typically combined multiple types of measures discussed above. Of these,
state support of the banking system has been the most widespread (Figure 3.3). In fact,
introduction of AMCs was accompanied by the use of public funds in 36 percent of cases as
public recapitalisation can facilitate creation of secondary market for NPLs as well as tightening
of provisioning or classification rules. And while much of the policy debate centres on the
establishment of market for distressed debt, with reference to the experiences of the Nordic
countries in the early 1990s and South-East Asia in the late 1990s, recapitalisation packages
have been more often accompanied by straight debt write-offs (implemented in around 60
percent of such episodes) than by creation of AMCs or bad banks. In Europe, developed
secondary NPL markets are largely limited to Ireland and Spain, with attempts to set one up
in Greece (see European Central Bank 2017b). Despite regulators actively encouraging banks
to dispose of their toxic assets on the secondary market, there is no empirical evidence that
such action would improve capitalisation18 and risk-profile in the long term.
[Insert Figure 3.4]
If policy measures were successful and a significant reduction in NPLs was achieved, the
NPL ratio broadly followed an average profile shown in Figure 3.4. At first, a country’s NPL
ratio rises fast as growth of performing credit slows down and eventually turns negative. Once
the ratio peaks (at a median value of 21 percent), the NPL ratio drops equally fast. During the
first two years this drop is strongly driven by the reduction in the stock of non-performing assets
(the numerator of the ratio). As credit growth resumes, from years 3 onwards the declines in
NPL ratio become primarily driven by the growing denominator of the ratio. A typical NPL
reduction episode lasts for five years and NPL ratio eventually declines to a median level of
4.4 percent - comparable to 3.5 percent average ratio in countries that do not experience high
NPLs (see Table 3.3).
18NPLs are usually sold at significant discounts (average 80%) and despite providing a reduction in
risk-weighted assets, such sale also reduces the retained earnings due to the recognition of losses on the
transaction.
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The following formula can be used to compute the relative contributions of the decline in
NPL stock and credit growth to the overall magnitude of a reduction in NPL ratio:
Performing Loan share =
Overall Loan Growth
Overall NPL Growth−Overall Loan Growth
(3.5)
The calculation is equivalent to comparing the hypothetical reduction in NPL ratio that
would have been achieved holding initial stock of NPLs constant with the one that would have
been achieved holding the stock of total credit constant. The median contribution of credit
growth at the start of an NPL reduction episode turns out to be 20.4 percent. In other words,
a drop in NPLs is considerably more likely to be followed by a revival in credit growth than
the other way round.
In some instances, NPL reductions were kick-started predominantly by credit growth (for
example, in Bangladesh in the 2000s). However, such occurrences are rare: credit growth
contributed more than 70 percent to the initial drop in NPL ratio in less than 10 percent of
cases. Furthermore, these instances are concentrated in countries with shallow financial sectors,
with a median credit-to-GDP ratio of 15 percent compared with 45 percent in countries where
high NPLs persist. In sum, a strong upturn in credit growth is a theoretically possible but
empirically improbable solution to most of today’s instances of high NPLs.
3.3.5. Episodes of sharp drops in NPL ratio and the estimation strategy
The analysis of the economic impact of policy-assisted NPL reductions exploits the fact that
a typical episode starts with a sharp drop in NPL ratio, typically accounted for by a drop in
the stock of NPLs, followed by a phase of more gradual reduction. Focusing specifically on the
episodes that contain a ”steep” initial phase can help to reduce potential reverse causality con-
cerns in estimation of the impact of a drop in NPL ratio on subsequent rather than concurrent
economic performance.
Overall, in 143 cases (close to 80 percent of the total number) a drop of at least 5 percentage
points in the NPL ratio occurs within a single year at the start of an NPL reduction episode.
In 75 of these cases at least a 10 percentage point reduction occurs within a single year. And
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in further 38 episodes a 10 percentage point drop happens within two years. Only in six cases
the steep drop occurs towards the middle or the end of an episode rather than at the start.
The baseline analysis focuses on the episodes that feature a 5 percentage point drop in a single
year at the start of an episode or a ten percentage point drop over two years (the events of
interest in our study). The strategy is to compare these ”sharp drop” episodes with otherwise
similar cases where high NPL ratios persisted.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we look at the link between various policies and
the NPL trajectory, including the likelihood of observing a sharp drop in NPL ratio. This
exercise complements a separate study by Plekhanov and Skrzypinska (2019) who identify
statistically and economically significant relationship between financial sector policies and NPL
reductions by looking at the impact of policy measures in a given jurisdiction on NPLs of
subsidiary banks operating in other jurisdictions compared with NPLs of other banks in host
countries (see Chapter 4). Second, we look at the impact of a sharp drop in NPLs on economic
outcomes by comparing evolution of economic indicators after a sharp drop in NPLs with
economic outcomes during episodes of high and persistent NPLs that are similar in terms of
their initial characteristics using propensity score matching.
[Insert Figure 3.5]
The rationale for the two-step approach (schematically presented in Figure 3.5) is the
likely absence of the direct impact of NPL resolution policies on growth, investment or other
outcome variables. Financial sector policies can target NPL levels. Reductions in NPLs may,
in turn, affect economic outcomes by removing the burden of non-performing assets from the
balance sheets or banks and corporates, hence improving access to credit, and boosting business
confidence.
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3.4. Policy effectiveness
3.4.1. Effect of various policies on NPLs
We start by looking at the link between various policies and NPL reductions. We are specifically
interested in how policies are related to the events used later to identify the impact of NPL
reductions on economic outcomes. In particular, we look at (i) the likelihood of a sharp drop in
NPLs within three years of a policy being put in place and (ii) the magnitude of the subsequent
NPL reduction, conditional on a sharp drop occurring. For this reasons, we estimate the
following two-part model:
Pr(Sharp Reductionct = 1) = Φ
(




Magnitudect|Sharp Reductionct = 1
]
= β1 + POLctγ1 +Xctλ1 + εct (3.7)
The first stage links the likelihood of a sharp drop in NPL ratio in country c and time
period t to a vector of policy dummy variables (POL) in a probit regression19. These variables
take a value of one if a corresponding policy was in operation at any point during the preceding
three years. The set of control variables X includes the initial value of the NPL ratio and
macroeconomic variables such as the logarithm of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity
(PPP), growth of GDP per capita, consumer price inflation and an index capturing the strength
of insolvency resolution frameworks. The sample is restricted to instances of NPL ratio above
7 percent in order to exclude cases where NPL drop was not feasible.
The second stage links the magnitude of a sharp drop in NPLs (Magnitudect) conditional
on a sharp drop taking place (Sharp Reductionct = 1) to the set of policy variables and controls
defined above. The model is estimated as a two-part model following the framework of Belotti
et al. (2015). This framework assumes a gamma distribution of the size of the overall magnitude
of reduction in NPLs conditional on achieving a sharp reduction20 and an identity link function
19Where the function Φ(.) represents the cummulative standard normal distribution
20This assumption matches the best our empirical distribution of NPL reduction magnitude, which
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for simplicity. The choice of the two-part model approach is dictated by the fact that we do
observe all changes in NPLs (unlike, for instance, in the Heckman selection framework) but we
are specifically interested in the link between policies and events defined as sharp reductions in
NPL ratio. The results are reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 for the first stage probit and second
stage GLM, respectively.
[Insert Tables 3.4 and 3.5]
The use of asset management companies is associated with a statistically and economi-
cally significant increase in the likelihood of achieving a sharp drop in NPLs, as represented
by positive and statistically significant coefficients on the AMC Policy dummy in Table 3.4.
The magnitude of NPL reductions in the presence of AMCs are, on average, around 3 percent-
age points larger than could be otherwise expected, as indicated by positive and significant
coefficients in Table 3.5.
The provision of financial sector bailouts, on the other hand, has no significant impact
on the magnitude of the NPL reduction and, if anything, there is an indication that it may
somewhat reduce the likelihood of a sharp drop in NPL ratio. This is perhaps not a surprising
result, as financial sector recapitalisations rarely state explicitly how the injected new capital
is expected to be used and thus may provide little incentives for banks to write-off toxic assets.
Moreover, such recapitalisations may encourage banks to take on more risk in the future, as
they implicitly guarantee future obligations.
Macroprudential tightening is designed to work as a countercyclical tool to prevent build-
up of NPLs in the future(see, for instance, Bruno et al. 2017). Therefore, it has insignificant
detectable impact in a medium term in a situation when NPL ratios are already high. If
anything, it may be associated with lower reductions in NPLs (negative coefficients in the
table 3.5) as macroprudential tightening may limit options for refinancing and restructuring of
existing exposures.
has a positive skewness parameter.
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Higher initial NPL ratios at the beginning of the episode are associated with larger NPL
reductions provided one is achieved. However, on average, the higher the initial level of NPL
ratio, the lower the probability of achieving a ”sharp” reduction in a short period of time.
This result illustrates the importance of addressing the NPL crisis early and implementing
preventative measures. It also explains the more ”chronic” nature of recent NPL crises (see
Section 3.3.2). Should the NPL ratio continue going up, one can expect to further slow down
the economic activity, which in turn perpetuates the negative feedback loop and increases the
aggregate NPL ratio. In a situation of continued weak economic growth, the reduction of NPLs
is particularly difficult to achieve, especially if a government has reached its maximum fiscal
capacity.
Both Italy and Greece has experienced this particular vicious cycle in the recent years. The
real per capita GDP has fallen by 5 percent and 22 percent respectively for Italy and Greece in
the past decade, while the public debt reached record levels of 130 and 180 percent of GDP21.
Given the continued weak economic prospects, lack of fiscal space and the fact that their NPL
ratios remain at dangerously high levels22, it is difficult to expect any rapid improvements.
NPL reductions are more likely to occur in lower-income economies that experience higher
economic growth. Countries with better insolvency resolution framework and more efficient
judicial systems are less likely to be in a situation of high NPLs (see Cerulli et al. 2017). Indeed,
NPLs average 5.7 percent in the quartile of countries with the strongest frameworks versus 8.7
percent in the bottom quartile of countries. At the same time, once NPLs rise, countries with
better insolvency resolution frameworks are less likely to experience large reductions in NPLs -
perhaps because a strategy of holding on to problematic exposures and seeking resolution looks
more attractive. Although not reported, we have also conducted a robustness check where the
two part model is replaced with a static OLS. For this purpose we take all episodes of sharp
NPL reductions, gradual reductions and persistency and calculate the change in NPL ratio
throughout the episode duration, thus achieving a continuous estimate of the NPL change,
ranging from -69 to +37 percentage points, this allows us to avoid the truncation on the zero
21Source: Eurostat
22NPL ratio was reported 14% for Italy and 45% for Greece in 2017 according to WDI data
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threshold that necessitates the two stage approach. The results are robust to such change.
3.4.2. Policies as a package
While estimates point towards relative effectiveness of AMCs and ineffectiveness of bailouts,
in many cases these policies were combined as a package (Figure 3.3). Indeed, even efficient
and developed secondary market for NPLs may necessitate relatively low prices associated with
transfer of non-performing assets, leaving banks with potentially large capital shortfalls. Higher
transfer prices, on the other hand, may require larger injections of capital into AMCs, thus
putting more burden on taxpayers.
To check for any complementarities between the use of AMCs and public funds for recap-
italisation, the exercise is repeated distinguishing between three types of interventions: AMC
only, provision of bailouts in the absence of AMCs or a combination of AMCs and public funds
made available for recapitalisation. The first two columns in Table 3.6 report estimates for
the likelihood of a sharp drop in NPLs, comparable to first stage of the two-part model. The
dependent variable in the columns (2-4) is now the reduction in NPL ratio over the course of an
episode, irrespective of whether a sharp reduction event occurred in a static OLS specification23.
We find that public bailouts have no significant impact on probability of sharp reduction
NPLs, in line with earlier estimates, while AMCs are associated with a higher likelihood of
a sharp drop in NPLs and a greater magnitude of a reduction in NPLs. However, the effect
of AMCs on both the likelihood and the magnitude of NPL reduction is estimated to be
around 2.5 times greater if AMCs are used in conjunction with public funds being available
for recapitalisation. We do not find any significant effects of changes in loan classification and
provision stringency (results are available upon request).
[Insert Table 3.6]
23The results are robust to the approach using two-part model as explained in the previous section
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3.5. The effect of bank’s sovereign bondholdings
In section 3.4 we show that the use of AMCs and the bank recapitalisations can increase the
likelihood of a sharp reduction in NPLs as well as the overall magnitude of the reduction in the
stock of NPLs at a country-level. It is worth pointing out however, that those policies carry
usually a substantial upfront fiscal cost; in the case of financial sector bailout averaging close
to 10 per cent of GDP in our sample (Bova et al., 2016). Since both public AMCs and bailouts
require public-fund support from the government the policy intervention itself can deteriorate
fiscal balance and increase sovereign risk thus triggering the negative feedback loop between
sovereigns and banks.
When government raises funding for such schemes via bond issuance, a large proportion of it
may come from the banks themselves. In India, for instance, the 2017 policy package, aimed at
addressing high NPLs, explicitly stated to load the banks with newly-issued domestic sovereign
bond holdings and using the proceeds to increase banks’ capital reserves. To make the situation
even more complex, the preponderance of banks, that were subject to the government bailout,
where already majority state-owned and had large domestic exposures to domestic sovereign
debt. In these schemes, money effectively does not change hands but banks’ regulatory capital
ratios improve.
Similar argument can be extended to the deployment of publicly-funded AMCs. In order to
provide a relief to the banking sector, such AMCs must offer a sufficiently high transfer price
for the NPLs that are sold by the ailing banks. This, in turn, implies a large fiscal cost to
the budget to provide necessary funding to the AMC. The data on transfer pricing is rarely
released to the public and we have not been able to find realistic and comparable estimates of
average AMC cost to the public finances for a larger sample of countries. Despite this data
limitation, it can be argued that in order for the AMC scheme to make a positive impact on
the financial sector health, it may require large fiscal outlays.
For example, Slovenia struggled with a sudden increase in the NPL ratio in the aftermath
of the Global Financial Crisis and in response the government established a Bank Assets Man-
agement Company (BAMC) in 2013. BAMC has purchased approximately 60% of the total
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Slovenian corporate NPLs in the first year of its operation. The gross carrying amount off the
transferred impaired loans constituted 16% of Slovenian GDP in 201324. Simultaneously, the
bank’s average sovereign bond holdings increased from 10% of total assets to 17% between 2012
and 2013, thus providing anecdotal evidence of the circular funding hypothesis.
The empirical evidence on the relevance of “circular” funding of bank bailouts or AMCs for
NPL resolution is scarce. The prior literature on the problematic nature of the sovereign-bank
nexus has grown substantially in the past decade. However, systematic evidence on whether the
sovereign-bank nexus also reduces the effectiveness of financial sector policies, and in particular
policies aimed at resolving overhang of NPLs, has not been discussed in the literature to the
best of my knowledge. More generally, a high share of domestic sovereign bond holdings in
bank’s total assets has been linked to the crowding out of private lending, increases in systemic
risk and negative real effects in terms of lower investment and slower job creation (see, for
instance, Broner et al. 2013; Chari et al. 2018; Bocola 2016; Asonuma et al. 2015; Acharya
and Steffen 2015; Gennaioli et al. 2014; Reinhart and Rogoff 2008). Chapter 2 of this thesis
provides more background on the sovereign-bank nexus topic, while this section provides an
empirical assessment of the effectiveness of policy packages aimed at resolving NPLs - taking
into account the “funding-circularity” argument. In order to empirically test this hypothesis,
we include the average size of sovereign bond portfolio held by banks in each country, as a
measure of the sovereign-bank interconnectedness, in our estimation and interact it with the
policy dummies.





24Slovenia also engaged in bank recapitalisations prior to establishing BAMC (For the
description of BAMC intervention see https://www.oenb.at/dam/jcr:a9498bc7-aeab-44b3-a314-
640884cb8ad6/Balogh-Session-3.pdf
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∆NPL ratio over the episodect = β1 +POLctγ1 + ¯BHctφ1 + ¯BHct×POLctθ1 +γ1 +Xctλ1 + εct
(3.9)
The equations 3.8 and 3.9 correspond to the equation 3.6 and the static OLS version of
equation 3.7 with two major changes: (i) the regression is extended to include the country-level
aggregate size of bank’s sovereign bond exposure as share of total assets, ¯BHct together with
its interactions and (ii) the second stage equation includes the changes of the average NPL
ratio over both the sharp reduction periods as well as the persistency periods in the static OLS
approach25.
The bank’s sovereign bond holdings are aggregated to the country-level by taking an average
across all banks in each country-year and weighting by banks’ total assets. Even though the
sovereign bondholdings here cannot differentiate between the domestic vs foreign government
bonds, Gennaioli et al. (2014, 2018) show that it is a good proxy for the size of bank’s home
bias, as for most countries majority of sovereign bonds held are domestic bonds. The average
size of sovereign bondholdings in our sample is 11% and has a standard deviation of 9.6%,
the measure is higher for emerging countries (12.4% vs 9.6% for advanced). Results of the
regressions are reported in Table 3.7. The core coefficients remain robust to the addition of
sovereign bondholdings and their interaction with policy dummies.
[Insert Table 3.7]
Sovereign bondholdings are overall positively correlated with the probability of sharp reduc-
tion in NPL, possibly because banks with large NPL burden intentionally shift risk to increase
the exposure to sovereign or due to a lack of alternative investment options.
In the baseline estimation bailouts implemented on their own (not in conjunction with the
establishment of asset management companies) have no statistically significant impact on the
likelihood or the magnitude of a drop in NPLs (see Table 3.6). However, the estimated impact
25The results are robust to the Two Part Model approach explained in section 3.4.
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of bailouts on NPL resolution becomes significantly negative when banks have large exposures
to the sovereign debt portfolio. It appears that in this case banks, and markets, interpret
such a scheme as a license to do more of the same, as there is little evidence of structural
change or genuine fresh funds injected into the banks. One can also argue, that in the presence
of the substantial sovereign-bank nexus, governments cannot credibly commit sufficient funds
for financial recapitalisations or that such bailouts create a negative sovereign risk shock that
triggers the diabolic loop. It is worth noting that the high exposure to sovereign debt reduces
only the probability of the sharp reduction episode following the financial sector recapitalisation
(columns 1-3), it does not however affect the overall magnitude of the NPL reduction (columns
5-6).
On the other hand, if bailouts are accompanied by the establishment of asset management
companies, the interaction term with sovereign bond holdings is small and not statistically
significant. This preserves the positive impact of a policy package combining bailouts and
AMCs, even in the presence of significant circular financing of government by banks. In this
case, the presence of structural element of the reform package – associated with establishment
of a market for non-performing loans – lends the credibility to the initiative. This result can be
explained by the fact that the part-circular nature of funding underpinning the policy package
becomes secondary as the intervention itself reallocates the bad loans away from the banks
towards the more efficient users of the assets.
3.6. The economic impact of NPL reductions
3.6.1. Methodology
With the relationship between financial sector policies and reductions in NPL ratios in mind,
this section, in turn, investigates the link between falling NPL ratios and economic outcomes.
Our methodology aims to deal with both the reverse causality running from higher economic
growth to lower NPL ratios and non-random nature of episodes of NPL reductions, linked to
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non-random nature of adoption of NPL policies.
To provide a better insight into the direction of the causal relationship, we focus on the
aftermaths of sharp drops in NPLs (the treatment group, Sharp Reductionit=1). To alleviate
concerns about countries’ selection into the group of NPL reduction episodes, we use matching
to produce plausible counterfactuals. In particular, the control group are episodes of high and
persistent NPLs (Sharp Reductionit=0). The matching takes into account a set of variables X
available for each episode i, including GDP growth and inflation during the year of the sharp
drop (year zero) as rising prices may help to inflate the burden of non-performing debt away.
In various specifications we also match on GDP per capita at PPP, GDP growth during the
preceding year, the public debt-to-GDP ratio (that may affect availability of fiscal space to
implement policy packages), private sector credit-to-GDP ratio (capturing the level of financial
development and bank dependency), the initial NPL ratio, investment-to-GDP ratio and unem-
ployment rate. We focus on five economic outcomes (Y ): growth of GDP per capita, investment
growth, growth of exports, consumption growth, and unemployment rate. We are interested in
estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), the expected difference between
the observed outcomes in the treatment group Y1i and the counterfactual economic outcomes
that would have occurred in the treatment group in the absence of treatment Y0i:
ATT = E[Y1it − Y0it|Sharp Reductionit = 1] (3.10)
To calculate the ATT, we draw on kernel propensity score matching with a common support
requirement (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) by estimating differences conditional on a set of
observed covariates X:
E[Y1it − Y0it| Sharp Reductionit = 1] = E
[
E(Y1it|Xit,Sharp Reductionit = 1)
−E(Y0i|Xit,Sharp Reductionit = 0)| Sharp Reductionit = 1
] (3.11)
For each episode from a treatment group, the algorithm selects a set of episodes from
the control group which together resemble as closely as possible the treated episodes, based
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on the estimated propensity that belongs to the treatment episode, conditional on the set of
economic characteristics X. The weights attached to control observations are inversely related
to the distance in terms of the estimated propensity scores. Under the assumption that the
conditioning variables capture all the relevant differences between the treatment and control
groups, this procedure creates a valid estimate of the correlation between the reduction in NPL
ratios and economic outcomes (ATT).
3.6.2. Results of the matching analysis
Sharp reductions in NPL ratio are associated with extra GDP growth of more than 1.5 per-
centage points per annum over several years as compared with the cases of high and persistent
NPLs (see Table 3.8). The growth effect kicks in around 2 years after the start of the episode
and peaks around year 4; the average treatment effect on the treated is statistically significant
for five years following the beginning of sharp reduction episode. These growth differentials
accumulate over time when it comes to the level of GDP per capita (see Figure 3.6). The
trajectories of output for the treated and controls are similar up and including the year when a
sharp drop in NPLs occurs, despite the fact that we do not match specifically on GDP growth
prior to episode start, with a stark divergence in paths from year two onwards, exceeding 13
percentage points by year 5. The additional 1.5 percent annual GDP growth is economically
meaningful and at least in our estimation window does not show any signs of further reversal,
leading up to the conclusion that reduction of NPLs has a persistent economic effect rather
than transitionary.
[Insert Table 3.8]
Stronger growth appears to be underpinned by rebounding investment. The estimated
differences in investment growth between the treatment and control group are large with es-
timates ranging between 3 and 8 percent additional investment growth per annum and sta-
tistically significant in most years and specifications. Figure 3.7 shows the cumulative effect
of the investment growth differentials, which despite being estimated with less precision than
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the GDP growth differentials, shows a cumulative difference in Investment index of approxi-
mately 45 percentage points. The impact on exports is more volatile and appears to be weaker
than on investment or consumption, possibly due to exporters’ ability to access credit against
international receivables and their lower sensitivity to domestic credit conditions.
The results of propensity score matching need to be interpreted with caution. Despite
our best efforts to reduce concerns of reverse causality and the selection bias, given our data
restrictions, we cannot confidently claim that all of our results reflect causal effects. However,
the results of our analysis point to the fact that carefully chosen policy action can help to lower
NPL ratios, which in turn stimulates economic performance.
[Insert Figures 3.6 and 3.7]
3.6.3. Example: The case of the Philippines
The case of the Philippines provides a useful illustration of various estimated relationships.
Following the Asian crisis of 1997, the Philippines experienced several years of high and per-
sistent NPLs: the NPL ratio jumped to 12.4 percent in 1998 and climbed further peaking at
27.7 percent in 2001.
A policy package, aimed at cleaning up bank balance sheets, included introduction of AMCs
supported by availability of bailout funds and other policy measures. In particular, the Spe-
cial Asset Management Companies Law of 2002 provided the legal basis for establishment of
privately-funded AMCs, introduced tax deductions and other incentives for setting up such
special purpose vehicles. At the same time, the regulation put a threshold of 5 percent for
bank’s ownership of any AMCs that purchases assets from its balance sheet (Fung et al., 2004),
thus increasing the likelihood of a genuine market for non-performing assets being created. In
addition, the Privatisation and Management Office was established in 2001 to deal with gov-
ernment’s banking assets. Financial sector recapitalisation funds provided by the government
are estimated to have totalled 13.2 percent of GDP (Laeven and Valencia, 2012).
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The introduction of the policy package was followed by a sharp drop in NPL ratio (which
fell to 14.6 percent at end-2002). NPL eventually declined to 5.6 percent in 2007, representing
an overall NPL reduction of 22 percentage points over a six-year episode. Economic growth
picked up from an average of 2.5 percent in 1998-2001 to 3.6 percent in 2002 (the year of the
initial sharp drop in NPL ratio) to the average of 5.7 percent over the subsequent five-year
period (2003-07).
More recent examples of policy packages that delivered a swift reduction in the NPL ratio
at a country level include Spanish and Slovenian examples. Both countries following the 2009
global financial crisis, experienced a sharp increase in NPL ratio. Subsequently the authorities
established the AMCs (SAREB and BAMC, respectively) and supported selected banks with
direct recapitalisation. In response to the policy actions NPLs dropped sharply from the peak
of 14% and 18% in 2014 to the below 5% level in 2019. The GDP growth has followed the
previously described pattern, with a substantial contraction around the time of the peak NPL
episode and policy implementation and a recovery in the years following.
3.6.4. Discussion
If the links between policy packages and NPL reductions are strong and reductions in NPL
ratios yield large growth dividends, why have measures to reduce NPLs not been deployed on
a larger scale? In part, this may be because policies that are found to have been effective in
dealing with NPLs - such as a combination of AMCs and use of bailout funds - are costly. On
average, the fiscal cost of a bank bailout is estimated to have cost around 10 percent of GDP.
Some of these funds may be eventually recovered, for instance in the form of return on public
shareholding in banks or profits generated by public AMCs, others may be written off.
Even so, from a social perspective the net present value (NPV) of future gains in GDP
appears to clearly justify the initial fiscal cost. If future output is discounted at 8 percent, an
assumption based on the cost of funding for an emerging market with a modest credit rating,
the infinite-horizon NPV of additional output is estimated at more than 40 percent of today’s
GDP (this calculation conservatively assumes that only 20 percent of the difference in output
between an NPL reduction scenario and a high-NPL scenario persists after year 6). Stricter
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assumptions may yield lower estimates but the NPV of associated extra tax revenue is most
likely exceeding the initial fiscal outlay in most calculations.
At the same time, the balance of cost and benefit may be less straightforward over a horizon
of up to 4 years - the length of a typical electoral cycle. The NPV of extra output generated
over this period is between 4 and 9 percent of today’s GDP, depending on how fast NPL
ratio responds to the policy package. This highlights why policies aimed at reducing NPLs -
similarly to long-term infrastructure projects - may not always be politically attractive even if
their life-cycle socio-economic benefits are convincingly documented.
In addition, there is a stochastic element to this calculation: NPL policies raise the likeli-
hood of a sharp drop in NPLs but their success is not guaranteed and depends on the design and
implementation of the policy package. Centralised solutions to the overhang of NPLs involving
well-capitalised state-backed bad banks or asset management companies require strong admin-
istrative capacity and appropriate legal regimes. In some cases the authorities’ administrative
strength, rather than fiscal, may be a binding constraint.
3.6.5. Robustness checks
We run a series of robustness checks to validate the reported results. The first set of checks of
the propensity score matching analysis excludes episodes of NPL reduction where credit growth
made a sizeable contribution at the start of an episode. Credit growth contribution exceeded
80 percent only in 6 cases and in further 9 cases it ranged between 70 and 80 percent (the
corresponding specifications are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.9). The results
also hold for stricter requirements with respect to contribution made by the initial drop in the
stock of NPLs.
The second set of checks use various permutations of variables on which episodes are
matched, as well as their lagged values. These include the NPL ratio, investment-to-GDP
ratio, private credit-to-GDP ratio and the unemployment rate as well as the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators as a proxy for the quality of institutions (political stability, rule of law,
regulatory quality), selected questions from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervi-
sion Survey that look at the asset quality and provisioning rules, and the World Bank Doing
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Business indicators of the depth of the credit market, ease of insolvency proceedings and the
strength of legal rights (extended sets of results are available upon request).
We also test the robustness with respect to the magnitude of NPL ratio reduction used to
identify various episodes. The baseline analysis uses a 7 percent cutoff for episodes of high and
persistent NPLs and a 7 percentage point drop for episodes of NPL reductions. The results are
qualitatively similar if higher cut-offs are used, for instance 15 percent (see Column 5, Table
3.9).
[Insert Table 3.9]
A stricter definition can also be applied to the sharp drops in NPLs at the start of the
episodes used as the treatment group. A 7 percentage point drop in the first year (or a 10
percentage point drop over two years) leaves up to 90 treated episodes satisfying the common
support requirement. The estimated growth differentials are, if anything slightly higher than
those reported in Table 3.8 (see Table 3.10).
[Insert Table 3.10]
The large part of our analysis relies on the newly constructed spliced NPL ratio. We conduct
robustness checks replacing the spliced NPLs with ratios reported by WDI and find qualitatively
similar results although weaker statistical significance due to the reduced sample. We also
explored number of alternative specifications for the estimation of policy effects including:
inclusion of gradual reduction episodes to treatment group, inclusion of sharp NPL reduction
episodes that experienced the biggest NPL reduction following a few years of medium NPL
declines, changing the length of policy window from 3 years to 2 years and 1 year.
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3.7. Conclusion
The paper constructed a novel panel dataset of NPL ratios since 1990 covering more than
190 countries as well as a novel dataset of financial sector policies targeting NPL reductions.
Having identified episodes of high NPLs and NPL reductions episodes, the analysis covered the
”anatomy” of a typical episode of high NPLs, the effectiveness of policies aimed at reducing
NPLs, and the impact of sharp drops in NPL ratios on economic growth and other economic
outcomes.
The analysis shows that episodes of high NPLs are more than just by-products of (relatively
well-studied) crises: only 40 to 48 percent of cases of high NPLs episode can be linked to a
banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis. NPL levels seen in the 2010s are not exceptional by
historical standards, but if in the past instances of high NPLs were of ”acute” nature, today’s
malaise seems to be more ”chronic”, with NPLs building up slowly and persisting. Episodes
of high NPLs typically last for 6 years while NPL reductions tend to start after NPL ratio
surpasses 21 percent.
In the overwhelming majority, countries tend to eventually adopt policy packages aimed
at resolving NPLs. What appears to work best is a combination of availability of public
funds (bailouts) and establishment of specialised asset management companies (a market-based
solution). This package is 2 to 3 times more likely to achieve a fast and large reduction in
NPLs than introduction of AMCs as a stand-alone measure, while financial sector bailouts
in the absence of AMCs have no statistically or economically significant impact on NPLs, at
least within a three-year window. The effectiveness of adopted policies depends also on the
banking sector exposure to domestic sovereign debt. High sovereign bond holdings are in fact
detrimental to the effect of bailout packages on NPLs when bailout packages are implemented
in isolation. We attribute this effect to the circular funding argument.
A typical NPL reduction episode starts with a sharp drop in NPL ratio driven primarily by
falling stock of NPLs. Occasionally credit expansions results in a rapid fall in NPL ratio - but
such cases are rare and are predominantly found in shallow financial sectors (with a median
credit-to-GDP ratio of 15 percentage points).
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Once a steep drop in NPLs occurs, economic growth improves by more than 1.5 percentage
points a year over several years. This is reflected by a rebound in investment and consumption
growth and lower unemployment rate. The estimated effect is of similar order of magnitude
compared with the growth impact of sovereign debt restructurings estimated by Reinhart and
Trebesch (2016).
From a medium-to-long-term perspective, returns to policies aimed at reducing NPLs are
high. Yet high upfront fiscal costs combined with the delayed onset of benefits may make the
proposition insufficiently attractive to politicians with short electoral horizons. In other cases,
administrative capacity required to implement a coordinated policy package and to develop a
secondary market for NPLs may be a binding constraint.
Overall, the findings can be viewed as both good and bad news for the economies burdened
with non-performing loans. The good news is that policy packages can be effective in terms
of reducing the NPLs and lower NPL burden is, in turn, associated with significant economic
benefits in the medium term. Past episodes of high NPLs provide valuable insights into package
of measures that can help banks and corporations clean their balance sheets. The not-so-good
news come from the anatomy of the past NPL episodes. A successful NPL resolution may be
particularly challenging when the malaise is more chronic than acute, debt levels are high, the
use of public funds for recapitalisation is restricted and political horizons are short.
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3.8. Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Data description and sources
Variable Description Data Source
Sharp NPL
drop episode
Sequence of negative changes in NPL ratio that start at
minimum ratio of 7pp. The total reduction must exceed
7pp or more and at least one year with reduction bigger
than 5pp of NPL must be recorded at the beginning or in
the middle of the episode. We allow for one year in
between the subsequent NPL reductions for one-off NPL





Sequence of negative changes in NPL ratio that start at
minimum ratio of 7pp and the total reduction is 7pp or
bigger but no single year has min 5pp NPL reduction. We
allow for one year in between the NPL reductions when





When NPL is at a level of 7pp or higher and there is no
sequence of NPL drops that would reduce the NPL by
more than 7pp. NPL during persistence episodes can be





Dummy variable equals one when sharp drop episode





The total difference in NPL from the beginning to the end
of sharp drop or persistency episode. It is below -7 for






The total difference in NPL from the beginning to the end




The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. The data
combines WDI and Bankscope NPL measures according to




Dummy variable equals one when in a given year an Asset
Management Company was in operation in country. It
refers to publicly backed AMC, internal bad bank and





Dummy variable equals one when in a given year a
government has realised an implicit or explicit contingent




Dummy variable equals one when in any given year Asset
Management Company was operating but there have been
no financial sector bailouts and zero otherwise.
90
Tables and Figures
Data description and sources (continued)
Variable Description Data Source
Bailout only
Dummy variable equals one when in any given year
government has bailed-out a financial institution but no




Dummy variable equals one when in any given year Asset
Management Company was operating and there has been




Dummy variable equals one when in any given year the
borrower-targeting or financial institution-targeting
macroprudential regulation has tightened and zero
otherwise. This can include decrease in Loan-to-value
ratio, leverage of banks, interbank exposures, etc.
Cerutti et al.
(2015)
GDP pc Gross domestic product per capita in PPP IFS
GDP pc
growth
Percentage increase in gross domestic product per capita in
PPP
IFS
Inflation Percentage increase in CPI IFS
Advanced
dummy





Distance to frontier index is derived from questionnaire
responses by local insolvency practitioners and verified
through a study of laws and regulations as well as public
information on insolvency systems. Higher values represent






Average total government debt securities held by bank to
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Figure 3.1: Splicing - Comparison of the NPL time series - Argentina
The chart presents non-performing loans ratio time series based on time series data for Argentina. The
green line shows the WDI data, the red line shows the average Bankscope data aggregated to country-
year level and the blue line represents the additional data obtained through splicing procedure (see
section 3.3.1 for description).
Figure 3.2: Splicing - Comparison of the NPL time series - full sample
The chart presents non-performing loans ratio time series based on cross-country data for averaged for
all countries in our sample (equally weighted). The blue line shows the WDI data, the green one shows
the average Bankscope data aggregated to country-year level and the red line represents the spliced
NPL (see section 3.3.1 for detailed description of the procedure).
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Figure 3.3: Overlap in different types policy measures taken to address high NPLs
The chart represents the fraction of high NPL episodes and episodes of NPL reduction that coincide in
time with the use of particular policy type. Only 3.2% of NPL crises have not been addressed by one
















Figure 3.4: An average pattern of sharp NPL reduction episode.
The figure illustrates an average time series of selected indicators over the course of a sharp NPL
reduction episode which starts in year 0. The green line represents the evolution of NPL ratio (right
hand side axis) while the bars capture the growth in stock of non-performing loans (blue) and credit
growth (red).
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Figure 3.5: Two-stage approach illustration



















Figure 3.6: Output trajectories with and without NPL reduction
Based on the matching estimator where the treated group are cases of high NPLs where a sharp reduction
in NPL ratio occurs in year 0; the control group are cases where high NPLs persist. Propensity score
kernel matching with common support, where the matching variables are economic growth in year 0,
the level of NPLs and a number of other variables. The resulting growth rates are turned into an index
where value of 100 is assigned at year 0.
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Figure 3.7: Output trajectories with and without NPL reduction
Based on the matching estimator where the treated group are cases of high NPLs where a sharp reduction
in NPL ratio occurs in year 0; the control group are cases where high NPLs persist. Propensity score
kernel matching with common support, where the matching variables are economic growth in year 0,
the level of NPLs and a number of other variables. The resulting growth rates are turned into an index
where value of 100 is assigned at year 0.











Table 3.2: High NPL episodes characteristics
NPL reduction episodes have a minimum reduction in non-performing loans ratio of 7 percentage points;
episodes of high and persistent NPLs have a duration of minimum 4 years, no decrease in NPLs that
would be classified as sharp and a minimum initial NPL ratio of 7 percent.
Mean St. dev. Median Min Max
High and persistent NPLs
Duration (years) 5.9 2.0 5.5 4.0 17.0
Initial NPL ratio 11.4 5.3 9.5 7.0 42.4
Change in NPL ratio 8.1 8.5 6.8 -6.7 37.0
NPL ratio at the end 19.5 9.9 18.0 7.0 59.8
NPL reduction episodes
Duration (years) 5.8 3.3 5.0 2.0 15.0
Initial NPL ratio 24.0 13.8 21.2 8.0 95.3
Change in NPL ratio -17.4 10.9 -14.2 -69.4 -7.1
NPL ratio at the end 6.7 7.5 4.4 0.1 66.4
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Table 3.3: Means for selected variables by episode type
Means are reported in percent across all years in an episode, unless indicated otherwise. NPL reduction
episodes have a minimum reduction in non-performing loans ratio of 7 percentage points; episodes of
high and persistent NPLs have a duration of minimum 4 years, no decrease in NPLs that would be
classified as sharp and a minimum initial NPL ratio of 7 percent.
NPL reductions Persistent NPL Low NPL
All Sharp Gradual
Number of episodes 178 149 29 104 144
NPL ratio (start) 23.92 25.90 13.77 11.37 3.50
NPL ratio (end) 6.64 7.22 3.68 19.45 3.56
GDP pc (start) 13,137 11,591 20,816 15,433 19,980
GDP growth (start) 3.02 3.36 1.31 3.11 4.24
Public debt, %GDP (start) 64.19 66.96 53.54 54.20 48.72
Inflation, % (start) 7.19 7.40 6.21 4.72 4.86
Private sector credit, % (start) 31.09 26.79 51.29 45.44 55.30
Annual GDP growth 5.51 5.85 4.46 2.90 3.66
Annual investment growth 9.49 10.40 6.73 4.75 5.12
Annual consumption growth 5.07 5.50 3.78 2.79 3.99
Annual export growth 7.89 8.59 6.12 5.64 4.70
Unemployment rate (start) 9.76 9.97 8.72 9.61 8.80
Unemployment rate (end) 8.75 9.06 7.22 10.23 8.12
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Table 3.4: Effectiveness of NPL targeting policies - first stage probit
The dependent variable in all regressions is the dummy variable equal to one when a country has
experienced a sharp reduction in NPLs and zero otherwise. The independent variables in regression
3.6 are level of spliced NPL ratio, dummy for AMC, Bailout and Macroprudential tightening, GDP per
capita (PPP), GDP pc (PPP) growth, CPI growth, dummy variable indicating advanced countries and
insolvency resolution index. See table 3.1 for more detailed definitions. Column 0 reports OLS results
as baseline, columns 1-4 report probit results - first part of Two Part Model. The regression includes
only country-years that have NPL ratio above 7pp and have either experienced a persistency or sharp
drop episode. Column 4 includes country FE. Standard errors are reported in the brackets.
*, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sharp reduction dummy
NPL -0.213*** -0.0531*** -0.0488*** -0.0809*** -0.0684***
(0.0358) (0.00465) (0.00495) (0.00876) (0.00668)
Policy AMC 5.272*** 0.429*** 0.449*** 0.669*** 0.538**
(0.908) (0.0923) (0.0996) (0.16) (0.241)
Policy Bailout -1.367 -0.278** -0.242 -0.212 -0.376*
(1.352) (0.139) (0.152) (0.246) (0.214)
Macroprudential tightening -0.822 0.101 0.0738 -0.341 0.131
(1.858) (0.185) (0.201) (0.26) (0.245)
GDP pc -0.0176 0.000229 0.00324 0.0142** 0.0303
(0.0307) (0.00196) (0.00332) (0.00651) (0.0238)
GDP pc growth 41.69*** 6.546*** 9.005*** 9.433*** 8.078***
(6.496) (0.803) (1.062) (1.498) (1.406)
Inflation -0.0372 0.0292 3.824*** -0.0111
(0.858) (0.103) (1.114) (0.133)
Advanced dummy -3.731*** -0.221* -0.277 -2.011
(1.148) (0.124) (0.236) (1.644)
Insolvency Resolution -0.00698*
(0.00364)
Constant 10.69*** 0.178** 0.077 0.254
(0.743) (0.0806) (0.0905) (0.181)
Observations 1248 1472 1248 645 1002
Model OLS Probit
Country FE Yes
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.151 0.241 0.318
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Table 3.5: Effectiveness of NPL targeting policies - second stage GLM conditional on
sharp reduction
The dependent variable in all regressions is the difference in NPL from the beginning until the end of
sharp reduction; the variable is censored at NPL equal to 7pp the minimum required reduction over the
period to qualify as sharp reduction. The independent variables in regression 3.7 are level of spliced
NPL ratio, dummy for AMC, Bailout and Macroprudential tightening, GDP per capita (PPP), GDP
pc (PPP) growth, CPI growth, dummy variable indicating advanced countries and insolvency resolution
index. See table 3.1 for more detailed definitions. Columns 1-4 report Generalised Linear Model results
- second part of Two Part Model. GLM assumes a gamma distribution of dependent variable and
identity link function. The regression includes only country-years that have NPL ratio above 7pp and
have experienced a sharp drop episode. Column 4 includes country FE. Standard errors are reported in
the brackets.
*, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Magnitude of sharp reduction (%)
NPL 0.266*** 0.207*** 0.149 -0.0977***
(0.0582) (0.0618) (0.105) (0.0354)
Policy AMC 3.460*** 2.805*** 1.66 0.578
(1.109) (1.067) (1.5) (0.78)
Policy Bailout 1.853 3.59 4.012 -1.217
(2.128) (2.295) (3.104) (0.931)
Macroprudential tightening -2.719 -4.810*** -2.956 0.587
(1.868) (1.792) (2.346) (0.724)
GDP pc -0.0716*** -0.0153 -0.0593 -0.120*
(0.0113) (0.0206) (0.0455) (0.0714)
GDP pc growth 12.16 23.56* 53.46*** -8.346**
(7.954) (12.67) (17.32) (3.838)
Inflation 6.255 15.63 -2.612
(7.173) (14.35) (2.149)




Constant 17.93*** 19.16*** 22.35***
(0.824) (1.218) (2.139)
Country FE Yes
N GLM 597 503 277 503
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Table 3.6: Effectiveness of NPL targeting policies - probit and OLS
The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is a dummy variable equal to one when a country has experienced
a sharp reduction in NPLs and zero otherwise - when the country had persistently high NPL ratio. The
dependent variable in columns 3-4 is equal to the total change in NPL over the duration of the sharp drop
or persistency episode; it is naturally below -7pp for sharp drop episodes and above -7pp for persistency
episodes. The independent variables are level of NPL, dummy for AMC without Bailout, Bailout without
AMC, combination of AMC and Bailout, GDP per capita (PPP), GDP pc (PPP) growth, CPI growth
and a variable indicating advanced countries. See table 3.1 for more detailed definitions. Columns 1-2
report probit results and columns 3-4 report OLS results. The regressions include only episodes that
have initial NPL ratio above 7% and have either experienced a sharp reduction or persistency - one
observation per episode. Standard errors are reported in the brackets.
*, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sharp Reduction dummy NPL change over episode
NPL spliced -0.0163** -0.0158** 0.574*** 0.574***
(0.00664) (0.00617) (0.0598) (0.0536)
Policy AMC only 0.326* 0.329* -4.418** -4.473**
(0.195) (0.189) (2.13) (1.985)
Policy Bailout only 0.19 0.162 1.097 0.518
(0.357) (0.298) (3.494) (2.91)
Policy AMC and Bailout 0.838*** 0.820*** -7.804*** -8.410***
(0.241) (0.229) (2.653) (2.463)
GDP pc -0.00334 0.00275 0.0935 0.0533
(0.00691) (0.00538) (0.0751) (0.0557)
GDP pc growth 4.639*** 4.500*** -17.71* -20.03**
(1.521) (1.263) (10.23) (9.015)
Inflation -0.144 0.303
(0.169) (1.009)
Advanced dummy -0.443* -0.428** 2.507 2.572
(0.23) (0.205) (2.408) (2.057)
Constant -0.463*** -0.582*** -8.580*** -7.674***
(0.143) (0.125) (1.43) (1.208)
Observations 428 522 428 522
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.063
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.203
Model Probit Probit OLS OLS
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Table 3.7: Sovereign-bank nexus distortion of NPL targeting policies
The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is a dummy variable equal to one when a country has experienced
a sharp reduction in NPLs and zero otherwise - when the country had persistently high NPL level. The
dependent variable in columns 4-6 is equal to the total change in NPL over the duration of sharp drop
or persistency episode; it is naturally below -7pp for sharp drop episodes and above -7pp for persistency
episodes.
The independent variables are level of NPL, dummy for AMC without Bailout, Bailout without AMC,
combination of AMC and Bailout, average sovereign bondholdings held by banks (% of total assets,
weighted by total assets), interactions of sovereign bondholdings with policy types and macro-controls:
GDP per capita (PPP), GDP pc (PPP) growth and dummy variable indicating advanced countries. See
table 3.1 for more detailed definitions.
Columns 1-3 report probit results and columns 4-6 report OLS results. The regressions include only
country-years that have NPL ratio above 7pp and have either experienced a persistency or sharp drop
episode - multiple observations per episode. Columns 3 and 6 control for country-year fixed effects.
Standard errors are reported in the brackets.
*, ** and *** represent significance of the result at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sharp reduction dummy NPL change over episode
NPL -0.0555*** -0.0595*** -0.0658*** 0.722*** 0.770*** 0.760***
(0.00469) (0.0055) (0.00834) (0.0462) (0.0528) (0.0562)
AMC only 0.464*** 0.562*** 0.189 -6.799*** -9.304*** -6.634**
(0.107) (0.204) (0.406) (1.352) (2.459) (2.927)
Bailout only 0.0228 0.436 0.37 -0.356 -2.799 -5.141*
(0.165) (0.293) (0.445) (2.006) (3.127) (3.109)
AMC and Bailout 0.599*** 0.557** 0.991** -8.593*** -7.245*** -9.395***
(0.135) (0.23) (0.501) (1.698) (2.75) (3.102)
S. bondholdings 1.013** 3.209*** -8.136 -8.18
(0.506) (1.243) (5.899) (7.966)
S. bondholdings × -0.613 2.3 10.52 -3.167
AMC only (1.371) (2.468) (16.61) (17.66)
S. bondholdings × -5.419* -5.778* 20.12 20.61
Bailout only (2.948) (3.392) (27.64) (25.43)
S. bondholdings × 0.404 0.794 -20.82 -11.74
AMC and Bailout (1.501) (2.754) (17.17) (18.48)
GDP pc 0.00503** 0.00722*** 0.0134 0.0223 -0.0124 0.0634
(0.00253) (0.00278) (0.0172) (0.0305) (0.0309) (0.109)
GDP pc growth 6.500*** 8.094*** 5.529*** -50.56*** -50.88*** -28.44***
(0.804) (1.037) (1.651) (7.374) (8.106) (7.654)
Advanced dummy -0.362*** -0.439*** -1.015 4.153*** 5.693*** -7.273
(0.111) (0.121) (1.646) (1.357) (1.388) (10.94)
Constant 0.193** 0.0938 -10.03*** -9.278***
(0.0826) (0.113) (0.941) (1.247)
Observations 1472 1115 790 1472 1115 1115
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.155 0.187 0.384 0.199 0.233 0.511
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS
Country-year FE Yes Yes
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Table 3.8: Results of propensity score matching estimating the impact of sharp NPL
reduction on economic outcomes
The table reports the estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated from propensity score matching
exercise for five consecutive years since the beginning of the episode. Treatment is defined as an episode
of a sharp NPL reduction, of at least 5 percentage points in the year t = 0. Controls are defined as cases
of high and persistent NPL episodes, where NPLs remain above the 7 percent threshold for a minimum of
4 years. The matching procedure is using propensity score from kernel matching with common support.
Treatments and controls are matched on GDP growth, GDP per capita level, the initial level of NPLs,
public debt ratio to GDP and inflation in the year t = 0. Standard errors are reported in the brackets.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5
GDP growth 1.549** 2.253*** 2.330*** 2.582*** 1.926***
(0.663) (0.632) (0.564) (0.558) (0.536)
Investment growth 5.893** 7.239** 8.388*** 3.291 5.087**
(2.914) (3.561) (2.309) (3.011) (2.433)
Consumption growth 3.423** 2.583*** 2.876*** 3.857*** 3.216***
(1.358) (0.933) (0.981) (0.998) (1.120)
Export growth 0.0225 1.983 4.352** 0.707 1.616
(2.152) (1.863) (1.907) (1.90) (2.154)
Unemployment rate -2.741** -2.663** -2.464** -2.141** -2.067**
(1.106) (1.109) (1.080) (1.063) (1.042)
Controls 99 102 108 114 119
Treated 117 116 110 108 107
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Table 3.9: Robustness test - Results of propensity score matching estimating the impact
of sharp NPL reduction on economic outcomes using stricter definition of NPL reduction
The table reports the estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated from propensity score matching
exercise for five consecutive years since the beginning of the episode. Treatment is defined as an episode
of a sharp NPL reduction, of at least 7 percentage points in the year t = 0 or 10 percentage points over
two years. Controls are defined as cases of high and persistent NPL episodes, where NPLs remain above
the 7 percent threshold for a minimum of 4 years. The matching procedure is using propensity score
from kernel matching with common support. Treatments and controls are matched on GDP growth,
GDP per capita level, the initial level of NPLs, public debt ratio to GDP and inflation in the year t = 0.
Standard errors are reported in the brackets. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4 t+ 5
GDP growth 1.367** 2.508*** 2.495*** 3.211*** 2.380***
(0.681) (0.653) (0.698) (0.593) (0.591)
Investment growth 8.691** 8.944** 7.298*** 4.817 7.311***
(3.584) (4.338) (2.694) (3.422) (2.641)
Consumption growth 2.689** 2.614** 2.504** 4.183*** 3.370***
(1.055) (1.076) (1.052) (1.089) (1.142)
Export growth 0.084 3.729* 3.528 1.322 3.050
(2.389) (2.143) (2.294) (2.185) (2.074)
Unemployment rate -3.057** -3.014** -2.946** -2.468** -2.129**
(1.144) (1.157) (1.138) (1.115) (1.082)
Controls 99 102 108 114 119
Treated 90 89 84 83 82
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Table 3.10: Robustness test - Results of propensity score matching estimating the impact
of sharp NPL reduction on economic outcomes, alternative specifications
The table reports the estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated from propensity score matching
exercise for years 2-4 since the beginning of the episode. Treatment is defined as an episode of a sharp
NPL reduction, of at least 5 percentage points in the year t = 0. Controls are defined as cases of high
and persistent NPL episodes, where NPLs remain above the 7 percent threshold for a minimum of 4
years. The matching procedure is using propensity score from kernel matching with common support.
Treatments and controls are matched on GDP growth, GDP per capita level, the initial level of NPLs,
public debt ratio to GDP and inflation in the year t = 0. Column (1) excludes the episodes of sharp
NPL reduction that where credit growth contributed in more than 80% to the sharp decrease of NPL
ratio. Column (2) excludes the episodes of sharp NPL reduction that where credit growth contributed
in more than 70% to the sharp decrease of NPL ratio.
Columns (3) and (4) use extended set of matching variables; matching also on the investment-to-GDP
ratio, private credit-to-GDP ratio and unemployment rate. Column (3) matches on variables in the year
t = 0, while column (4) matches on lagged variables t = −1. Column (5) uses a stricter definition of
NPL episode using a 15 percentage points threshold in lieu of 7 percent. Standard errors are reported
in the brackets. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01













GDP growth 2.689*** 2.364*** 2.553*** 2.814*** 2.119***
(0.539) (0.471) (0.728) (0.536) (0.562)
Investment growth 8.092*** 7.908*** 8.599*** 6.532*** 8.446***
(2.521) (2.193) (2.892) (1.308) (2.788)
Consumption growth 2.596*** 2.451*** 1.385** 2.652*** 2.457***
(0.574) (0.538) (0.691) (0.525) (0.713)
Export growth 2.87 2.519** 3.885** 1.400 2.128
(1.502) (1.246) (1.884) (1.407) (1.564)
Unemployment rate -2.614** -2.690** 1.304 -2.517* -1.797
(1.230) (1.177) (1.908) (1.326) (1.417)
Controls 88 95 85 88 88
Treated 76 41 69 67 91
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Table 3.11: List of sharp NPL reduction episodes
List of sharp NPL reduction episodes in alphabetical order.. ISO is a 2-digit ISO code, Start and End
capture the first year and last year of the sharp reduction period. Initial NPL is the NPL in the year
prior to episode start (lagged, in %), NPL change over episode in %.
ISO Country Start End Initial
NPL
∆NPL ISO Country Start End Initial
NPL
∆NPL
AE United Arab Emi-
rates
2002 2009 15.7 -13.4 LT Lithuania 1998 2006 22.2 -21.6
AF Afghanistan 2009 2010 75.66 -48.58 LT Lithuania 2010 2016 23.99 -18.19
AF Afghanistan 2011 2014 49.9 -45.05 LV Latvia 1996 2007 19.71 -19.21
AI Anguilla 2004 2008 16.18 -10.19 LV Latvia 2011 2017 15.93 -12.09
AL Albania 2000 2002 24.25 -21.59 LY Libya 2012 2015 38.1 -20.44
AM Armenia 1998 1999 23.36 -17.36 MA Morocco 2005 2011 19.4 -14.6
AM Armenia 2002 2006 24.4 -22.5 MD Moldova 1999 2008 33.13 -29.43
AR Argentina 1995 1999 27.95 -22.65 MG Madagascar 2003 2006 28.58 -21.26
AR Argentina 2003 2016 18.1 -16.36 MG Madagascar 2007 2009 21.66 -17.01
AZ Azerbaijan 2002 2009 28 -25.62 MK Macedonia, FYR 1995 1996 94.15 -27.72
BA Bosnia and Herze-
govina
2000 2008 23.27 -20.25 MK Macedonia, FYR 1998 1999 95.3 -62.4
BB Barbados 1996 2006 22.56 -18.19 MK Macedonia, FYR 2000 2009 41.3 -34.59
BD Bangladesh 2000 2007 41.1 -28.3 ML Mali 1994 2003 38.1 -32.82
BD Bangladesh 2008 2011 14.5 -8.77 MN Mongolia 2001 2004 25.01 -14.69
BF Burkina Faso 2011 2015 13.57 -9.86 MN Mongolia 2009 2010 17.72 -13.39
BG Bulgaria 1998 1999 24.4 -8 MN Mongolia 2013 2015 14.68 -9.67
BG Bulgaria 2000 2005 26.7 -24.7 MO Macao, China 2001 2002 16.84 -9.21
BG Bulgaria 2016 2017 20.6 -7.43 MO Macao, China 2003 2014 12.81 -12.71
BJ Benin 1996 1997 28.13 -17.52 MR Mauritania 2009 2011 30.43 -20.08
BJ Benin 2005 2006 18.43 -8.72 MW Malawi 2003 2004 25.23 -18.23
BM Bermuda 2010 2011 14.73 -12.54 MW Malawi 2014 2016 15.12 -12.43
BY Belarus 2002 2009 14.9 -13.2 MZ Mozambique 1999 2000 22.52 -13.58
BZ Belize 2014 2016 38.1 -10.98 MZ Mozambique 2002 2010 23.4 -21.56
CI Ivory Cost 2005 2008 32.71 -23.51 NG Nigeria 1994 1999 35.47 -16.07
CI Ivory Cost 2009 2011 16.03 -12.65 NG Nigeria 2003 2009 21.4 -15.15
CI Ivory Cost 2013 2015 22.84 -9.1 NG Nigeria 2010 2015 37.25 -34.29
CN China 2002 2013 29.8 -28.85 NI Nicaragua 2002 2007 11.73 -9.57
CR Costa Rica 1997 2008 31.91 -30.71 NP Nepal 2006 2007 11.48 -8.78
CU Cuba 2005 2007 12.9 -11.86 OM Oman 1996 2000 14.39 -8.39
CU Cuba 2008 2013 13.64 -9.07 PE Peru 2004 2009 14.8 -12.6
CV Cape Verde 1995 1996 24.37 -7.58 PG Papua New Guinea 1993 1995 25 -18.19
CV Cape Verde 1999 2002 21.21 -17.24 PG Papua New Guinea 2001 2007 23.52 -23.13
CV Cape Verde 2008 2010 13.15 -8.97 PH Philippines 2002 2016 27.7 -25.81
CW Curacao 2003 2004 25.88 -8.72 PK Pakistan 2002 2007 23.4 -16.1
CW Curacao 2005 2007 23.52 -20.23 PL Poland 1995 1998 23.05 -12.55
CZ Czech Republic 1997 1999 27.73 -7.43 PL Poland 2004 2009 21.2 -18.38
CZ Czech Republic 2001 2008 29.3 -26.93 PS Palestinian Terri-
tory
2009 2015 19.25 -15.41
EC Ecuador 2001 2014 31 -27.44 PY Paraguay 2004 2011 20.6 -19.16
EG Egypt 2006 2016 26.5 -19.3 QA Qatar 2002 2009 15.44 -14.24
ET Ethiopia 2003 2005 32.87 -17.63 RO Romania 1999 2003 71.7 -69.4
ET Ethiopia 2006 2010 21.92 -18.8 RO Romania 2014 2017 21.87 -10.57
GD Grenada 2006 2008 11.37 -8.34 RS Serbia 1996 1999 18.8 -13.28
GE Georgia 1999 2001 13.04 -9.22 RS Serbia 2001 2002 27.53 -12.78
GE Georgia 2002 2007 11.6 -10.79 RU Russia 1999 2007 17.3 -14.9
GM Gambia 2014 2016 19.07 -12.58 RW Rwanda 2002 2015 74.1 -68.88
GN Guinea 2004 2007 17.63 -12.07 SE Sweden 1994 2008 10.95 -10.87
GN Guinea 2010 2015 23.18 -17.12 SK Slovak Republic 1996 1997 39.43 -14.24
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List of sharp NPL reduction episodes (continued)
ISO Country Start End Initial
NPL





2004 2007 9.82 -7.12 SK Slovak Republic 1999 2005 31.6 -29
GQ Equatorial
Guinea
2009 2012 16.18 -11.77 SL Sierra Leone 2001 2004 37.9 -30.5
GR Greece 2000 2002 15.5 -9.9 SL Sierra Leone 2007 2010 26.9 -16.31
GY Guyana 2004 2006 35.81 -31.57 SM San Marino 2012 2013 34.05 -13.76
HR Croatia 1997 1998 14.76 -7.93 SN Senegal 1994 1995 37.94 -24.92
HU Hungary 1994 2005 17.2 -15.4 SN Senegal 1997 1999 29 -15.03
IL Israel 1999 2010 9.9 -8.5 SZ Swaziland 1997 2004 31 -29
IQ Iraq 2010 2011 36.08 -9.36 TG Togo 1996 1998 20.27 -10.6
IQ Iraq 2013 2015 34.95 -19.13 TG Togo 2002 2004 31.13 -9.49
IS Iceland 2011 2016 18.3 -16.6 TG Togo 2005 2008 23.86 -18.42
JO Jordan 2002 2008 19.3 -15.2 TH Thailand 1999 2002 42.9 -31.4
KE Kenya 2000 2002 33.7 -20.6 TJ Tajikistan 2006 2008 58.13 -53.33
KE Kenya 2004 2012 34.9 -30.47 TM Turkmenistan 2010 2013 10.56 -8.28
KG Kyrgyz Rep. 2001 2005 30.9 -22.9 TR Turkey 2002 2008 29.3 -25.98
KG Kyrgyz Rep. 2006 2008 15.36 -11.76 TT Trinidad and To-
bago
1994 1999 11.13 -8.07
KG Kyrgyz Rep. 2011 2015 15.8 -11.3 TZ Tanzania 2000 2003 25.2 -16
KH Cambodia 2002 2003 25.55 -13.94 TZ Tanzania 2004 2006 12.93 -7.31
KN Sain Kitts and
Nevis
2001 2004 16.95 -9.91 UA Ukraine 2000 2003 35.8 -13.9
KR Korea, Rep. 2001 2009 8.9 -8.33 UA Ukraine 2007 2009 59.76 -55.87
KW Kuwait 2001 2008 19.2 -15.4 UG Uganda 1999 2003 20.2 -17.2
KY Cayman Islands 2003 2004 11.94 -7.57 UY Uruguay 2003 2009 33.9 -33.39
KY Cayman Islands 2011 2014 15.05 -11.33 VN Vietnam 1999 2005 15.11 -14.08
KZ Kazakhstan 2002 2007 37.71 -35.31 XK Kosovo 2009 2012 21.96 -13.28
KZ Kazakhstan 2011 2017 20.93 -13.03 XK Kosovo 2011 2014 15 -13.28
LA Lao PDR 2010 2014 25.89 -25.18 YE Yemen, Rep. 2007 2010 24.52 -10.62
LB Lebanon 1994 1999 13.68 -10.08 ZM Zambia 2001 2004 26 -20.7
LR Liberia 2006 2009 34.46 -28.58 ZW Zimbabwe 2001 2004 19.55 -16.89
LR Liberia 2011 2014 38.1 -24.02 ZW Zimbabwe 2005 2007 20.95 -20.39
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Table 3.12: List of gradual NPL reduction episodes










BN Brunei Darussalam 2010 2016 9.36 -8.96 MT Malta 2002 2005 18 -11.5
BO Bolivia 2003 2013 17.7 -16.2 MV Maldives 2011 2017 24.83 -14.2
BR Brazil 1999 2008 10.2 -7.22 MX Mexico 1999 2006 11.3 -9.8
CO Colombia 2000 2006 13.6 -10.9 MY Malaysia 2002 2016 17.8 -16.2
DO Dominican Republic 2004 2015 8.7 -7.16 OM Oman 2004 2009 12.5 -10.5
DZ Algeria 2010 2015 21.14 -11.93 SA Saudi Arabia 2000 2006 11.4 -9.5
GB United Kingdom 1993 1993 10.98 0 SD Sudan 2011 2016 14 -8.9
GD Grenada 1999 2005 12.32 -7.29 SG Singapore 2002 2015 8 -7.24
HN Honduras 2000 2008 11.2 -8.1 SI Slovenia 2013 2017 15.18 -7.21
IN India 1998 2010 15.7 -13.49 TH Thailand 2003 2014 16.5 -14.2
JM Jamaica 2000 2007 13.53 -10.93 TN Tunisia 2004 2012 24.2 -12.9
KH Cambodia 2004 2016 14.47 -12.88 VE Venezuela, RB 1995 1998 10.63 -7.83
KW Kuwait 2010 2017 11.5 -9.1 VE Venezuela, RB 2003 2006 9.2 -8.1





Abstract Authorities in many countries recently deployed policies to reduce non-
performing loans (NPL). This paper sheds light on the effectiveness of such policies.
Using data on ownership of subsidiaries of foreign banks in Emerging Europe, we first
show that changes in NPLs have an impact of NPLs of banks’ foreign subsidiaries. The
transmission is driven by internal capital markets, consolidated supervision and, to some
extent, by the exchange of knowledge within banking groups. We then use a novel dataset
on policies deployed to address high levels of NPLs in a large number of countries over
the period 1990-2013 and bank-level data to assess the impact of various NPL policies
on bank subsidiaries operating in foreign jurisdictions. The difference-in-difference iden-
tification strategy exploits the exogenous timing of introduction of policies in foreign
jurisdictions. Establishment of asset management companies (AMCs) with the view to
develop a secondary market for impaired loans is found to have positive impact on foreign
bank subsidiaries’ NPL reduction. AMCs are estimated to be associated with a 12-20
percent yearly reduction in the stock of NPLs over several years. The social benefits of
policies to reduce NPLs may be larger than previously thought - on account of positive
cross-border spillovers.
Keywords: non-performing loans, cross-border spillover, asset management compa-
nies
JEL Codes: F42, G21, G28, G33, O40
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4.1. Introduction
A decade after the global financial crisis of 2008-09, balance sheets of banks in many
advanced economies and emerging markets remained clogged by non-performing loans
(NPLs) - broadly understood as loans that are at least 90 days in arrears. Persistence
of NPLs after the 2008-09 crisis has brought the issue of NPL resolution to the forefront
of policy debate, with countries from Italy to India belatedly putting forward packages
aiming to reduce NPL ratios. Such packages may include establishment of Asset Man-
agement Companies (AMCs) specialising in dealing with NPLs, provision of public sector
funds for bank recapitalisation with the view to facilitate management and write-off of
NPLs, changes to loans classification and provisioning rules and amendments to tax
treatments of NPLs, among others.
Financial sector shocks and policy changes have been shown to affect banks across
borders. Foreign bank affiliates respond to financial shocks in home territories of parent
banks (Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000; Schnabl, 2012; Cerutti and Claessens, 2017)
reflecting the workings of internal capital markets of banking groups (de Haas and van
Lelyveld, 2010; Ongena et al., 2013a). Macroprudential measures can also significantly
affect behaviour of bank affiliates abroad (Aiyar et al., 2014a,b; Ongena et al., 2013b;
Berrospide et al., 2017) and monetary policy is transmitted internationally (Hills et al.,
2017; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012).
This paper investigates whether changes in NPLs affect foreign subsidiaries of banks
and evaluates cross-border effects of policies aimed at reducing NPLs. The estimates of
such cross-border effects are of major interest for two reasons.
First, policy packages aimed at reducing NPLs tend to be costly, at least in the short-
to-medium term. Positive cross-border spillovers of such policies imply higher welfare
benefits of policy actions. In certain setting, for instance in the context of the European
Union (EU), such cross-border effects can be internalised in the decision making process,
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strengthening the case for a more forceful (and, perhaps, more centralised) approach to
addressing high NPLs.
Second, cross-border estimates can be seen as the lower bound of the effectiveness of
NPL policies in the jurisdiction where they are deployed. Coupled with information on
the magnitude of transmission of changes in NPLs within banking groups these estimates
also shed light on the direct impact of NPL policies. Estimating the effectiveness of NPL
policies within jurisdictions with precision is difficult (see Chapter 3) and much of the
evidence to date is based on case studies of various episodes (Baudino and Yun 2017, for
a recent summary of lessons learned). The use of policies in response to high and rising
NPLs and the timing of such policies is arguably non-random. As a result, effective
policies adopted early in the crisis may look ineffective due to the severity of economic
downturn, and the effect of policies adopted late may be estimated with positive bias.
In contrast, estimates of cross-border effects of NPL reductions exploit arguably ex-
ogenous variation in the deployment of policies. Identification comes from comparing
the evolution of NPLs in domestic banks and in subsidiaries of foreign banks in the same
year and operating in the same jurisdiction. This approach accounts for the relevant
differences in macroeconomic conditions and policy environments across countries and
across time.
To estimate the transmission of changes in NPLs from parent to subsidiary banks
we use detailed information on bank ownership in Central and South-Eastern Europe
(CESEE) based on De Haas et al. (2015). This region is particularly interesting, due to
the large NPL variation over time as well as across-borders and the common presence
of foreign bank subsidiaries, however the data is limited to the 1990-2010 period. To
estimate the cross-border effects of policies aimed at reducing NPLs, we use a novel
dataset on policy actions in a large number of countries over the period 1990-2015 and
bank-level data from Bankscope database in combination with bank-level data on bank
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ownership (Claessens and Van Horen, 2015)26.
The paper contributes to two distinct strands of literature. The first, briefly touched
upon above, examines cross-border transmission of various financial sector shocks through
bank ownership networks. This paper extends the analysis of cross-border policy spillovers
by looking specifically at the evolution of non-performing loans and a broader set of pol-
icy measures. The second strand looks at the aftermaths of banking crises and, more
specifically, at approaches to dealing with the overhang of non-performing loans in the
banking sector and their effectiveness. The analysis reveals that a one percent reduction
in the stock of parent’s bank NPLs is associated with a 0.6 of a percentage point reduc-
tion in the stock of NPLs of a subsidiary bank operating in a foreign jurisdiction when
parent’s NPL levels are high (above the 5 percentage points NPL ratio threshold). This
transmission appears to be driven largely by the workings of internal capital markets
within banking groups and consolidated supervision and, to some extent, by the transfer
of knowledge in the area of NPL resolution. We find that banks with parents located
in Basel jurisdiction exhibit higher co-movement in NPL stock, those whose parents are
better capitalised tend to have a slower growth of NPLs and that those subsidiaries lo-
cated close to their parent have stronger credit risk transmission. Our analysis however
does not allow to quantify the magnitude of each channel.
As a result of this transmission, policies aimed at reducing NPLs can have detectable
cross-border effects. In particular, the establishment of Asset Management Companies
(AMCs) specialising in dealing with NPLs has an impact on NPL resolution in banks’ for-
eign subsidiaries. This impact does not appear to be enhanced by public sector bailouts
in the foreign jurisdiction. We estimate that the establishment of an AMC in the ju-
risdiction of a parent bank reduces the stock of NPLs on the balance sheets of foreign
26The CESEE sample allows us to map directly the links between the subsidiary-parent bank pairs,
however the sample is limited to a shorter time period. The ownership data from Claessens and Van
Horen (2015) allows us to extend the analysis until 2015 and to include a larger number of countires, at
the expense of granularity, as this data set allows only to map the subsidiary-parent country link rather
than subsidiary-parent bank ID.
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subsidiary banks by an additional 12 percent per annum compared with domestic banks
in the same jurisdiction. In contrast, financial sector bailouts not accompanied by the
establishment of AMCs appear to have a weak impact on NPL ratios, if any. Changes
in loan classification stringency, revisions to provisioning rules or macroprudential policy
tightening do not appear to have significant cross-border effects on NPL ratios or credit
availability.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the adverse eco-
nomic effects associated with high NPLs as well as financial sector policies that can help
reduce NPL ratios. Section 4.3 explores possible transmission of such policies across
borders. Section 4.4 estimates the impact of changes in NPLs on NPLs of banks’ for-
eign affiliates. Section 4.5 examines the cross-border effects of various policies aimed at
reducing NPLs and infers their likely effectiveness in the domestic jurisdiction. It also
revisits possible cross-border transmission channels of NPLs in the context of the results
of empirical analysis. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. Policies to reduce NPLs and their potential cross-border effects
4.2.1. Adverse effects of non-performing loans
A high ratio of non-performing loans to total loans tends to have a negative impact on
bank lending and economic activity. High NPLs require greater loan loss provisions,
reducing capital resources available for lending, denting bank efficiency and profitability
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Keeton and Morris, 1987; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Jiménez
and Saurina, 2006). The NPL exposure focuses bank’s internal resources on loan recov-
ery work, including repossession of collateral and its disposal. These efforts are costly
(Townsend, 1979) and come at the expense of expanding business.
Undercapitalised banks may take excessive risk in a gamble to boost profitability
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which may exacerbate the NPL problem further. Recent
studies find a positive correlation between banks’ leverage ratios or loan-to-asset ratios
and NPLs (Klein, 2013; Garrido et al., 2016). High NPLs ultimately predict bank failures
(González-Hermosillo et al., 1997).
High NPLs may also result in a misallocation of resources in an economy. Zombie
lending - channelling new credit predominantly to troubled companies - may help to
prevent second-round business failures but at the expense of starving more productive
parts of the economy of credit (see Peek and Rosengren 2005; Caballero et al. 2008).
Breaking this vicious cycle requires large capital injections (Giannetti and Simonov,
2013). Reducing NPLs can thus be associated with a sizeable growth dividend (see
Chapter 3.6).
Dealing with non-performing loans
Recognising the adverse effects of NPLs, policymakers adopted a number of measures
aimed at accelerating NPL reductions. The first step is to transparently assess the
quality of bank assets and build up provisions against expected losses. Relying on banks’
voluntary efforts in this area may not be sufficient and regulators may need to guide
banks with respect to loan classification and provisions as well as assist banks with
developing special capacity to deal with NPLs. When judicial capacity to deal with
NPLs on a case-by-case basis is lacking, creating a sound legal framework for timely
corporate restructuring is crucial. For instance, centralised out-of-court debt workout
programmes were actively used in Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1990s
(Woo, 2000). In this paper, we consider five types of financial sector policies that can
influence NPL ratios: the establishment of an asset management company, provision
of bailouts to the financial sector (for instance, public funds for bank recapitalisation),
changes to macroprudential regulation, changes to loan classification and changes to
provisioning stringency, we discuss these in turn.
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Asset management companies
The establishment of ”bad banks”, also referred to as asset management companies,
encourages the development of a secondary market for NPLs. It enables commercial
banks to transfer NPLs to a specialised entity at a fair (market) value. The AMCs can
choose to securitise and resell impaired loans in a secondary market, use their expertise
to partially recover bad loans or initiate foreclosure with the view to monetise collateral
attached to bad loans. AMCs have additional advantages: unlike individual banks, they
may internalise the effect of foreclosure on value of housing collateral in the portfolio
(Favara and Giannetti, 2017), enjoy economies of scale and are not subject to bank
capital regulation.
AMCs were deployed, for instance, in Sweden and Mexico in the 1990s (Macey,
1999; Krueger and Tornell, 1999). AMCs established following the Asian financial crisis
assembled assets valued at up to 20 percent of GDP and achieved a significant degree
of value recovery (Fung et al., 2004). In 2016, the Italian government reached a deal
with the European Union (EU) to attach a government guarantee to a subset of NPLs,
thus creating number of internal AMCs. Such guarantees help to bridge the difference
between the reservation value of NPLs and the price potential buyers are willing to pay
that arises due to asymmetric information (see Avgouleas and Goodhart (2017) for a
recent discussion of issues related to the design of AMCs).
Reflecting information asymmetry27 and high risks, majority of AMCs are funded
publicly. In other cases, banks establish internal (private) AMCs, ring-fencing own funds
on- or off-balance sheet for a special workout unit. Internal AMCs have the same objec-
tive - to maximise the recovery value from a portfolio of impaired assets. Occasionally,
deposit insurance funds are directly used to acquire non-performing assets. Such in-
27Informational asymmetry arises at the bank which originated the non-performing loan has private
(soft) information that is not observed by (or cannot be transferred to) the third party buyer. This
is an additional level of asymmetry to the classical asymmetric information problem between the bank
and the borrower.
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stances are less common, however, as this approach may weaken the ability of deposit
insurers to perform their core duties.
The recently emerging theoretical literature, however points that without the disposal
of legacy assets the deposit guarantee scheme is at risk of bearing the costs of potential
bank failures anyway. Segura and Suarez (2019) find that the requirements to dispose of
toxic assets (through AMCs), in extreme cases together with bank public recapitalisa-
tions, can limit the costs to a deposit guarantee scheme and be ex-ante optimal from the
perspective of policy maker. In similar vein, Lucchetta et al. (2019) show that internal
AMCs, funded by ”bail-inable” debt, can be welfare enhancing. Due to the theoretical
predictions, in the remainder of this work we will treat all types of AMCs are equivalent.
For the empirical analysis, data on AMCs is taken from the Building Better Bad
Banks project by Hallerberg and Gandrud (2015). The database contains information
on 139 AMCs (109 public, 20 internal, 8 backed by deposit insurance and 2 unclassified)
across 60 countries during the period 1990-2016. Where the data on AMC closure is
not available, an AMC is assumed to have a life span of 8 years, the mean across the
sample. Examples of public AMCs include UK Asset Resolution Ltd, the Bank Asset
Management Company in Slovenia, the Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria and
the Korean Asset Management Company. The use of AMC covers all years of our
observations, regions and level of country development.
Public bank recapitalisation
Public funds can also be used to directly recapitalise ailing banks. Such bailouts enhance
banks’ ability to provision non-performing exposures, write them off or sell them at a
discount. Policy packages often combine establishment of AMCs with the use of public
funds for bank bailouts. In the long term, government interventions can exacerbate moral
hazard: banks counting on a potential bailout may take greater risks (Lammertjan and
Koetter, 2012). Our analysis is focused on the short-term effect of bailouts on bank
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NPLs and abstracts from their possible negative implications over the longer term.
The data on financial sector bailouts is taken from Bova et al. (2016) and covers 95
interventions, both during systemic banking crisis and stand-alone cases, spanning 66
countries. Estimates of fiscal cost of recapitalisation (available for 83 of those episodes)
average 9.4 percent of GDP. The dataset also records public bailouts and recapitalisations
in the non-financial sector (for instance, with respect to public-private partnerships,
subnational governments or state-owned enterprises) which we use in a placebo test.
Macroprudential policies
The third block of policies comprises macroprudential measures. These measures target
behaviour of financial institutions through limits on leverage, maximum interbank ex-
posures, risk concentration ratios, capital surcharges on systemically important financial
institutions or reserve requirements. Macroprudential measures can also target borrow-
ers by limiting loan-to-value or debt-to-income ratios. While macroprudential tightening
may limit build-up of NPLs over the economic cycle their short-term impact on the stock
of existing NPLs is likely to be limited. The long-term impact is also debated as tight-
ening in one area, for instance mortgage lending, can prompt banks to take extra risks
in other areas such as corporate lending or securities trading (Acharya et al., 2019).
The data on macroprudential policies come from Cerutti et al. (2015). The database
covers 119 countries from 2000 to 2013 and identifies 135 cases of macroprudential tight-
ening in 76 countries. The cases of macroprudential loosening are limited to Bulgaria in
2008 and Serbia in 2013 and are not explored further.
Changes in loan classification and provisioning stringency
Changes in the stringency of loan classification and provisioning may also have an impact
on NPL resolution. Forcing banks to recognise and fully provision NPLs strengthens
incentives to promptly resolve non-performing assets. At the same time, a move towards
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stricter loan classification may result in an initial increase in reported NPL ratios.
Data on stringency of loan classification and provisioning is taken from Barth et al.
(2013). The stringency of loan classification is proxied by the total number of days of
delinquency after which a loan is classified as sub-standard, doubtful or lost (combining
the three categories). The data comes from surveys of 127 central banks conducted in
1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 (values are carried forward in other years). The indicator
ranges from 4 months to over 3 years, with an average of 18 months. The provisioning
stringency is proxied by the sum of the minimum required provisions as loans become
substandard, doubtful and loss (this sum averages 120 percent).
This list of policies is not exhaustive. Examples of other relevant measures include
changes in tax treatments of NPLs that remove disincentives in terms of writing off bad
loans for banks and borrowers, judicial and legal reforms to accelerate the foreclosure
process and improvements in out-of-court resolution mechanisms (see European Central
Bank 2017b). At the same time, the five types of measures outlined above account for a
bulk of actions historically taken to reduce NPL ratios. One or more of these measures
were deployed in more than 90 percent of cases of high NPLs as identified in Chapter
3.4.2.
4.3. Cross-border transmission of NPL policies
4.3.1. Cross-border transmission of financial sector policies
Various spillover effects of financial-sector policies have been documented by earlier stud-
ies. For instance, foreign bank affiliates have been shown to respond to financial shocks
in home territories of parent banks (Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000; Schnabl, 2012)
reflecting the workings of internal capital markets of banking groups (de Haas and van
Lelyveld, 2010; Ongena et al., 2013a). This response tends to be partial, affected by
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frictions in internal capital markets (Cerutti and Claessens, 2017). It is higher when for-
eign affiliates are financed by intra-group funding rather than by local deposits (De Haas
and van Lelyveld, 2014). In a case when the macroeconomic shocks are locally idiosyn-
cratic, the foreign-owned banks can be seen as a stabilising force with respect to local
shocks in a host economy, thus dampening the local business cycle, in comparison with
banking sector dominated by local banks. In presence of a local negative funding shock,
the foreign-owned bank can rely on capital or liquidity injection from the parent group,
therefore maintaining (or even expanding) credit supply, in comparison with domestic
banks. However, once the macroeconomic shocks become correlated across countries the
strong presence of foreign-owned banks provides a network channel through which sys-
temic risk is transmitted globally and can lead to amplification of the local macro cycle
(see De Haas et al. 2015 for more detailed explanation).
Macroprudential measures significantly affect behaviour of bank subsidiaries abroad.
Conversely, changes to macroprudential regulation and capital requirements may have lit-
tle impact on lending behaviour of foreign-owned banks operating in a jurisdiction where
such changes are introduced (Aiyar et al., 2014a,b; Ongena et al., 2013b; Berrospide et al.,
2017). Several transmission channels may similarly give rise to cross-border transmis-
sion of policies aimed at reducing banks’ NPL ratios. The main potential channels - the
workings of internal capital markets, consolidated supervision, and transfer of knowledge
on how to work with impaired exposures - are discussed in turn.
4.3.2. Internal capital markets
Parent banks and foreign subsidiaries are linked through internal capital markets enabling
banking groups to reallocate capital with the view to maximise growth opportunities and
better manage solvency risk at the holding level. In addition, liquidity can be injected
in subsidiaries through short-term or long-term loans. Capital and liquidity can flow
internally in both directions. When positions of parent banks are strong, they tend
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to support their subsidiaries at times of adverse shocks in host economies. Conversely,
when parents experience an adverse shock, lending in subsidiaries tends to be negatively
affected as parents focus their banking-group resources on the home markets (the so-
called reverse support effect, see de Haas and van Lelyveld 2010).
An adverse NPL shock experienced by a parent bank is likely to propagate to its sub-
sidiary through the reverse substitution effect. This weakens the ability of the subsidiary
to deal with NPLs through timely provisioning and write-offs. In some circumstances, the
incentives of subsidiary’s management to improve performance may be reduced, while
adverse incentives to take on extra risk may become stronger (Berger and DeYoung,
1997).
A successful policy designed to reduce NPL ratios can put this chain into reverse.
Availability of bailout funds in the parent’s jurisdiction or sales of NPLs to AMCs can free
up capital resources that are, in turn, redistributed through internal capital markets. The
resulting support effect enhances subsidiary’s ability to address NPLs and strengthens
management incentives to pursue strong financial results. In addition, NPL resolution
at the parent bank level may free up management resources to focus on the performance
of subsidiaries.
4.3.3. Consolidated supervision
Over time, global financial markets have become increasingly complex and intertwined.
In response, bank supervisors moved to supervision regimes on a consolidated basis,
whereby supervisors examine the prudential risks of an institution and all its inter-
national establishments, including branches and subsidiaries. This holistic view gives
home country supervisors indirect oversight over banks’ subsidiaries operating in foreign
jurisdictions. The principles of consolidated supervision were formalised by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision in Concordat in 1975 (Goodhart, 2011) with further
refinements in 1983 and 1992 when the Minimum Standards for supervisory cooperation
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between Basel member countries were established.
The guidance and moral suasion that supervisors use to address high and rising
NPL ratios can apply to the supervised subsidiaries. For example, NPL Guidance first
issued by the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Single Supervisory Mechanism in March
2017 and by the European Commission in March 2018 is applicable to all significant
institutions including their international subsidiaries and branches. The guidance also
calls for harmonisation of NPL definitions at a group level. It is not legally binding but
high-NPL banks deviating from the reduction targets may see additional capital add-ons
imposed (European Central Bank, 2017a).
In sum, consolidated supervision both imposes additional implicit costs associated
with NPLs in subsidiaries and prompts banks to harmonise approaches to dealing with
NPLs across the banking groups. Under certain circumstances, a parent bank burdened
with high NPLs and operating in an economy with a relatively weak growth outlook
(such as Greece or Italy in the mid-2010s) may find it more cost-effective to prioritise
NPL reduction in its subsidiaries abroad.
4.3.4. Transfer of knowledge and management expertise
The existence of multi-national banking corporations can be partially explained by the
value of replicating certain practices and techniques in foreign markets. Such replication
involves flow of information from the parent to the subsidiary. The competitive allocation
of resources through internal markets and use of common technological platforms foster
such knowledge transfer (Özsomer and Gençtürk, 2003; Ambos and Ambos, 2009).
The transfer of knowledge is common in credit risk management (for example, when
it comes to credit scoring). It extends to dealing with impaired exposures - in terms of
identifying substandard loans, monitoring collateral valuation, modelling provisions and
making decisions about sales of non-performing assets at a discount, repossession or loan
write-offs. If a parent bank adopts new ways of managing NPLs such as sales to AMCs,
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subsidiary banks may follow the new practice (see Boissel et al. 2015 for the evidence of
aligning loan loss provisions policy when a subsidiary gets acquired in line with the new
parent group strategy).
The extent of successful knowledge transfer may depend on the value of knowledge
(which may be higher when NPLs are high), motivation to share knowledge (which
may be enhanced in the presence of consolidated supervision), richness of transmission
channels (for instance, the extent of IT integration or cultural proximity) and absorptive
capacity of the knowledge acquirer. The latter may be higher where subsidiary staff are
offered regular trainings by the parent (see Gupta and Govindarajan 2000, for a general
discussion of knowledge transfer).
4.4. Identifying cross-border spillovers from changes in the stock of NPLs
4.4.1. Data
To test whether changes in NPLs may be transmitted across borders within banking
groups we match international parent banks and subsidiary banks operating in Central,
Eastern and Southern-Eastern Europe (CESEE) using the dataset compiled by De Haas
et al. (2015). In this dataset, we observe 468 banks that are subsidiaries of global parent
banks and 1,834 domestic banks in the region between 1999 and 2010. Parent banks
come from a total of 43 countries. The data on ownership are combined with data from
bank balance sheets and income statements as reported in Bankscope. We use a panel
of 27,500 banks located in 190 countries. For these banks we observe NPL ratio over the
period 1990-2015. We exclude banks with less than US$100,000 in total assets, those
that report multiple financial statements within the same calendar year and those whose
core activity does not include granting credit. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table
4.2.
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[Insert Table 4.2 ]
Under the Basel definition a loan is classified as non-performing when a borrower is 90
days or more behind on their contractual payments or whenever a debtor is considered
”unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the banking group in full, without recourse
by the bank to actions such as realising the security”. The exact definition can vary
from country to country and certain jurisdictions may not report the quality of loans
meaningfully. At the same time, consistent under-reporting of NPLs in certain emerging
markets, if anything, would lead to the extent of transmission of changes in NPLs being
underestimated in our analysis.
4.4.2. Cross-border spillovers within banking groups
The following specification is used to estimate the cross-border transmission of changes
in NPLs:
∆ln(NPL)idt =β1Fid,t−1 ×∆ln(NPL)if,t−1 + β2Fid,t−1 ×NPLRif,t−1+
β3Fid,t−1 × TCRif,t−1 + γZid,t−1 + θFid,t ×MF ft+
δi + δdt + εit
(4.1)
Where the dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the stock of NPLs
of bank i, located in host country d in year t. Bank i may be owned by a parent bank
operating in foreign (home) country f . Effectively, the dependent variable captures the
percentage change in the stock of NPLs. On the right-hand side, the foreign-ownership
dummy (Fid,t−1) is interacted with the (lagged) logarithm change in NPL stock of the
foreign parent bank (∆ln(NPL)if,t−1), the NPL ratio of the parent bank (NPLRif,t−1)
and its total capital ratio (TCRif,t−1).
The approach broadly follows estimation of cross-border spillovers in lending in De
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Haas and van Lelyveld (2014) and Allen et al. (2014). The set of bank-level control
variables Zid,t−1, include the (lagged) non-performing loans ratio , return on average
assets, change in bank’s total assets, the change in bank’s total deposits and the total
capital ratio, in addition to bank fixed effects (δi). Some specifications also include a
set of macro-economic factors in the foreign jurisdiction f (MF ft) such as inflation,
growth in GDP per capita and a change in the ratio of investment to GDP. Bank fixed
effects control for bank time-invariant heterogeneity. Except in cases where bank own-
ership changed, they also subsume domestic country fixed effects thus accounting for
time-invariant differences between countries such as the origin of the legal system. The
specifications also include a set of domestic country-year fixed effects, δdt, to control for
time-varying macro factors that affect both domestic- and foreign-owned banks in the
same jurisdiction d. Standard errors are clustered at the domestic (host) country level.
The results reported in Table 4.5 point to an co-movement association between the
changes in NPL stock of subsidiary banks and those of their parents , as well as parent’s
NPL ratio . The estimated effect is weakly significant for the changes of parent’s NPL
stock, with magnitude of 0.4, and strongly significant for the parent’s NPL ratio, where
1 percentage point increase in NPL ratio of a parent leads to 0.1 percentage points
increase of subsidiary’s NPL stock. This association is much stronger in the case of
parent banks with high NPL ratios, 1 percentage point reduction of NPL stock of parent
bank is associated with a 0.6 of a percentage point reduction in the stock of NPLs of a
subsidiary bank operating in a foreign jurisdiction, and is absent in the case of parent
banks with low NPLs (see Table 4.6)28. To estimate these effects separately we interact
the log changes in the stock of NPLs of the parent with the dummy variables that take
the value of one if parent’s NPL ratio is above (below) the 5 percent threshold. We
choose the 5 percent cut-off point since it is commonly considered by supervisors as an
28The results are similar when the split into high-NPL and low-NPL category is based on the NPL
ratios of subsidiary banks.
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indication of excessive risk taking. It is close to the median for the entire sample of banks
although, applied to parent banks, the dummy takes the value of 1 in approximately one
fifth of cases.
∆ln(NPL)idt =β1Fid,t−1 ×∆ln(NPL)if,t−1 × highNPLRif,t−1+
β2Fid,t−1 ×∆ln(NPL)if,t−1 × lowNPLRif,t−1+
β3Fid,t−1 ×NPLRif,t−1 + β4Fid,t−1 × TCRif,t−1+
γZid,t−1 + θFid,t ×MF ft + δi + δdt + εit
(4.2)
Where parent bank NPL ratios exceed 5 percent, a one percentage point reduction in
the NPL stock of a parent bank is associated with an approximately 0.6 of a percentage
point reduction in the stock of NPLs of the subsidiary; the corresponding coefficient
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (and at the one percent level in most
specifications). Inclusion of domestic country-year fixed effects provides assurances that
this result is not driven by the economic cycle, which equally affects domestic banks.
We discuss possible channels underpinning the estimated cross-border transmission in
Section 4.5.5 later on.
The coefficients on control variables are by and large intuitive. The stock of NPLs
is more likely to decline significantly if the NPL ratios are higher to start with and if
the bank is more profitable, as reflected in the higher return on assets. The opposite is
true for the level of NPL ratio of the parent bank: higher NPL ratios of the parent are
associated with greater increases in NPLs of subsidiaries.
[Insert Tables 4.5 and 4.6 ]
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4.5. Identifying cross-border effects of NPL policies
4.5.1. Identification strategy
Having established that changes in NPLs spill over to banks’ subsidiaries abroad, we can
use this finding to estimate the effectiveness of policies targeting reductions in NPLs -
by looking at the cross-border impact of such policies.
A straightforward way to estimate the impact of NPL policies on NPL ratios involves
linking country-level outcomes (the average NPL ratio of a banking system) or bank-level
outcomes (a bank’s NPL ratio) to the adoption of specific policies using country-year or
bank-year data. When interpreting these estimates, it is important to acknowledge that
policymakers’ decision to intervene, the timing of intervention and the choice of policy
instrument are likely to be non-random, influenced by external circumstances. The
estimates of the effect of policies may thus be subject to endogeneity bias. For instance,
if a certain policy comes into effect late in the economic cycle, on the back of improving
economic conditions, its impact may be overestimated. If policies are adopted at the
height of a crisis when the health of the financial sector is deteriorating rapidly, their
impact may be underestimated.
In contrast, when estimating cross-border effects of measures aimed at reducing NPLs,
we look at an exogenous source of timing of adoption of various policies from the perspec-
tive of foreign subsidiary. In particular, we focus on the performance of foreign-owned
banks and policy changes in jurisdictions where the corresponding parent holding bank
operates. We compare changes in behaviour of foreign-owned subsidiaries with changes
in behaviour of locally-owned banks operating in the same jurisdiction as well as sub-
sidiaries of foreign banks whose parents are not affected by a certain policy intervention.
The two groups of banks are subject to the same set of economic conditions and domes-
tic policy environment - except some foreign-owned banks are also indirectly exposed to
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changes in policy and economic environment affecting their parents.
[Insert Figure 4.1 ]
The introduction of policies targeting NPL reduction in the home country where a
parent bank operates may have a direct effect on behaviour of banks in that jurisdiction
and a cross-border effect on NPLs of subsidiary banks located in a foreign jurisdiction
(see Figure 4.1 for a schematic representation). In a typical host country, we find foreign-
owned subsidiaries with parents located in different home jurisdictions that are subject to
different policy environment. For example, the Greek banking sector in 2005 comprised
32 domestic banks and 4 foreign subsidiaries with parents located in Cyprus, Germany,
France and Portugal. At the same time, Greek banks owned subsidiaries in nine juris-
dictions ranging from South Africa to Bulgaria. Such multiplicity of cross-border links
strengthens the difference-in-difference identification strategy.
4.5.2. Basic empirical specification
The analysis can be performed on a large sample of banks where we do not observe
exact ownership links beyond the country of origin. Data on foreign ownership of banks
in this larger sample is taken from Claessens and Van Horen (2015). A bank is identified
as foreign-owned when at least 50 percent of bank’s shares are held by foreigners. The
corresponding foreign policy in regressions is set to reflect the policy changes in the
home country of the largest foreign shareholder. The ownership data is available for
5,102 banks in 111 countries. In approximately 9 percent of cases foreign ownership
status of a bank changed during 1995-2013.
We estimate a reduced-form model where NPL policies can have an impact on bank
affiliates abroad. The dependent variable in the basic model (Equation 4.3) is the change
in the logarithm of stock of NPLs for bank i between years t− 1 and t. As before, bank
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i operates in domestic jurisdiction d but may be owned by a parent bank operating in
a foreign jurisdiction f. The specification further includes interaction terms between the
foreign ownership dummy (Fid,t) and a set of dummy variables capturing policies in place
in the home jurisdiction f of the respective parent banks in year t (denoted POLft). For
instance, an AMC dummy variable is equal to one if an asset management company
was in operation in the past 3 years in the jurisdiction of the parent holding bank. The
coefficients on these interaction terms (β) capture the cross-border effects of policies on
the subsidiaries of foreign parent banks.
∆ln(NPL)idt =βFid,t × POLft + γZid,t−1 + λFid,t + θFid,t ×MF ft+
δi + δdt + εit
(4.3)
Bank fixed effects, δi, subsume foreign ownership except for banks that changed
ownership during the sample period. The coefficient on the foreign ownership dummy
thus reflects the average movement in the stock of NPLs upon a bank changing ownership
from domestic to foreign or vice versa. Domestic (subsidiary jurisdiction) country-year
fixed effects, δdt, capture both changes in demand for credit and any changes in domestic
policies that apply to all banks.
In this difference-in-difference approach only foreign banks are eligible for treatment
(having a parent subjected to certain policies aimed at reducing NPL levels). Reassur-
ingly, we find no large systematic difference between NPL ratios in domestic and foreign-
owned banks (see Table 4.3). In both groups of banks, average NPL ratios evolved in
similar ways and reached similar levels.
[Insert Figure 4.2 ]
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4.5.3. Results
The estimation first distinguishes between three mutually exclusive policy scenarios: es-
tablishment of an asset management company (AMC); use of public funds to recapitalise
banks (bailouts); and a combination of the two policies (see Table 4.4 for a summary of
incidence of various policies in the sample).
Establishment of AMCs in the parent bank’s jurisdiction is associated with a statis-
tically significant reduction in the NPL of subsidiary banks - the stock of NPLs declines
by around 12 percentage points (see Table 4.7). The effect does not increase if the intro-
duction of AMCs in a foreign jurisdiction is packaged with provision of bank bailouts. In
some specifications the effect in fact becomes smaller, with weaker statistical significance
- possibly because bailouts come with the pressure to ringfence the use of public funds
for domestic purposes reducing the extent of cross-border transmission. In light of the
theoretical findings by Segura and Suarez (2019), the establishment of AMC, depending
on the severity of NPL problem, may need to be assisted by public bank recapitalisa-
tion to ensure that entities incurring losses on the NPL disposals meet the participation
constraints instead of deciding to go into bankruptcy. In the absence of AMCs, the pro-
vision of bailouts is associated with a small and statistically insignificant reduction in the
stock of NPLs, reflecting the fact that recapitalisation itself does not enforce reduction
of credit risk exposure and in fact may enhance moral hazard problem in the long term.
[Insert Table 4.7 ]
The differences in estimated effects of bailouts in the presence and in the absence of
AMCs are insightful, assuming that any pressure to ringfence public funds for domestic
use is comparable in both scenarios. In the absence of structural reforms aimed at
creating market for distressed debt, bailouts may do little to strengthen incentives for
resolving non-performing loans. In some circumstances, bailouts may encourage greater
129
Chapter 4: NPL spillovers
provisioning (and thus recognition) of bad debts in the hope of increasing the amount of
public funds being made available. Furthermore, bailouts may also encourage banks to
pursue riskier new borrowers in search of higher upside expecting the downside risk to
be limited. The overall impact on NPLs may thus be ambiguous. As this study focuses
on relatively short-term impact of various financial sector policies, no inference can be
made about the long-term effects of financial sector bailouts on banks’ risk appetite.
The cross-border effects of asset management companies on NPLs appear to be
strongest one year after a policy is adopted, with effects gradually becoming weaker.
The results reported in Figure 4.3 are obtained by estimating specification allowing for
dynamic lags; the specification is otherwise similar to Equation 4.3.
[Insert Figure 4.3 ]
When it comes to changes in NPLs, we do not find any significant cross-border effects
of changes in loan classification, provisioning stringency or macroprudential tightening
(see Table 4.8). This might reflect the propensity of international banking groups to
apply stricter loan classification and provisioning standards than the minimum required
by the regulation.
[Insert Table 4.8 ]
4.5.4. Discussion: Inference about the domestic effects
The estimated cross-border effects could be seen as the lower bound of the domestic effect
of various policies on NPL ratios - due to the fact that any cross-border transmission is
partial. Some back-of-envelope estimates may further give us some sense of a possible
magnitude of the underlying domestic effect of asset management companies. Establish-
ment of AMCs is estimated to be associated with a 12 percent per annum reduction in
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the stock of NPLs of foreign affiliates. From estimation in the previous section, such
a reduction corresponds to a 15 to 20 percent reduction in the NPL ratio of a parent
bank, on average (based on transmission coefficients in the range of 0.6 to 0.8). In other
words, the introduction of AMC would need to lower the NPL ratio of domestic banks by
15-20 percent per annum (over a three-year window) to induce the observed cross-border
spillovers.
In principle, cross-border policy transmission could surpass the domestic effect in a
case where AMCs purchase a significant amount of NPLs from the balance sheet of a bank
subsidiary abroad. Nonetheless, the anecdotal evidence suggests that such situation is
unlikely to arise in practice, not least because AMC’s comparative advantages in dealing
with problem loans do not easily extend to foreign jurisdictions.
For example, Ireland’s National Asset Management Agency was set up to purchase
NPLs exclusively from the Irish domestic banks. NAMA’s 2017 financial statement
show that 83 percent of loans on its balance sheet are backed by collateral from Ireland,
12 percent from the UK and 5 percent from the rest of the world. Similarly, Spain’s
SAREB portfolio consists exclusively of loans backed by collateral in Spain, as reported
in its 2017 annual statement. Unfortunately, we do not have the access to data that
would categorically show that such transfer of bad assets from foreign subsidiaries to
parent’s AMCs is not in place.
The presented analysis is conducted under the assumption of limited (or non-existent)
cross-border AMC transfers. Given the large fiscal outlays needed to establish the
publicly-funded AMCs, we remain positive that such assumption can be rationalised.
The local governments are likely to ensure that the positive policy effects remain con-
centrated mostly in the domestic banking sector through the design of the AMC transfer
policy limiting it to either domestic loans or loans originated in the local jurisdiction.
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4.5.5. Transmission channels
Next, we discuss the evidence regarding various possible transmission channels underpin-
ning cross-border spillovers from an NPL reduction. First, we note that the coefficient
on the parent bank total capital ratio in our estimations (Table 4.5 and 4.6) is neg-
ative and statistically significant, consistent with the presence of the internal capital
markets channel: higher capitalisation of the parent enables subsidiary banks to tackle
non-performing assets more actively, as discussed in section 4.3. In particular, an extra
one percentage point in terms of a parent’s capitalisation is associated with an extra 5
percentage point reduction in the stock of NPLs of a subsidiary.
To shed light on the existence of the consolidated supervision channel we investigate if
the spillover effect is stronger when parent banks reside in member countries of the Basel
Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS). The holistic supervisory approach at the
heart of the BCBS work is based on the banking supervisors’ multinational cooperation.
It requires multinational banks to apply consistent approach to NPL recognition and
management across their subsidiaries. If a parent bank is domiciled in a country where
the banking supervisor is a member of BSBC, its foreign subsidiaries are subjected to
indirect supervision in the home jurisdiction. The membership of the Basel committee
grew from 11 economies in the 1990s to subsequently include the European Union as
well as 18 jurisdictions outside the EU. In the empirical specification (equation 4.2)
the variables of interest are additionally interacted with the dummy variable for BCBS
membership.
The results, reported in Table 4.9, are consistent with consolidated supervision play-
ing an important role in facilitating cross-border transmission of changes in NPLs. In
particular, the effect is present for subsidiaries of parents with high NPL ratios and lo-
cated in the Basel-member countries. The effect is approximately two times smaller, and
is statistically insignificant, for subsidiaries of non-Basel parent banks (again, condition-
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ing on parents’ high NPL ratios).
[Insert Table 4.9 ]
Testing for the transfer of knowledge channel relies on assumptions about observable
traits of bank pairs that are associated with greater likelihood of transfer of knowledge
taking place. One such trait is the physical distance (Ambos and Ambos, 2009) as
higher cost of travel, time difference and cultural differences make it harder for bank
staff to communicate. On the other hand, distance should have limited, if any, impact
on the consolidated supervision and internal markets transmission channels. In the
empirical analysis distance is measured between capital cities and the largest cities in
banks’ jurisdictions, weighted by relative population size, using the CEPII dataset. Its
logarithm is interacted with the change in the stocks of NPLs of parent banks.
The transmission of changes in NPLs is estimated to be somewhat weaker with dis-
tance (see Table 4.10) although the role of the distance is not very pronounced. When
we include the interaction between parent’s changes in NPL stock and the log distance
to the parent we find weakly negative coefficient on the triple interaction. The results
are similar if interactions with dummy variables for long and short distances are included
instead, where long distance is defined as above 2000km. Similar results (available on
request) can also be obtained by using common language and (or) common colonial
history as a measure of cultural proximity that may facilitate exchange of information
while having no bearing on consolidated supervision or internal capital markets. In sum,
transfer of knowledge appears to play some role, albeit possibly limited.
On balance, the evidence is consistent with the cross-border effects of changes in
NPLs being driven primarily by the workings on internal capital markets, application
of consolidated supervision and, to some extent, exchange of knowledge within banking
groups.
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[Insert Table 4.10 ]
4.5.6. Robustness checks
To further address concerns that the results may be driven by common economic cycle,
or perhaps global policy coordination, we run a series of robustness checks. These checks
probe the three key building blocks of our estimation strategy: the cross-border linkages,
the identification of policies aimed at reducing non-performing assets and the timing of
these policies. In the first exercise, foreign-owned banks are randomly assigned their
parents’ domiciles, keeping the frequency of home-host country pairs in the dataset
unchanged. The results of the exercise yield no statistically significant cross-border
spillovers of NPL policies (see Table 4.11) confirming that actual ownership linkages
matter for cross-border spillovers and such spillovers are not a product of global policy
coordination or common trends.
[Insert Table 4.11 ]
Another placebo test preserves the actual ownership linkages but uses bailouts of
subnational government, state-owned enterprises, private-public partnership (PPPs) and
other types of non-financial-sector bailouts reported in Bova et al. (2016) in lieu of fi-
nancial sector bailouts when constructing a measure of policy intervention. We observe
195 such non-financial recapitalisations in 40 countries (excluding instances of disaster
relief). The non-financial government bailouts, as predicted, have no meaningful inter-
national spillover effect on NPL ratios, the estimates being several times lower than for
financial sector bailouts (see Table 4.13).
Having established that ownership linkages and the definition of policies play a mean-
ingful role in driving the results we do the same for the timing of policies. In particular,
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we create ”placebo” policies that were enacted two years earlier than in reality (see Table
4.12). Reassuringly, the cross-border effects of, say, placebo asset management compa-
nies are statistically insignificant and several times smaller than the properly estimated
effects. This also suggests that introduction of policies to address high levels of NPLs is
not commonly anticipated by banks.
[Insert Tables 4.12 and 4.13]
4.6. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper investigated whether changes in NPL stocks spill over to banks’ foreign af-
filiates and whether policies trying to reduce the level of non-performing loans have
cross-border spillover effects. The analysis reveals that a one percent reduction in the
stock of NPLs is associated with an approximately 0.6 of a percent reduction in NPLs
of a subsidiary bank operating in a foreign jurisdiction. This transmission appears to
be driven largely by the workings of internal capital markets within banking groups,
consolidated supervision and, to some extent, by the transfer of knowledge in the area
of NPL resolution, although we are unable to quantify the magnitude of each channel.
As a result of such transmission, policies aimed at reducing NPLs can have cross-
border effects. In particular, the introduction of asset management companies with the
view to develop a secondary market for distressed debt is associated with a sizeable
reduction in the stock of NPLs of foreign affiliates of parent banks, where parent banks
are based in the jurisdiction in which a policy package is implemented. The stock of NPLs
in a foreign affiliate bank falls by an additional 12 percentage points per annum compared
with the stock of NPLs of locally-owned banks operating in the same jurisdiction. The
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cross-border effect of the introduction of AMCs does not appear to become stronger in
the presence of public bailouts in the jurisdiction of the parent banks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to find evidence of positive
international spill-overs due to the establishment of AMCs. In contrast, the analysis did
not find evidence of significant cross-border spillovers of other policies deployed to address
the problem of high and persistent NPL ratios - including financial sector bailouts not
accompanied by establishment of AMCs, changes to the stringency of loan classification,
revision to provisioning rules and macroeconomic tightening.
The estimated effects are averages across various designs of AMCs. A relatively small
sample size and lack of more detailed data do not permit us to make inference about the
importance of the institutional setup of asset management companies or their specific
features. The findings are nonetheless highly relevant for the policy debate in the EU on
the potential establishment of a pan-European AMC. In particular, they suggest that the
returns to deploying measures to address NPLs may be higher than previously thought
on account of sizeable cross-border spillovers.
The results are also indicative of the lower bound of effectiveness of various NPL
policies in terms of reducing NPLs within the jurisdiction where they are deployed. In
particular, deployment of an AMC appears to be associated with an approximately 12
to 20 percent reduction in the NPL ratio of banks operating in the jurisdiction (12 being
the estimated indirect effect 20 being the higher-end estimate of the domestic effect that
would induce the estimated cross-border effect).
This estimate, even if imprecise, is valuable as direct estimates of the effectiveness
of policies aimed at reducing NPLs may be subject to large biases on account of non-
random timing of the adoption of NPL policies while the direction of any such bias is




4.7. Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Data description and sources
Variable Description Data Source
NPLR Ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans, % Bankscope
∆NPL stock
The change in logarithm of total stock of
non-performing loans in the past year, %
Bankscope
ROAA Return on average assets Bankscope
∆ Total
assets
Precentage increase in total assets, % Bankscope
∆ Deposits Percentage increase in total deposits, % Bankscope
TCR Total capital ratio over RWA, % Bankscope
Total assets Total assets in mln of USD Bankscope
High NPLR




Dummy variable equal to one when the bank has




Dummy variable equal to one when the bank has





Dummy variable equal to one when AMC was in use in






Dummy variable equal to one when financial
recapitalisation of bank was in use in the past 3 years
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Dummy variable equal to one when number of days
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Data description and sources (continued)
Variable Description Data Source
Basel
Dummy variable equal to one when the parent bank is
located in a country that belongs to Basel Committee
of Banking Supervision, zero otherwise
Distance
Distance between biggest cities in two countries,
weighted by the city’s population share
CEPII
Inflation Percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index IFS
∆GDP




Percentage increase in the ratio of gross capital
formation over aggregate GDP
IFS
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for full sample.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev Min Max
NPL, % 267,508 3.21 5.37 0 32.73
∆NPL stock, % 205,497 0.12 0.90 -2.59 3.32
ROAA, % 384,333 0.85 1.74 -6.52 10.19
∆ Total assets, % 347,992 0.08 0.25 -7.91 8.42
∆ Deposits, % 344,310 0.08 0.35 -11.32 11.87
Total capital ratio, % 247,582 21.51 39.30 -747.38 993.90
Total assets, mln $ 386,486 11793.83 92606.16 0.1 3807892
Foreign - CESEE 20,698 0.19 0.40 0 1
Foreign - full sample 44,757 0.31 0.46 0 1
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics by ownership type in the full sample.
Domestic banks Foreign banks T-test
Variable N Mean N Mean ∆ t-value
NPL, % 18,617 6.36 7,458 6.80 -0.43 -3.96***
∆NPL stock, % 15,460 0.14 6,036 0.16 -0.02 -1.71**
ROAA, % 30,550 1.07 13,956 1.02 0.05 2.24***
∆ Total assets, % 27,601 0.12 12,701 0.12 0.00 0.49
∆ Deposits, % 27,429 12.55 12,652 12.61 -0.05 -0.17
Total capital ratio, % 16,208 17.73 6,654 22.97 -5.24 -15.79***
Total assets, mln $ 30,710 32,277 14,047 8,870 23,407 17.29***






Asset Management Company 853 62
Public 740 58
Internal 83 10
Deposit guarantee scheme 111 6
Bank bailouts 279 66
Macroprudential policy tightening 254 119
Tightening loan classification stringency 74 64
Tightening provision stringency rules 60 53
139
Chapter 4: NPL spillovers
Figure 4.1: Identification strategy
Figure 4.2: Time trend in NPLs for domestic- and foreign-owned banks in the full sample
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Table 4.5: Transmission of NPLs from parent to subsidiary
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes the observation of 2107 unique banks located in 31 countries
from CESEE region over the 1999-2010 period. All columns include the three interactions between
foreign-ownership dummy and the parent bank lagged change in the stock of NPLs, NPL ratio and total
capital ratio. Columns 2-5 include lagged bank controls. Columns 4 and 5 include additionally lagged
total capital ratio. Columns 3 and 5 include foreign (host) country macro controls.
Table 4.1 gives detailed variable description. All columns include bank and domestic country-year fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered at domestic country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ NPL stock
Foreign×∆NPL stockif,t−1 0.398* 0.427* 0.393 0.314 0.302
(0.204) (0.210) (0.272) (0.216) (0.244)
Foreign ×NPLRif,t−1 0.0969*** 0.107*** 0.0987*** 0.0800*** 0.0891***
(0.0301) (0.0232) (0.0239) (0.0257) (0.0270)
Foreign ×Total Capital Ratioif,t−1 -0.0419** -0.0566*** -0.0561*** -0.0536*** -0.0508***
(0.0187) (0.0146) (0.0120) (0.0176) (0.0168)
NPLRi,t−1 -0.115*** -0.120*** -0.0941*** -0.0950*** -0.0939***
(0.0209) (0.0210) (0.00959) (0.00624) (0.00678)
ROAAi,t−1 -0.0692*** -0.0710*** -0.105*** -0.103***
(0.0155) (0.0145) (0.0305) (0.0297)
∆Assetsi,t−1 0.0948 0.0226 0.474 0.546*
(0.0736) (0.108) (0.285) (0.297)
∆Depositsi,t−1 -0.133*** -0.0569 -0.327 -0.380*
(0.0226) (0.0504) (0.220) (0.204)
Total Capital Ratioi,t−1 -0.00166 -0.000159
(0.00638) (0.00678)
Foreign ×InflationF 0.981 2.113
(2.355) (3.806)
Foreign ×∆GDPF -0.916 -0.621
(1.971) (1.672)
Foreign ×∆InvestmentF -0.0192 0.0178
(0.523) (0.578)
Observations 3641 2901 1429 982 933
R2 0.339 0.381 0.460 0.570 0.572
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.056 0.153 0.290 0.286
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domestic country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.6: Transmission of NPLs from parent to subsidiary - breakdown
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes the observation of 2107 unique banks located in 31 countries
from CESEE region over the 1999-2010 period. . All columns include the triple interactions between
foreign-ownership dummy, the parent bank lagged change in the stock of NPLs and the dummy variable
for high (low) NPL ratio of the parent in addition to double interactions between foreign ownership
dummy and lagged parent bank NPL ratio and total capital ratio. Columns 2-5 include lagged bank
controls. Columns 4 and 5 include additionally lagged total capital ratio. Columns 3 and 5 include
foreign country macro controls.
Table 4.1 gives detailed variable description. All columns include bank and domestic country-year fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered at domestic country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ NPL stock
Foreign × ∆NPL stockPBt−1 × High NPLPBt−1 = 0 0.126 0.122 0.151 0.0247 0.0465
(0.273) (0.287) (0.304) (0.322) (0.310)
Foreign × ∆NPL stockPBt−1 × High NPLPBt−1 = 1 0.690*** 0.746*** 0.723** 0.583** 0.621***
(0.173) (0.186) (0.269) (0.211) (0.207)
Foreign ×NPLRif,t−1 0.0943*** 0.103*** 0.0957*** 0.0756*** 0.0842***
(0.0281) (0.0228) (0.0236) (0.0260) (0.0264)
Foreign ×Total Capital Ratioif,t−1 -0.0438** -0.0571*** -0.0574*** -0.0532*** -0.0512***
(0.0165) (0.0133) (0.0109) (0.0163) (0.0152)
NPLRi,t−1 -0.115*** -0.120*** -0.0942*** -0.0951*** -0.0941***
(0.0208) (0.0209) (0.00958) (0.00619) (0.00676)
ROAAi,t−1 -0.0691*** -0.0710*** -0.105*** -0.101***
(0.0154) (0.0146) (0.0316) (0.0304)
Total Capital Ratiot−1 -0.00180 -0.000594
(0.00636) (0.00681)
∆Assetsi,t−1 0.101 0.0376 0.468 0.542*
(0.0742) (0.108) (0.283) (0.293)
∆Depositsi,t−1 -0.139*** -0.0728 -0.337 -0.382*
(0.0229) (0.0506) (0.217) (0.198)
Foreign ×InflationF 1.574 3.049
(2.360) (3.869)
Foreign ×∆GDPF -0.886 -0.878
(2.042) (1.683)
Foreign ×∆InvestmentF 0.186 0.305
(0.492) (0.594)
Observations 3641 2901 1429 982 933
R2 0.340 0.382 0.461 0.572 0.574
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.057 0.155 0.292 0.288
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domestic country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.7: Cross-border policy effects
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes 5102 unique banks located in 111 countries over the 1995-2013
period. All columns include the interactions between foreign-ownership dummy and policy dummy,
equal to one when the policy was in place in the parent’s jurisdiction between t− 3 and t− 1. Columns
1-5 include lagged bank controls. Columns 1-4 include foreign country macro controls.
Table 4.1 gives detailed variable description. All columns include bank and domestic country-year
fixed effects. Column 2 includes also foreign country fixed effect in place of foreign ownership dummy.
Standard errors clustered at domestic country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ NPL stock
Foreign ×AMC onlyF -0.0813* -0.137** -0.0719* -0.144*** -0.119** -0.0482
(0.0452) (0.0610) (0.0424) (0.0540) (0.0544) (0.0450)
Foreign ×Bailout onlyF -0.0578 -0.0543 -0.00941 -0.0488 -0.0350 -0.0612
(0.0391) (0.0448) (0.0364) (0.0535) (0.0550) (0.0453)
Foreign ×AMC and BailoutF -0.133** -0.176*** -0.0478 -0.107* -0.0867 -0.138***
(0.0570) (0.0632) (0.0500) (0.0632) (0.0615) (0.0498)
ROAAt-1 0.0266*** 0.0270*** -0.0125** -0.0282*** -0.0260***
(0.00642) (0.00626) (0.00605) (0.0104) (0.00960)
∆ Assetst-1 0.154*** 0.148*** 0.0422 0.0867 0.103
(0.0530) (0.0518) (0.0452) (0.0738) (0.0752)
∆ Depositst-1 0.0562** 0.0572** 0.0264 -0.0130 -0.0207
(0.0271) (0.0267) (0.0250) (0.0586) (0.0595)
NPLRt-1 -0.0564*** -0.0594*** -0.0589***
(0.00339) (0.00368) (0.00364)
Total Capital Ratiot-1 0.000617 0.000387
(0.00133) (0.00145)
Foreign ×InflationF -0.125 -0.208 -0.104 -0.500
(0.367) (0.370) (0.361) (0.811)
Foreign ×∆GDPF -1.498** -1.575** -1.624** -1.089
(0.746) (0.774) (0.687) (0.708)
Foreign ×∆InvestmentF 0.246 0.272 0.194 0.328*
(0.191) (0.192) (0.165) (0.186)
Foreign 0.187*** 0.135*** 0.206*** 0.155** 0.137***
(0.0504) (0.0492) (0.0777) (0.0734) (0.0468)
Observations 18426 18426 18426 12199 12375 20672
R2 0.330 0.332 0.405 0.442 0.440 0.320
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.124 0.225 0.257 0.256 0.123
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domestic Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign Country FE Yes
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Figure 4.3: Dynamic cross-border policy effects from t− 1 to t− 3
The results come from regression of dynamic cross-border policy spillovers analogous with equation
4.3. The navy dots visualise the coefficients on the Fid,t−x × POLf,t−x interaction term and the bars
represent corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The results are corresponding to column (1) of Table
4.7where the policy dummies are included dynamically. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total
non-performing loans in time t divided by total non-performing loans at time t − 1, winsorised at 1st
and 99th percentile.
The regression includes 16 059 bank-year observations and yields R2 of 0.332 and Adjusted R2 of 0.123.
The regression includes the dynamic interactions between foreign ownership dummy at time t− x and
policy dummy equal to one when the specified policy was in place at time t−x in the parent’s country of
jurisdiction (where x = 1, 2, 3). The policy choice is limited to AMC and Bailouts without further split
into exclusive AMC and those assisted by Bailouts for simplicity. The controls include lagged return
on assets, growth of total assets, growth of deposits and further foreign macro controls: inflation, GDP
growth and investment growth. The regression includes bank and domestic country-year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at domestic country level.
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Table 4.8: Cross-border policy effects - regulation
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes 5102 unique banks located in 111 countries over the 1995-2013
period. All columns include the interactions between foreign-ownership dummy and policy dummy,
equal to one when the policy was in place in the parent’s jurisdiction between t− 3 and t− 1. Columns
1-5 include lagged bank controls. Columns 1-4 include foreign country macro controls. Table 4.1
gives detailed variable description. All columns include bank and domestic country-year fixed effects.
Column 2 includes also foreign country fixed effect in place of foreign ownership dummy. Standard
errors clustered at domestic country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ NPL stock
Foreign ×Loan classificationF -0.0299 -0.0235 -0.0441 -0.0510 -0.0626 -0.0323
(0.0502) (0.0576) (0.0441) (0.0716) (0.0726) (0.0522)
Foreign × Provision stringencyF 0.0463 0.0773 0.0549 0.117 0.163** 0.0898
(0.0819) (0.0928) (0.0794) (0.0901) (0.0803) (0.0719)
Foreign × Macroprudential policyF 0.0182 0.0108 0.00827 -0.00795 -0.0180 0.0428
(0.0372) (0.0376) (0.0358) (0.0414) (0.0405) (0.0389)
ROAAt-1 0.0258*** 0.0264*** -0.0128** -0.0279*** -0.0275***
(0.00659) (0.00643) (0.00613) (0.0104) (0.0104)
∆ Assetst-1 0.156*** 0.153*** 0.0395 0.0921 0.0982
(0.0547) (0.0535) (0.0460) (0.0761) (0.0753)
∆ Depositst-1 0.0586** 0.0595** 0.0295 -0.0111 -0.0130
(0.0275) (0.0269) (0.0248) (0.0601) (0.0598)
NPLRt-1 -0.0565*** -0.0598*** -0.0597***
(0.00336) (0.00362) (0.00363)
Total Capital Ratiot-1 0.000578 0.000708
(0.00134) (0.00136)
Foreign ×InflationF 0.141 0.0851 0.168 -0.0537
(0.380) (0.386) (0.449) (0.903)
Foreign ×∆GDPF -1.543** -1.636** -1.790*** -1.034
(0.756) (0.777) (0.680) (0.769)
Foreign ×∆InvestmentF 0.307 0.322 0.282 0.357
(0.206) (0.205) (0.177) (0.226)
Foreign 0.144*** 0.130*** 0.149** 0.130** 0.134***
(0.0470) (0.0429) (0.0632) (0.0633) (0.0450)
Observations 18182 18182 18182 12097 12193 20229
R2 0.330 0.332 0.406 0.443 0.441 0.321
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.124 0.225 0.258 0.257 0.123
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domestic Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign Country FE Yes
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Table 4.9: Transmission channel - consolidated supervision
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes the observation of 2107 unique banks located in 31 countries from
CESEE region over the 1999-2010 period.
All columns include the quadruple interactions between foreign-ownership dummy, the parent bank
lagged change in the stock of NPLs, the dummy variable for high (low) NPL ratio of the parent and
the dummy variable capturing parent’s country Basel Committee membership. Additional double in-
teractions are included between foreign ownership dummy and lagged parent bank NPL ratio and total
capital ratio.
Columns 2-5 include lagged bank controls. Columns 4 and 5 include additionally lagged total capital
ratio of the subsidiary. Columns 3 and 5 include foreign country macro controls.
Table 4.1 gives detailed variable description. All columns include bank and domestic country-year fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered at domestic country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆NPL stock
Foreign × ∆NPL stockt-1PB× -0.366 -0.357 -0.436 -0.491 -0.359
low NPLRt-1
PB × Basel=0 (0.439) (0.554) (0.557) (0.873) (0.850)
Foreign × ∆NPL stockt-1PB × 0.376 0.359 0.428 0.230 0.209
low NPLRt-1
PB × Basel=1 (0.245) (0.226) (0.281) (0.201) (0.231)
Foreign × ∆NPL stockt-1PB × 0.0929 0.162 0.304 0.378 0.501
high NPLRt-1
PB × Basel=0 (0.299) (0.294) (0.261) (0.255) (0.339)
Foreign × ∆NPL stockt-1PB × 0.858*** 0.904*** 0.823** 0.609** 0.633***
high NPLRt-1
PB × Basel=1 (0.281) (0.274) (0.302) (0.235) (0.218)
Foreign × NPLRt-1PB 0.0811** 0.0887*** 0.0797*** 0.0642* 0.0752**
(0.0298) (0.0263) (0.0243) (0.0332) (0.0335)
Foreign × TCRt-1PB -0.0396** -0.0518*** -0.0509*** -0.0479*** -0.0468**
(0.0162) (0.0129) (0.0109) (0.0165) (0.0169)
NPLt-1 -0.115*** -0.120*** -0.0939*** -0.0948*** -0.0937***
(0.0210) (0.0210) (0.00959) (0.00618) (0.00676)
ROAAt-1 -0.0690*** -0.0710*** -0.105*** -0.101***
(0.0154) (0.0145) (0.0309) (0.0301)
∆T.assetst-1 0.0944 0.0187 0.430 0.521*
(0.0735) (0.114) (0.303) (0.305)
∆Depositst-1 -0.130*** -0.0533 -0.310 -0.363*
(0.0267) (0.0545) (0.224) (0.204)
TCRt-1 -0.00165 -0.000254
(0.00656) (0.00698)
Foreign × InflationF 1.867 3.088
(2.380) (3.762)
Foreign × ∆GDPF -0.0974 -0.514
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Transmission channel - consolidated supervision (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆NPL stock
(2.253) (1.674)
Foreign × ∆InvestmentF 0.100 0.253
(0.482) (0.555)
Observations 3641 2901 1429 982 933
R-squared 0.340 0.383 0.463 0.573 0.575
Adjusted R-squared 0.050 0.057 0.156 0.292 0.286
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.10: Knowledge transfer
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes the observation of 2107 unique banks located in 31 countries from
CESEE region over the 1999-2010 period.
All columns include the three interactions between foreign-ownership dummy and the parent bank
lagged change in the stock of NPLs, NPL ratio and total capital ratio. Additional triple interaction
between foreign dummy, change in parent bank lagged change in the stock of NPLs and the logarithm of
weighted distance between parent’s and subsidiary’s countries biggest cities (data from CEPII, weighted
by population). Columns 2-5 include lagged bank controls. Columns 4 and 5 include additionally lagged
total capital ratio. Columns 3 and 5 include foreign country macro controls. Table 4.1 gives detailed
variable description. All columns include bank and domestic country-year fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at domestic country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ NPL stock
Foreign×∆NPL stockt-1PB 1.175 1.434** 1.328** 1.282*** 1.312***
-0.741 -0.641 -0.544 -0.45 -0.423
Foreign×∆NPL stockt-1PB×Log Distance -0.101 -0.139 -0.137 -0.144* -0.147*
-0.115 -0.106 -0.097 -0.081 -0.0809
Foreign×NPLRt-1PB 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.0983*** 0.0771*** 0.0869***
-0.0313 -0.0254 -0.0244 -0.0261 -0.0274
Foreign×Total Capital Ratiot-1PB -0.0439** -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.0479** -0.051***
-0.0205 -0.0146 -0.0118 -0.018 -0.0166
NPLRt-1 -0.115*** -0.121*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.094***
-0.0211 -0.021 -0.00934 -0.00691 -0.00686
ROAAt-1 -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.107*** -0.103***
-0.0161 -0.0146 -0.0294 -0.0297
∆T.assetst-1 0.0693 0.0169 0.467 0.524*
-0.0766 -0.108 -0.299 -0.304
∆Depositst-1 -0.121*** -0.0536 -0.334 -0.370*





Foreign× ∆GDPF -0.834 -0.559
-2.017 -1.731
Foreign× ∆InvestmentF -0.0959 -0.0452
-0.528 -0.585
Observations 3606 2869 1427 961 931
R-squared 0.338 0.381 0.461 0.576 0.573
Adjusted R-squared 0.047 0.054 0.154 0.296 0.286
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domestic country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.11: Placebo test - random assignment of parent countries
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes 5102 unique banks located in 111 countries over the 1995-2013
period. Foreign-owned banks are randomly assigned their parents’ domiciles, keeping the frequency
of home-host country pairs in the dataset unchanged. Column 1 corresponds to Table 4.7 (Column
1); and Column 2 corresponds to Table 4.8 (Column 1) with the random parent country assignment.
Both columns include the interactions between foreign-ownership dummy and policy dummy, Table 4.1
gives detailed variable description. Both columns include bank and domestic country-year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at domestic country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2)
∆NPL stock ∆NPL stock
[0.5em] Foreign × AMC onlyRF -0.0197 Foreign × -0.0146
-0.0512 Tightening loan classificationRF -0.0495
Foreign × Public Bailout onlyRF -0.0148 Foreign × 0.0132
-0.0542 Tightening provision stringencyRF -0.0625
Foreign × AMC and Public BailoutRF -0.0262 Foreign × 0.00176
-0.0457 Macroprudential tighteningRF -0.0348
ROAAt-1 0.0266*** ROAAt-1 0.0246***
-0.00649 -0.00665
∆T.assetst-1 0.158*** ∆T.assetst-1 0.149***
-0.0533 -0.0545
∆Depositst-1 0.0551** ∆Depositst-1 0.0588**
-0.0274 -0.0275
Foreign × InflationF -0.0906 Foreign × InflationF -0.148
-0.35 -0.404
Foreign × ∆GDPF -1.335* Foreign × ∆GDPF -1.418*
-0.724 -0.766
Foreign × ∆InvestmentF 0.223 Foreign × ∆InvestmentF 0.237
-0.188 -0.209
Foreign 0.149*** Foreign 0.150***
-0.0509 -0.0477
Observations 18426 Observations 18124
R-squared 0.329 R-squared 0.331
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 Adjusted R-squared 0.126
Bank FE Yes Bank FE Yes
Domestic Country-Year FE Yes Domestic Country-Year FE Yes
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Table 4.12: Placebo test - timing of policies moved arbitrarily 2 years earlier
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes 5102 unique banks located in 111 countries over the 1995-2013
period. All columns include the interactions between foreign-ownership dummy and policy dummy, equal
to one when the policy was in place in the parent’s jurisdiction at time t+2. Columns 1-5 include lagged
bank controls. Columns 1-4 include foreign country macro controls. Table 4.1 gives detailed variable
description. All columns include bank and domestic country-year fixed effects. Column 2 includes also
foreign country fixed effect in place of foreign ownership dummy. Standard errors clustered at domestic
country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ NPL stock
Foreignt+2 ×AMCFt+2 0.0522 0.0593 0.0656 0.00952 0.0165 0.0128
(0.0438) (0.0508) (0.0411) (0.0489) (0.0481) (0.0359)
Foreignt+2 ×Public BailoutFt+2 -0.0134 -0.0188 0.00967 0.0184 0.0141 0.0518
(0.0444) (0.0423) (0.0397) (0.0649) (0.0645) (0.0435)
ROAAt-1 0.0198** 0.0209*** -0.0190** -0.0383*** -0.0375***
(0.00799) (0.00785) (0.00754) (0.0135) (0.0132)
∆ Assetst-1 0.127** 0.117* 0.0350 0.199** 0.207**
(0.0619) (0.0625) (0.0498) (0.0877) (0.0871)
∆ Depositst-1 0.0351 0.0416 -0.00544 -0.136* -0.130*
(0.0398) (0.0414) (0.0350) (0.0721) (0.0704)
NPLRt-1 -0.0595*** -0.0655*** -0.0652***
(0.00453) (0.00540) (0.00531)
Total Capital Ratiot-1 0.000347 0.000525
(0.00178) (0.00175)
Foreign ×InflationF 0.212 0.0642 0.123 0.110
(0.341) (0.375) (0.367) (1.058)
Foreign ×∆GDPF -1.511* -1.530* -1.856** -1.501**
(0.846) (0.881) (0.767) (0.753)
Foreign ×∆InvestmentF 0.118 0.136 0.0563 0.192
(0.188) (0.190) (0.158) (0.167)
Foreign 0.114* 0.108* 0.0991 0.0988 0.0881
(0.0580) (0.0552) (0.0748) (0.0687) (0.0534)
Observations 12949 12949 12949 8559 8682 14545
R2 0.366 0.369 0.439 0.481 0.480 0.356
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.141 0.242 0.281 0.282 0.142
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domestic Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign Country FE Yes
150
Tables and Figures
Table 4.13: Placebo test - non-financial sector bailout
The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of total non-performing loans in time t divided
by total non-performing loans at time t− 1, winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile. The observation unit
is at bank-year level. Sample includes 5102 unique banks located in 111 countries over the 1995-2013
period. All columns include the interactions between foreign-ownership dummy and policy dummy,
equal to one when the public bailout of non-financial sector was introduced by the governemnt in the
parent’s jurisdiction between t − 3 and t − 1. Columns 1-5 include lagged bank controls. Columns 1-4
include foreign country macro controls.
Table 4.1 gives detailed variable description. All columns include bank and domestic country-year
fixed effects. Column 2 includes also foreign country fixed effect in place of foreign ownership dummy.
Standard errors clustered at domestic country level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆NPL stock
Foreign × Placebo BailoutF 0.0181 0.0105 0.00241 -0.0253 -0.0182
(0.0350) (0.0364) (0.0355) (0.0442) (0.0431)
ROAAt-1 0.0262*** 0.0266*** -0.0118* -0.0288** -0.0286**
(0.00676) (0.00661) (0.00630) (0.0114) (0.0114)
∆T.assetst-1 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.0365 0.0770 0.0791
(0.0537) (0.0534) (0.0457) (0.0771) (0.0762)
∆Depositst-1 0.0611** 0.0590** 0.0273 -0.00598 -0.00741
(0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0249) (0.0614) (0.0614)




Foreign × InflationF 0.190 0.0840 0.169 0.807
(0.359) (0.361) (0.455) (1.280)
Foreign × ∆GDPF -1.030 -1.199 -1.587** -0.536
(0.774) (0.780) (0.737) (0.656)
Foreign × ∆InvestmentF 0.152 0.175 0.133 0.212
(0.235) (0.222) (0.189) (0.228)
Foreign 0.0811 0.0695 0.107 0.123
(0.0502) (0.0490) (0.0711) (0.0747)
Observations 17655 17655 17655 11816 11856
R2 0.329 0.330 0.404 0.442 0.442
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.124 0.224 0.256 0.256
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domestic Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





5.1. Conclusion and policy implications
This thesis addresses two major financial frictions that were exposed by the global fi-
nancial crisis and subsequent Eurozone debt crisis, namely the sovereign-bank nexus and
the prevalence of non-performing loans.
Chapter 2 explores the relationship between banks’ decisions to hold sovereign bonds
and the institutional characteristics of the home country. It finds that the quality of
political and economic institution, the monetary policy framework, the ownership struc-
ture of the banking sector, the regulatory and supervisory environment all play a role
in bank’s choice of sovereign bondholdings. Furthermore, this portfolio choice has an
impact on the bank lending behaviour, as banks with large exposure to sovereign risk
tend to contract credit supply more during recessions thus increasing the amplitude of
the business cycle. The strength of supervisory framework, however, can partially off-
set this effect. Thus the institutional characteristics play a role by both preventing the
formation of sovereign-bank nexus and by limiting the potential cost of financial crisis.
In the aftermath of the banking crises or business cycle downturn, banks often expe-
rienced large increases in the non-performing exposures on their balance sheet, caused
by economic decline. Chapter 3 presents the stylised facts about instances of high non-
performing loans and the government policies used to address them. It finds that govern-
ments can mitigate high NPLs by the introduction of an asset management company and
that such policy can be further assisted by the bailouts of particularly affected banks.
The combination of AMCs and bailouts is found to be the most effective way to reduce
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NPLs quickly, in the home jurisdiction, and as a result is associated with extra economic
growth in excess of 1.5 percentage points annually over several years. However, the effec-
tiveness of government policies to address the NPL crisis may be affected by the bank’s
initial exposure to sovereign risk and the fiscal space.
Finally, chapter 4 takes a closer look at the issue of NPLs and exploits more gran-
ular data to estimate the cross-border effects of the policies used to deal with NPL
problems. It finds that changes in the non-performing loans of a parent bank affect
the exposure to toxic assets of their foreign subsidiary, to the magnitude of approxi-
mately 60%. The existence of a link between parent and subsidiary banks as well as the
complexity of global banking network imply that NPL targeting policies can have cross-
border consequences for credit risk. We show evidence, exploring an arguably exogenous
identification strategy, that in particular the use of asset management companies can
have positive international spillover effects on reduction of non-performing loan stock.
This transmission can be partially attributed to the workings of internal capital markets,
consolidated supervision and knowledge transfers.
The empirical findings reported in this thesis have important implications for the
design of optimal government policies. Firstly, this thesis highlights the importance of
a strong and transparent institutional environment. Countries with independent central
banks, strong supervisors and regulators are naturally more insulated from distorting
banks’ incentives to hold sovereign bonds. Strong supervision, regulation and counter-
cyclical macroprudential policies can also encourage timely recognition and provisioning
of the non-performing loans. The importance of those factors has been highlighted in
numerous previous studies29, yet has not been systematically explored in the context of
banks’ sovereign bond exposure to my knowledge.
Despite the prevalence of large non-performing loans across the globe and through
29See for example Olson (1996); La Porta et al. (1997, 1999); Hall and Jones (1999) or Beck et al.
(2006) for the discussion of institutional characteristics in the context of economic growth, development
or access to finance.
154
Conclusion and policy implications
the time dimension; financial literature remains largely scarce on the topic. Chapter 3 is
the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to investigate the anatomy of a typical high
NPL episode and to assess the effectiveness of various policies designed to address the
problem of NPLs. A particularly important lesson is that a successful resolution may be
particularly challenging when the malaise is of a more chronic rather than acute nature,
as the most recent instances suggest. Despite its data limitations, this work can provide
a starting point for policy makers that are interested in addressing the issue of bad
debt overhang. Further research in the topic of asset management companies would be
particularly interesting in order to evaluate the importance of institutional set up of the
AMC, ownership structure, or the pricing of the NPLs. Our research also sheds light on
the political economy aspect of the non-performing loans that has not been investigated
previously. Given that the benefits of NPL reductions are often spread out across longer
time horizons, myopic politicians may be reluctant to take actions, that are potentially
costly in terms of fiscal outlays, promptly due to the short election cycle. Our results
should also provide a warning as some policies can backfire, if the government relies on
the domestic banks for the financing of the NPL package.
The final policy lesson comes from the existence of cross-border NPL spillovers. Given
the level of interconnectedness of large banking groups and their implications for financial
stability, keeping non-performing loans in check has positive consequences not only for
the countries where the banks are operating but also for the countries that are hosts to
foreign subsidiaries. Naturally, this implication works both ways, should a major global
banking player allow its banking system to accumulate large stock of toxic assets, the
cost can be expected to be exported partially abroad. From this perspective, the inter-
national coordination of banking regulation plays an even greater role than previously
reported, as it can act both as a lightening rod and a hand brake to the international
spread of credit risk. This insight, has a particularly important implications for Europe,
which has been particularly plagued in the recent years by the issue of bad loans in
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the periphery and simultaneously has significant cross-border bank links. This paper
provides empirical support to the idea of introducing a pan-European AMC, that could
be financed jointly by European countries and would help ailing banks to offload their
non-performing exposures.
Despite the positive implications for the European policy on the NPL policy coor-
dination, a word of caution is necessary. The design of such an AMC is likely to have
important implications for its success and remains an important research question. More
generally, this research focuses on a relatively short horizon and does not take into ac-
count potential costs of such policy in terms of moral hazard (distorting bank’s incentive
to screen and monitor loans).
Finally, one must also consider the consumer protection side of the argument. The
establishment of an active secondary market for non-performing loans may help to relieve
an ailing banking system and share the risk with investors that are more risk-tolerant
and not subject to strict banking regulation. However, such sales of the non-performing
loans can potentially increase the burden of the exposure for the debtors, by decreasing
the opportunities to default and exacerbating her subsequent access to credit markets.
Those social welfare implications remain an important topic outside of the scope of this
thesis for further investigation.
5.2. Limitations and avenues for further research
This thesis presents a number of novel results in the literature on the banks’ exposures
to sovereign bondholdings and non-performing loans. However, no research is without
its limitations. This subsection summarises the biggest challenges and lists potential
solutions that were beyond the scope of this work.
Endogeneity poses the single biggest research challenge for this thesis. In Chapters 2
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and 3, I attempt to address this concern by using lagged dependent variables and changes
of the independent variables. It is however, worth pointing out that this approach only
reduces the endogeneity and is not able to fully ensure unbiasedness or consistency of
the results. For this reason, the results from those two chapters should be taken with a
grain of salt and shall not be interpreted as causal. Despite this obvious limitation, the
results remain an extension of the related literature and provide new stylised evidence
of the cases of high exposures to sovereign debt and non-performing loans on the bank’s
balance sheet.
The potential endogeneity in Chapter 3 has prompted me to explore more exogenous
sources of NPL policy adoption. This process, led me to the idea of using a more granular
data to exploit the bank-level heterogeneity in an international setting. Despite the
adoption of multiple techniques to address the endogeneity problem, this remains a single
most challenging aspect of almost all social science research. It would be interesting,
for example, to investigate individual episodes of policy interventions that satisfy the
exogeneity condition. Such approach should allow to estimate the causal impact of
the policy on non-performing loans at the cost of external validity. Such individual
case studies are beyond the scope of this research, cannot give insight into more detail
institutional background of the policy package and do not allow for global comparisons.
Secondly, this thesis relies to a large extend on the Bankscope dataset. Bankscope
provides a data on large fraction of financial institutions across the globe, however, it does
not cover the full population of banks. In particular, the coverage of banks located in
less developed countries with poorer disclosure requirements or simply smaller (regional)
banks may exhibit selection bias. In terms of the time dimension, the reliability of data
reporting may be heterogeneous. For this reason, I made decision to use data from 1990,
to limit this concern.
The findings reported in this thesis lead to a number of promising research questions
for the future. One such direction is investigation of the institutional details of Asset
157
Chapter 5: Conclusion
Management Companies and their effects on the work-out of the non-performing assets.
For example, it would be interesting to evaluate if the size of the government financial
contribution plays a significant role in the probability of future repayments on the loan-
level.
Similarly one may ask, if sales of non-performing assets, that remain a burden to
banks across Europe, to outside investors could provide a relief for the banking system.
In particular, it would be interesting to investigate how the market reacts to a NPL sales
to AMCs vis-á-vis sales to other banks or vulture funds or if securitisations (or packages
of standardised collateralised assets) could help to reduce the adverse selection in the
market of such legacy assets.
The topic of non-performing loans has gained more attention following the European
debt crisis, however, remains still a largely unexplored topic in both theoretical and
empirical research. There remain a number of literature gaps that provide an exciting
direction for future work.
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